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INTRODUCTION 
Sixty years ago, the Supreme Court decided United States v. 
Reynolds.1 That decision attracted very little public attention at the 
time,2 remains largely unexamined today,3 and is critically important in 
understanding the scope of the contemporary state secrets privilege.4 
 
 1 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
 2 The Supreme Court’s 1953 decision in Reynolds attracted very little press attention when 
it was announced. See LOUIS FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY: UNCHECKED 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE REYNOLDS CASE 120 (2006). As one prominent student of the 
lawsuit has noted, the ruling “caused barely a ripple in the press.” Id. The New York Times 
endorsed the outcome in four “short” paragraphs, commenting that “judges were no more 
entitled to learn real military secrets than any other parties to a lawsuit,” even though the Times 
and the judges did not know whether the disputed documents in fact contained any military 
secrets. Id. The Washington Post summarized the outcome of the case in a news report that 
reviewed twelve other decisions and placed the description of the Reynolds case second to last. 
Id. The Philadelphia Inquirer followed suit, even though the case originated in Philadelphia. Id. 
 Many reasons combined to distract press attention at the time from the Supreme Court’s 
decision, even though the decision announced a startling new state secrets privilege of 
potentially enormous importance and controversy. First, the actual issue in the case was a 
rather dry rule of evidence as opposed to a seminal, easily digestible, public policy question 
such as the scope of protected speech as decided in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), 
the limits on presidential power as defined in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579 (1952), or the constitutionality of mandatory race segregation in the public schools as 
announced in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), which was pending before the 
Court in the spring of 1953. The state secrets doctrine had rarely been the subject of judicial 
disputation—including by the Supreme Court—had attracted minimal scholarly interest, and 
had never cut a public profile attracting the attention of the press or the public. Furthermore, 
the Supreme Court opinion itself gave the appearance—as misleading as it was—of not 
disturbing settled law, and that was true even though the Court knew when it announced the 
new state secrets privilege rules that it did so against a slate left almost unmarked by American 
judicial opinions. The disagreement among the justices over the resolution of the state secrets 
privilege in Reynolds was also muffled by the fact that the three dissenting justices—Black, 
Frankfurter, and Jackson—did not write an opinion. And as final as the new rules for the state 
secrets privilege were, the Supreme Court’s decision left unresolved the human interest side of 
the litigation: the claim by the three widows against the government. Lastly, the potential 
importance of the Reynolds case was overwhelmed by the case involving “convicted atomic 
spies Julius and Ethel Rosenberg.” Brad Snyder, Taking Great Cases: Lessons from the Rosenberg 
Case, 63 VAND. L. REV. 885, 886 (2010). Snyder concludes that the Rosenberg’s conviction and 
death sentence imposed upon the Rosenbergs “dominated the news and divided the country,” 
id. at 886, and was at the time “considered a Bush v. Gore moment, a rush to judgment that 
alienated people who held the Court in high institutional regard,” id. at 891. 
 3 I draw a distinction between a reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s 1953 decision in 
Reynolds and the contemporary state secrets privilege. The contemporary privilege has received 
close scrutiny by scholars and commentators; the original 1953 decision in Reynolds that 
announced the framework for the contemporary privilege has not. For two recent and very 
useful books on the Reynolds case, see FISHER, supra note 2; and BARRY SIEGEL, CLAIM OF 
PRIVILEGE: A MYSTERIOUS PLANE CRASH, A LANDMARK SUPREME COURT CASE, AND THE RISE 
OF STATE SECRETS (2008). Each book provides useful background information and thoughtful 
analysis of the Reynolds case. 
 4 The Reynolds decision announced the rules for the contemporary state secrets privilege 
that federal courts uphold in appropriate cases. During the last thirty-five years, that privilege 
has gone from a rarely invoked privilege to a frequently invoked, highly controversial, and 
enormously important one. See, e.g., DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY 
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The Reynolds decision announced new guidelines that courts to 
this day5 must follow when they decide whether to sustain an executive6 
branch claim that certain information is confidential because it is 
protected by the state secrets privilege.7 That privilege, which has been 
vastly expanded in recent decades and has a determinative impact on a 
large number of cases,8 is highly controversial and has been the subject 
of substantial analysis by judges,9 news commentators10 and legal 
 
AMERICA IS LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR 42 (2007) (“Perhaps the most troubling invocation of 
secrecy has been the administration’s invocation of the state secrets privilege to block judicial 
oversight of some of its most dubious practices.”); SUSAN N. HERMAN, TAKING LIBERTIES: THE 
WAR ON TERROR AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 198 (2011) (“Take the state 
secrets privilege. The Bush and then Obama lawyers have invoked this privilege . . . to keep 
cases out of court altogether, sometimes without even allowing the court to review whether an 
asserted national security concern is credible.”); ROBERT M. PALLITO & WILLIAM G. WEAVER, 
PRESIDENTIAL SECRECY AND THE LAW 86 (2007) (“The state secrets privilege is the most 
powerful weapon in the presidential arsenal of secrecy . . . .”); CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: 
THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
169–70 (2008) (“[U]se of the State Secrets Privilege essentially established the president and his 
department heads as the sole arbiters of which matters could receive judicial review.”). 
 5 See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010); El-Masri v. 
United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007); Black v. United States, 62 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir. 1995); 
Bareford v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1992); Zuckerbraun v. Gen. 
Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1991); Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 6 In this Article I have generally tried to use the word “executive” or the term “executive 
branch” as opposed to using the word “government” in referring to the executive branch. I do 
so because the president and the executive branch as a whole are not the “government.” Of 
course, it is true that the press and public frequently use the words “government,” “presidency,” 
and “executive branch” interchangeably. But such usage may result in confusion and 
uncertainty in considering the responsibilities and duties of the three co-equal branches with 
regard to such matters as maintaining a system of checks and balances and upholding the rule 
of law. 
 7 For a summary of the controlling rules set forth in Reynolds, see infra Part V.C.2. 
 8 The expansion of the state secrets privilege over the last three and a half decades has been 
so sweeping and intricate that a thorough description and analysis would require a separate 
Article. The best that can be done in footnotes is to point to mountain peaks. Thus, the so-
called “Mosaic theory,” which emphasizes that trivial information that may seem to be of no 
particular national security significance may in fact be significant when assessment, in the 
context of other information by an informed person, prompts the protection of seemingly 
harmless information. See, e.g., United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972). The 
“unacceptable risk” doctrine holds that a complaint will be dismissed before a responsive 
pleading is filed because of a state secrets privilege when a judge decides that litigation of the 
claim will present a “risk” that a state secret may be accidently and unintentionally disclosed 
and that a judge decides that the “risk” is “unacceptable.” See, e.g., Jeppesen Dataplan, 614 F.3d 
at 1079, 1083; El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 305–06. The state secrets privilege now applies when a party 
merely seeks from the executive a statement that information already in the public domain is 
true. A court may sustain the executive’s objection that acknowledging, confirming, or denying, 
the validity of such information constitutes a state secret. See, e.g., Bareford, 973 F.2d 1138; 
Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The privilege may result in the dismissal of an 
action if the unavailability of the evidence due to the privilege hampers a defendant in 
establishing a valid defense. Zuckerbraun, 935 F.2d 544. See generally infra Part VI.D. Perhaps 
in recognition of the expansion and potential abuse of the state secrets privilege, the Obama 
administration has adopted a policy which grants authority to the Department of Justice to 
review all claims of executive privilege. See infra note 409. 
 9 See, e.g., Jeppesen Dataplan, 614 F.3d at 1093 (Hawkins, J., dissenting); Ellsberg, 709 F.2d 
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scholars.11 Nonetheless, with few exceptions,12 scholars and 
commentators have not returned to re-examine the Reynolds decision, 
the basis of the modern privilege. 
The Reynolds decision also helped usher in what I term the Age of 
Deference, a seventy-year period that commenced with the ending of 
World War II and continues through today, in which courts exhibit the 
“utmost deference”13 towards the executive in national security cases.14 
 
at 60 (Edwards, J.); Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Bazelon, J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 10 See, e.g., Holly Wells, Note, The State Secrets Privilege: Overuse Causing Unintended 
Consequences, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 967 (2008); Adam Liptak, Obama Administration Weighs in on 
State Secrets, Raising Concern on the Left, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/08/04/us/politics/04bar.html?ref=states; Charlie Savage, Justice Dept. to Limit Use of State 
Secrets Privilege, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/23/us/politics/
23secrets.html?_r=1&. 
 11 The scholarly literature on the privilege is voluminous. See, e.g., Frank Askin, Secret 
Justice and the Adversary System, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 745 (1991); Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., 
The Executive’s Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Constitutional Question, 66 YALE L.J. 477 
(1957); Carrie Newton Lyons, The State Secrets Privilege: Expanding Its Scope Through 
Government Issue, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99 (2007); James Zagel, The State Secrets Privilege, 
50 MINN. L. REV. 875 (1966). 
 12 For two notable exceptions, see FISHER, supra note 3; SIEGEL, supra note 3. 
 13 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974). For two cases decided before Reynolds 
that provided doctrinal support for the Age of Deference, see Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. 
Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp. 299 U.S. 
304 (1936). 
 14 A thorough analysis of the Age of Deference is beyond the scope of this Article. But some 
comments are in order so that the term I use—Age of Deference—is understood. The Age of 
Deference, in which courts show the utmost respect for executive authority in national security 
matters, is a direct outgrowth of the establishment and development of the contemporary 
national security state that emerged after World War II. 
In 1947, the United States established what one authority, George C. Herring, termed “the 
Magna Charta of the national security state.” GEORGE C. HERRING, FROM COLONY TO 
SUPERPOWER: U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS SINCE 1776, at 614 (2008) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). This “Magna Charta” consisted of the National Security Act of July 1947 which 
created an independent Central Intelligence Agency; a National Security Council in the White 
House to coordinate policy-making; a cabinet-level, civilian secretary of defense responsible for 
the previously separate army, navy, and air force departments; and institutionalized the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. Added to these 1947 initiatives must be a seven-page presidential memorandum 
signed by President Harry S. Truman on October 24, 1952. This memorandum, which was 
classified top secret and stamped with a code word that was itself classified, JAMES BAMFORD, 
THE PUZZLE PALACE: INSIDE THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, AMERICA’S MOST SECRET 
INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION 15 (1983), established the National Security Agency (NSA, or, as 
referred to by some, “No Such Agency”). HERRING, supra, at 647. The initial purpose of the 
NSA was to “listen in on enemy communications and crack codes.” Id. 
Together these developments put in place a set of national security agencies that form the 
foundation of the U.S. national security structure. See FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ, JR. & AZIZ Z. 
HUQ, UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR 4–5 (2007) 
(“The cold war and the 1947 National Security Act brought a new institutionalization of 
intelligence powers. Until the 1940s, the United States, unlike the former Soviet Union and 
Great Britain, had no permanent secret intelligence services. What previously was ad hoc and 
informal became bureaucratic, regularized, and effective—a powerful tool concentrated almost 
exclusively in presidents’ hands. The FBI’s domestic security activities burgeoned. The CIA and 
the [NSA] were born and rapidly expanded to enormous proportions.”). 
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The result of the Age of Deference has been the insulation of the 
executive from meaningful judicial accountability and review, a 
distortion in the checks and balances governmental scheme, the denial 
of a judicial remedy to those allegedly harmed by executive branch 
conduct, and the undermining of the rule of law.15 Although many legal 
scholars and political scientists have evaluated the various legal 
doctrines that comprise the Age of Deference and protect the executive 
from judicial accountability,16 very few have re-examined the Reynolds 
case,17 which is one of the early major pillars of the entire epoch.18 
This Article’s reconsideration of Reynolds has led to many 
completely unexpected and surprising conclusions. Although Reynolds 
is a leading case calling for judicial deference to the executive in cases 
arguably implicating national security, it turns out that the initial 
impetus behind the executive branch’s effort that resulted in the modern 
state secrets doctrine had little to nothing to do with national security.19 
Rather, the executive branch’s litigation strategy that resulted in the 
Reynolds decision had its origins in its efforts during the 1940s to limit 
the reach of pre-trial discovery procedures authorized by the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. In its most ambitious expression, that 
complex effort sought an extremely broad and essentially absolute 
 
The growth and expansion of the agencies and personnel that constitute the national 
security structure has been enormous. Sixty years after the foundations of the national security 
state were established, the Washington Post published a lengthy three part series entitled Top 
Secret America: A Washington Post Investigation, which provides a contemporary snapshot of 
the growth of the national security state. The report concluded that about “1,271 government 
organizations and 1,931 private companies work on programs related to counterterrorism, 
homeland security and intelligence in about 10,000 locations across the United States”; 
approximately 854,000 individuals “hold top-secret security clearances”; since 9/11, thirty-three 
building complexes for “top-secret intelligence” work have been built or are being built and 
together they are, in size, the equivalent of “almost three Pentagons or 22 U.S. Capitol 
buildings.” Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, A Hidden World, Growing Beyond Control, WASH. 
POST, July 19, 2010, at A1. Moreover, “[t]he U.S. intelligence budget is vast, publicly announced 
last year [2009] as $75 billion, 2½ times the size it was on Sept. 10, 2001.” Id. These reports are 
now in book form. See DANA PRIEST & WILLIAM M. ARKIN, TOP SECRET AMERICA: THE RISE OF 
THE NEW AMERICAN SECURITY STATE (2011). 
 15 See infra Part VI.D. 
 16 See, e.g., MATTHEW CRENSON & BENJAMIN GINSBERG, PRESIDENTIAL POWER UNCHECKED 
AND UNBALANCED (2007); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: 
SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990); SAVAGE, supra note 4; ARTHUR M. 
SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973); SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 14; David 
Rudenstine, Breaking the Tradition: The Case for the 640 Detainees in Guantanamo, in 
GUANTANAMO BAY AND THE JUDICIAL-MORAL TREATMENT OF THE OTHER 15 (Clark Butler 
ed., 2007). 
 17 See supra note 3. 
 18 As is acknowledged and accepted, Congress has also improperly deferred to the executive 
branch in matters pertaining to national security. See generally, CRENSON & GINSBERG, supra 
note 16; SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 14; STEPHEN R. WEISMAN, A CULTURE OF DEFERENCE: 
CONGRESS’S FAILURE OF LEADERSHIP IN FOREIGN POLICY (1995). But see JAMES M. LINDSAY, 
CONGRESS AND THE POLITICS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1994). 
 19 See infra Part III.A–B. 
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privilege that would have provided the executive branch with a 
breathtakingly broad shield against discovery efforts to secure 
information from the government.20 Although the executive’s sweeping 
claim for a privilege was not initially termed “executive privilege,” that 
was the term the executive eventually used in its legal briefs filed with 
the Supreme Court by 1950.21 Thus, although Reynolds announced 
significant rules guiding courts in cases that, the executive claimed, 
implicated national security, the initial impetus for the executive’s 
strategy in that case had no connection to the nation’s security. 
Moreover, the fact that the executive branch ended up using the 
Reynolds case—a case that arose out of a 1948 crash of a B-29 plane that 
killed four civilian engineers in addition to five servicemen and that had 
little to nothing to do with national security—as a vehicle for pressing its 
request for a sweeping executive privilege turned out to be a complete 
happenstance. For its part, the Air Force needed to keep certain highly 
embarrassing documents confidential that were in dispute in the 
Reynolds case,22 and as for the Department of Justice it was urgently in 
need of a case to use to press its executive privilege claim, a claim it had 
previously unsuccessfully pressed in the courts.23 As a result, the 
interests of the Air Force and the Department of Justice unexpectedly 
came together in the Reynolds case, and the accidental nature of this 
intersection goes a long way towards explaining the mysteries 
surrounding Reynolds, such as why a routine tort case became a seminal 
national security declaration; why the executive branch delayed so long 
before asserting the executive privilege in the Reynolds litigation, and 
then engaged in the manipulation and misrepresentation of the 
evidence once it did assert the privilege; why, as is now known, there 
was in fact no information in the disputed documents that were at the 
heart of the Reynolds litigation that would injure national security if 
disclosed; and why the Supreme Court’s opinion in Reynolds was 
riddled with deceit and pretense. 
It also turns out that a reconsideration of the Reynolds case is a 
history of a complicated and entangled set of events involving the Air 
 
 20 See Brief for the Petitioner, United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Comm., 339 U.S. 
972 (1950) (No. 490), 1950 WL 78566 [hereinafter Cotton Valley Brief]. Harvard Law Professor 
Paul A. Freund wrote the foreword for the Harvard Law Review’s review of the 1973 Supreme 
Court term, in which he stated that the earliest usage of the phrase “executive privilege” that he 
could discover was in the executive’s brief in the Reynolds case. Paul A. Freund, Forward: On 
Presidential Privilege, 88 HARV. L. REV. 13, 18 n.29 (1973). The executive’s brief in Cotton 
Valley, however, makes use of the phrase three years earlier. Cotton Valley Brief, supra, at 19–
20, 1950 WL 78566, at *19–20; see also infra notes 306–317. And, as will be discussed in this 
Article, the executive’s brief in Reynolds, including the use of the term “executive privilege,” 
drew extensively from the executive’s brief in Cotton Valley. 
 21 See Cotton Valley Brief, supra note 20, at 18–19. 
 22 See infra Part I.E. 
 23 See infra Part III.C. 
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Force, Department of Justice lawyers, and the Supreme Court, aimed at, 
among other things, shielding the Air Force from substantial public 
embarrassment.24 The Air Force’s effort to protect itself began 
immediately after the plane crash that gave rise to the Reynolds case, 
when the Air Force conducted a limited investigation into the causes of 
the crash.25 The Air Force effort to protect itself from public humiliation 
and criticism continued when the Air Force kept confidential a second 
report reviewing the causes of the crash, submitted false responses to a 
routine set of interrogatories submitted to the Air Force by the 
plaintiffs’ lawyer, and deceived a senior Radio Corporation of America 
(RCA) executive about the causes of the plane crash.26 Thereafter in the 
litigation, senior Air Force officials submitted two affidavits to the 
federal court that contained misleading and deceptive statements27 in 
the hope of securing a ruling that protected the confidentiality of the 
investigation-related documents. 
The Air Force’s effort to protect itself from public embarrassment 
soon swept within its orbit Department of Justice lawyers. From the 
available evidence, it seems that the Department of Justice lawyers 
shielded themselves from discovering information that would have 
prevented them from asserting claims that the Air Force was 
determined to present to the courts in the hope of protecting its 
reputation and public standing. This complicity first occurred in the 
district court28 and then repeated itself throughout the appeal process.29 
But this effort to conceal the truth about the plane crash involved 
more than the executive branch. Eventually, the opinion in the Reynolds 
case, written by Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson, was yet one more major 
step taken to protect the Air Force from public criticism. Thus, although 
the Supreme Court in Reynolds set out rules that appear to constitute a 
blending of competing claims involving national security, individual 
justice, and the maintenance of a governmental system of checks and 
balances, the opinion invited executive branch caprice by granting the 
executive a de facto absolute right to control the disclosure of 
information. Moreover, the Justices on the Court who reversed the 
judgment of the lower courts in favor of the widows had reason to 
doubt, at the very time they decided the case, that the disputed Air Force 
documents contained any information harmful to the national 
security.30 Furthermore, although the opinion suggested that it would be 
possible for the widows to establish the cause of the crash without 
 
 24 See infra Parts III, V, VI. 
 25 See infra Part I.C–F. 
 26 See infra Part I.D–F. 
 27 See infra Part III.C. 
 28 See infra Part II.B.2. 
 29 See infra Part V.A.3. 
 30 See infra Part VI.A.2.a. 
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relying upon the evidence that the Air Force insisted should be 
privileged, there was no reasonable basis for such a representation.31 In 
the end, this Article maintains that although the outcome in Reynolds 
was probably in accord with Chief Justice Vinson’s willingness to 
curtail, if not eliminate, meaningful judicial review in cases implicating 
national security, it seems implausible that Vinson would have written 
the particular opinion he did in Reynolds unless he had received 
information about the case from President Harry Truman. 
But the reasons warranting the reconsideration of the Reynolds case 
are even more complex. During the last seventy years the Supreme 
Court has, in one case after another, crafted legal doctrines that insulate 
executive conduct from meaningful judicial review in cases in which the 
executive asserts that national security interests are implicated.32 The 
overall consequence of these doctrinal developments has been that the 
Court has too often failed to provide a judicial remedy to individuals 
arguably wronged by the government; to strengthen a system of checks 
and balances by holding the executive accountable for its actions, even 
though such judicial accountability deters executive abuse of power and 
contributes to making executive conduct transparent; and ultimately to 
uphold the rule of law. Because the Reynolds case is one of the bedrocks 
of the Age of Deference, reconsidering Reynolds may help foster a more 
complete, complex, and long-overdue rethinking of all the doctrines 
that compose this time period. 
The Supreme Court decision in Reynolds constituted a serious 
error. That decision provided a doctrinal basis for legal developments 
that have emboldened the executive at the expense of the courts and 
denied judicial remedies to individuals, thus undermining the rule of 
law. Yet the high court pretended in Reynolds that it was not making 
any of these problematic changes, which in turn only undermines the 
public trust in the Court which is the essence of its legitimacy. 
Summary 
To create a context so that the conduct of the Air Force in the 
Reynolds litigation can be understood, Part I of this Article, entitled 
“Not Safe for Flight,” sets forth the general design features and 
devastating problems that beset the B-29 bomber from its initial testing. 
It reviews the substandard condition of the crashed bomber, Bomber 
#866, that gave rise to the Reynolds case, outlines the initial Air Force 
investigation into the crash, and describes a letter written by a senior 
RCA Executive Vice President Frank M. Folsom, seeking more 
 
 31 See infra Part VI.A.3. 
 32 See infra Part VI.D. 
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information about the crash that killed RCA engineers. This Part also 
reviews the second Air Force investigation into the crash which 
concluded among other things that Bomber #866 was so impaired that it 
was not fit for flight, and concludes by summarizing the Air Force’s 
response to Folsom’s letter. 
Part II, entitled “A Lawsuit,” describes the initial developments in 
the Reynolds litigation,33 which were presided over by United States 
District Judge William H. Kirkpatrick of the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, and contributed to converting a routine tort action into a 
seminal national security case. This Part reviews the Air Force’s 
responses to the plaintiffs’ ordinary interrogatories, which contained 
two false statements, and discusses the Air Force’s refusal to disclose to 
the plaintiffs the Air Force’s investigative report into the plane crash and 
the statements of the three surviving servicemen. It was that refusal that 
ultimately culminated in the assertion by the Air Force that the 
documents were protected from disclosure because of executive 
privilege. 
Part III is entitled “Different Roads to a Showdown.” It reviews 
how the entirely different interests of the Air Force and Department of 
Justice unexpectedly intersected in the Reynolds case in late July and 
early August of 1950 and how that intersection led to the Supreme 
Court decision in Reynolds in 1953. Part III begins by canvassing the 
efforts by the Department of Justice during the 1940s to craft legal 
defenses to the discovery demands made on the government pursuant to 
the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It focuses on the Justice 
Department’s utilization of a British House of Lords decision,34 which 
granted the crown an absolute executive privilege, to support an 
argument for a comparable legal doctrine in the United States, and it 
examines a law review Article written by Herman Wolkinson,35 a Justice 
Department lawyer, which asserted that the Congress and the federal 
courts had consistently accepted that the executive had a 
constitutionally based executive privilege that was absolute. By 1950, the 
Justice Department had woven together the House of Lords decision 
and the Wolkinson Article into a legal position that advanced a 
sweeping claim for executive privilege, and then presented that claim to 
the Supreme Court, first in 1950 in United States v. Cotton Valley 
Operators Committee,36 and then again in 1953 in the Reynolds case. 
 
 33 Brauner v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468 (E.D. Pa. 1950), aff’d sub nom. Reynolds v. 
United States, 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1951), rev’d, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
 34 Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., [1942] A.C. 624 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 35 Herman Wolkinson, Demands of Congressional Committees for Executive Papers, 10 FED. 
B.J. 103 (1949). 
 36 See infra Part III.B. 
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Part IV, entitled “The Third Circuit,” summarizes that court’s 
opinion written by Judge Albert B. Maris in the Reynolds appeal that 
affirmed District Judge Kirkpatrick’s ruling requiring the Air Force to 
submit the disputed documents to the district judge for an ex parte, in 
camera inspection to determine if the documents satisfied the legal 
requirements of a privilege. The Third Circuit opinion takes on unusual 
importance in the reconsideration of Reynolds because the three 
dissenting Supreme Court Justices—Associate Justices Black, 
Frankfurter, and Jackson—stated that they dissented essentially for the 
reason set forth in Judge Maris’s opinion. 
Part V is entitled “The Supreme Court Proceedings.” This Part 
describes the brief submitted by the executive in its appeal to the 
Supreme Court in Reynolds, summarizes the discussion among the 
Justices at their weekly conference, and reviews Chief Justice Vinson’s 
majority opinion. 
Part VI is entitled “The Faustian Bargain.” Part VI argues that 
although the Supreme Court’s decision in Reynolds seems to blend a 
concern for national security with an effort to provide a remedy to three 
widows, to check potential abusive executive authority, and to uphold 
the rule of law, the decision created a de facto absolute state secrets 
privilege that has resulted in a broad contemporary state secrets 
privilege which is almost always fatal to a plaintiff’s effort to secure 
relief. This Part maintains that Vinson’s seemingly Solomonic opinion 
masked the many considerations that formed the underpinnings of the 
opinion, and that those considerations constituted a betrayal by the 
court of its responsibility to uphold the rule of law, to provide a remedy 
to an injured party asserting a legal right, to fulfill its role in a scheme of 
government dependent upon checks and balances, and to set forth a 
candid statement of the reasons for its judgment. Thus, the Court’s 
decision in Reynolds constituted a Faustian bargain in which it put aside 
its constitutional responsibilities to avoid confrontations with the 
executive. This Part also contends that Reynolds is one of the pillars of 
the Age of Deference,37 which expresses a juristic frame of mind that has 
placed the Court—quite ironically—in the middle of controversy which 
nibbles away at the underpinnings of its own legitimacy. 
Part VII is entitled “One More Appeal.” This Part focuses on the 
effort during the years 2003–2006 by the descendants of the RCA 
engineers killed in the 1948 crash to reopen the 1953 judgment. They 
claimed that because the now declassified confidential Air Force 
documents in dispute in Reynolds contained no information relating to 
national security, the judgment in the case should be vacated because of 
fraud.38 This Part argues that the defeat of the family members was the 
 
 37 See infra Part VI.D. 
 38 Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court at 2–3, 
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result of broad judicial deference towards the executive emblematic of 
the Age of Deference and not a consequence of the state secrets privilege 
or the doctrinal rules favoring the finality of judgments. Thus, in 
retrospect, the Reynolds litigation forms two bookends defining the Age 
of Deference—a 1953 decision that helped launch it and a 2006 decision 
that symbolizes its maturity. 
I.     NOT SAFE FOR FLIGHT 
How did a lawsuit following a plane crash become the basis of a 
seminal Supreme Court national security decision? How did Air Force 
and Department of Justice officials end up misleading and deceiving the 
courts? Why did the Supreme Court protect the Air Force from public 
embarrassment? The answers to these questions are complex, and if the 
Reynolds case is to be understood, the factors that led to a host of other 
events must be isolated and analyzed. The first of such events involve 
the development of the B-29 bomber. 
A.     Always Engine Fires 
The commencement of war in Europe in 1939 and the possibility of 
a Nazi conquest of Britain persuaded United States military authorities 
of the imperative need to develop a long-range bomber that might be 
capable of flying round-trip from the east coast of the United States to 
European targets.39 When the Army—at the time the Air Force was part 
of the Army—sought a builder for a new bomber that had demanding 
specifications, Boeing had a leg up on its competitors because it had 
been working on the design of a long-range bomber since the early 
1930s, and on September 6, 1940, the Army awarded a contract to 
Boeing for the construction of what became popularly known as the B-
29 bomber—the Superfortress.40 Although the B-29 was not used in the 
 
Herring v. United States, No. 03-CV-5500-LDD (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2004), 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 2430, at *104, *105. 
 39 B-29 Superfortress, Boeing, FIGHTER-PLANES.COM, http://www.fighter-planes.com/info/
b29.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2012). 
 40 Id.; see also B-29 Device Ends Oxygen Mask Use, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1944, at 11 
(reporting that “Boeing Aircraft produced the world’s first pressurized cabin plane in 1937,” a 
requirement for the B-29 development); B.K. Thorne, “Bugs” in B-29’s Date to War Tests; Power 
Plant Always Was Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1949, at 2 (“First conceived by Boeing 
engineers in 1936 as the plane that would inevitably replace the B-17.”); B-29 Superfortress, 
BOEING, http://www.boeing.com/history/boeing/b29.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2012) 
[hereinafter BOEING] (“Boeing submitted a prototype for the B-29 long-range heavy bomber to 
the army in 1939, before the United States entered World War II.”); Stephen Sherman, Boeing 
B-29 Superfortress, ACEPILOTS.COM, http://acepilots.com/planes/b29.html (last visited Apr. 5, 
2012). 
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European theatre,41 the bomber was a major weapon in the war against 
Japan and was the plane selected to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki in August 1945.42 
The B-29 was a giant airplane, nearly twice as heavy as the then-
heaviest bomber.43 This Superfortress44 was 99 feet long,45 had a wing 
span of 141 feet and 3 inches,46 was 29 feet and 7 inches off the ground 
at its highest point,47 with a gross weight of 105,500 pounds,48 had a 
maximum speed of 365 miles per hour,49 could fly over 31,000 feet 
above the earth,50 and could climb 900 feet per minute,51 and had a 
combat range of 5830 miles.52 The aircraft was powered by four 2200 
horsepower Wright R-3350-23 radial engines53 driving 16-foot, 7-inch 
four-bladed propellers.54 
In addition to being huge, the B-29 was one of the most 
sophisticated bombers in its time.55 It featured such innovations as a 
pressurized cabin which allowed a twelve-person crew to work without 
heated flying suits, heavy boots, thick gloves, helmets, or oxygen 
masks;56 “a central fire-control system”;57 “four remotely controlled gun 
turrets mounting a total of twelve fifty-caliber machine guns”;58 and a 
 
 41 Weapons of Mass Destruction: B-29 Superfortress, GLOBAL SECURITY, http://www.global
security.org/wmd/systems/b-29.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2012); see also Foster Hailey, 
Superfortress Is Largest and Swiftest Bomber in the World; It Carries Heaviest Load, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 16, 1944, at 4. 
 42 BOEING, supra note 40. It was a B-29 that dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima on 
August 6, 1945, and another B-29 that dropped the second atomic bomb on Nagasaki three 
days later. Id. 
 43 B-29 Superfortress, Boeing, supra note 39. 
 44 The B-29 was nicknamed “Superfortress.” 
 45 BOEING, supra note 40. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Boeing B-29 Superfortress Strategic Heavy Bomber, MILITARY FACTORY, 
http://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.asp?aircraft_id=82 (last visited Feb. 22, 2013); 
B-29 Flight Procedures and Combat Crew Functioning, ZENO’S WARBIRD VIDEOS, 
http://www.zenoswarbirdvideos.com/B-29.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2013). 
 48 BOEING, supra note 40. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Nathan Twining, General Twining’s History of the B-29, http://flgrube1.tripod.com/
id26.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2013). 
 52 BOEING, supra note 40. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Dep’t of the Air Force, U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet: Boeing B-29, NAT’L MUSEUM OF THE AIR 
FORCE (Feb. 4, 2011), http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=2527. 
 55 See 2 MARCELLE SIZE KNAACK, POST-WORLD WAR II BOMBERS, 1945–1973, at 482 (1988). 
 56 GEOFFREY PERRET, WINGED VICTORY: THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II 448 
(1993); see also B-29 Device Ends Oxygen Mask Use, supra note 40, at 11 (“Pressurized cabins—
air-conditioned compartments in which superchargers maintain near-normal air pressure—
make it possible for crews of the new B-29 Superfortresses to operate without oxygen masks at 
altitudes of 40,000 feet and higher, the War Department revealed today.”). 
 57 B-29 Superfortress, ALLEXPERTS.COM (on file with author). 
 58 PERRET, supra note 56, at 448. 
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“twenty-millimeter high-velocity, long range cannon in the tail.”59 It was 
“crammed with state-of-the-art electrical and electronic systems”60 that 
permitted it to “navigate over vast expanses, under conditions of radio 
blackout and overcast skies, when celestial navigation was impossible.”61 
The actual manufacturing of the B-29 was an immense and 
complex task involving a Boeing plant in Renton, Washington, and 
Wichita, Kansas, a Bell plant in Marietta, Georgia, a Martin plant in 
Omaha, Nebraska, and thousands of subcontractors.62 The complex 
design and manufacturing of the B-29 was made only more complicated 
by the military demand that Boeing begin the manufacturing of the B-29 
within a few years of receiving the contract.63 
From the beginning, the B-29 was plagued with serious problems.64 
That was at least partially true because of the sheer sophistication and 
complexity of the design and because of the speed with which a 
developmental design became a final design and the basis for 
manufacturing.65 More specifically, it was also true because the plane’s 
engine—the 2200 horsepower Wright R-3350, which had two compactly 
arranged rows of eighteen radial cylinders—gave rise to serious 
maintenance problems and at times catastrophic failures.66 In order to 
 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 WILBUR H. MORRISON, POINT OF NO RETURN: THE STORY OF THE TWENTIETH AIR FORCE 
18 (1979). 
 62 BOEING, supra note 40. 
 63 See PERRET, supra note 56, at 448 (describing the pressure on Boeing to have B-29s ready 
to deploy by early 1944); see also KNAACK, supra note 55, at 481 (“The first experimental B-29 
(Serial No. 41-002) made its initial flight on 21 September 1942; the second XB-29 (Serial No. 
41-003), on 30 December.”); SIEGEL, supra note 3, at 15 (describing the rushed nature of testing 
B-29 prototypes to meet production demands from the Air Forces). 
 64 See B-29 Superfortress, Boeing, supra note 39; see also KNAACK, supra note 55, at 482 
(“Another special—and for a while greatly troublesome—feature of the B-29 was the brand 
new, but fire-prone, 18-cylinder Wright R-3350-23 engine.”). 
 65 See generally KNAACK, supra note 55, at 484 (“The cumulative effect of the B-29’s many 
new features caused more than the normal quota of ‘bugs’ attendant to the production of a new 
plane. This was compounded by several factors. First, the B-29 was urgently needed. Secondly, 
troubles with the R-3350 engine hampered testing to the point that all flight operations were 
suspended until September 1943, even though production models of the already greatly 
modified B-29 kept on rolling off the line.” (footnote omitted)); see also B-29 Superfortress, 
Boeing, supra note 39 (“Because of [the B-29’s] highly advanced design, challenging 
requirements, and immense pressure for production, development was deeply troubled.”). 
Further, the development and manufacturing of the B-29 may have been further complicated 
by “defective parts” furnished for “use in Army and Navy planes by the Wright Aeronautical 
Corporation.” Say Faulty Parts Went into Planes: Truman Committee Declares Army and Navy 
Craft Got “Defective” Items, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1943, at 17; see also Plane Defects Laid to a 
Wright Plant; Government Sues: Report of Truman Committee Accuses Factory in Ohio of 
Making Defective Engines, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1943, at 1; Truman Disputed by Curtiss-Wright, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1943, at 24. 
 66 See generally KNAACK, supra note 55, at 484. Knaack offers one indication of the troubles 
created by the engine: “By mid-1943, 2,000 engineering changes had been made to the R-3350 
engine, first tested in early 1937. Approximately 500 of these changes required tooling 
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achieve an optimal weight-to-horsepower ratio, the crank-cases were 
made of light-weight but strong magnesium which was highly 
inflammable and made the engines a fire hazard.67 The hazard was 
increased because the two rows of cylinders restricted the flow of 
cooling air, causing overheating and engine fires.68 At that point, a fire 
not contained in the forward part of the engine would spread to the 
back of the engine, and an accessory housing manufactured of 
magnesium alloy would then often catch fire, producing such an intense 
heat that it burned through the firewall to the main wing span in no 
more than 90 seconds, resulting in catastrophic failure of the wing.69 
The propensity of the B-29 engine to catch fire came to public 
attention on February 18, 1943 when perhaps the nation’s most 
celebrated test pilot, Edmund Turney Allen, died in the test flight of a B-
29.70 Allen was held in such high regard as a test pilot that insurance 
companies would refuse to cover test flights unless he was the pilot.71 
On the 18th, Allen tested a #2 XB-29 that had completed only thirty-one 
flights, together totaling thirty-four hours and twenty-seven minutes.72 
He took off at 12:09 PM, and eight minutes later, while climbing 
 
modifications.” Id. at 484 n.12; see also B-29 Superfortress, Boeing, supra note 39. 
 67 SIEGEL, supra note 3, at 15. 
 68 Id.; see also WILBUR H. MORRISON, BIRDS FROM HELL: HISTORY OF THE B-29 4 (2001) 
(“Designed with two rows of 18 cylinders to develop 2,200 horsepower for take-off, [the R-3350 
engines] had revealed an unpleasant characteristic. They were so compact, with front and rear 
rows of cylinders, that there was an insufficient flow of air around the cylinders to properly cool 
them. Several B-29s had been lost due to uncontrollable engine fires.”). 
 69 MORRISON, supra note 68, at 4–5. A New York Times report from November 1949, 
described the dynamic that produced frequent devastating engine fires as follows:  
One “bug” in early B-29’s that went to eastern theatres of war was that the throttle 
setting for cruising was “full-rich,” usually used only for take-off and landing. “Full-
rich” fuel mixture is much the same as pouring raw gasoline into the cylinders to 
burn. Great power is obtained from such a mixture but the engines run very hot. If 
the throttle setting is held for any length of time at “full-rich” the danger of fire is 
considerable. 
Thorne, supra note 40, at 2; see also MORRISON, supra note 68, at 4–5 (“The most intense 
portion of an engine fire was caused by the magnesium accessory housing because this material 
burns at an extremely hot temperature. Once a fire started, if the extinguishers failed to contain 
it in the forward section of the engine, it was impossible to stop. After the housing ignited, the 
fire usually burned through the engine’s firewall in to the wing, causing it to break off. From 
the time the housing caught fire, a crew had one-and-a-half minutes to bail out.”). 
 70 See, e.g., Army & Navy: Test Pilot No. I, TIME, Mar. 1, 1943, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,932958-1,00.html; see also B.K. Thorne, 
supra note 69, at 2 (“The famous test pilot Edmund T. Allen and thirteen other persons were 
killed on Feb. 18, 1943, when one of the original B-29’s with at least one engine afire, crashed 
into a packing house in Seattle.”); see also KNAACK, supra note 55, at 481–82; CURTIS E. LEMAY 
& BILL YENNE, SUPERFORTRESS: THE STORY OF THE B-29 AND AMERICAN AIR POWER 60–64 
(1988). 
 71 See Army & Navy: Test Pilot No. I, supra note 70. 
 72 Bob Robbins, Eddie Allen and the B-29, in THE GLOBAL TWENTIETH 34–35 (Chester 
Marshall et al. eds., 1988). 
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through 5000 feet, a fire was reported in the number one engine.73 Allen 
reacted by cutting the mixture and fuel to engine number one, 
feathering the propeller, closing the cowl flaps, and discharging a fire 
extinguisher.74 Because the fire appeared to be extinguished, Allen 
elected to follow a normal landing.75 But apparently the fire broke out 
again, causing Allen to radio in that he was “coming in with a wing on 
fire” and prompting a crew member to state: “Allen better get this thing 
down in a hurry. The wing spar is burning badly.”76 Allen’s plane never 
made it to the runway. The crash killed all eleven crew members and 
nineteen workers in the nearby Frye meat-packing plant.77 Given the 
subsequent history of the B-29 bomber, it is evident that the story of 
Allen’s fatal test flight in a B-29 is emblematic of the B-29.78 
The B-29 problems stemmed from demanding specifications, a 
rushed design, the fast-paced manufacturing, and the abbreviated 
testing period before the plane was rushed into operations. As problems 
announced themselves, “fixes” were tried, and some were more 
successful than others.79 But B-29 engine fires persisted despite the 
 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id.; see also KNAACK, supra note 55, at 482 (referring to the crash that killed Edmund T. 
Allen, the encyclopedia states: “The accident, caused by fire which spread throughout the plane, 
was not attributed to any mechanical failure. Leakage of gasoline and a backfire were the likely 
factors.”). 
 77 See KNAACK, supra note 55, at 482. 
 78 See, e.g., 17 Die as Bomber Burns in Take-Off, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1948, at 26 (“[T]he 
plane was about to take off when one port engine caught fire. The pilot was forced to feather his 
propellers and the plane lost speed. It had barely left the ground. Just as it passed the edge of 
the runway it banked to the left, the left wing hit the ground and the plane turned over and 
burst into flames.”); Army Crash Kills 11 in New Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1947, at 3 (“[O]ne 
of the engines caught fire before the huge craft cleared the field.”); B-29 Falls in West; 15 Leap, 
14 Safe, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1949, at 1 (“Fifteen airmen parachuted to safety when a B-29 
Superfortress crashed five miles southeast of Wellpinit, Wash. One man was missing. Spokane 
Air Force officials announced the entire crew of fifteen bailed out after the bomber’s number 
four engine burst into flames.”); B-29 Pacific Crash Kills 2; Six Hunted, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 
1945, at 2 (“The B-29 took off from Okinawa on Oct. 7. According to a radio message received 
at headquarters of the United States Strategic Air Forces at Guam, engine trouble later 
developed and two engines caught fire.”); Parachute Burned Open, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1945, at 
4 (reporting that “Harold G. Vovra . . . was in a Superfortress . . . when an engine caught fire. 
The B-29 lurched violently, his back was broken and he was tossed out.”); Ten of B-29’s Crew 
Rescued from Sea, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1945, at 3 (“The B-29 . . . had started to turn 
back . . . when the right outboard engine started to shoot hot metal . . . . Less than thirty 
seconds later the plane exploded . . . . ‘Fire shot up, lighting the whole sky for miles around. 
There was a terrific explosion, then it was quiet.’”); U.S. Grounds B-29s as Another Crash Kills 5 
in Florida, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1949, at 1 [hereinafter U.S. Grounds B-29s]; Seeking Lost B-29, 
Another Crashes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1949, at 2 (“A B-29 off to hunt for another B-29 missing 
in the Atlantic crashed into the mud of Tampa Bay today, killing five of the nine-man crew . . . . 
The big plane in today’s crash was five minutes off the ground and barely 1,000 feet up when 
one of the motors developed trouble. Smoke poured out, then flames.”). 
 79 One of the “fixes” was set out in “Technical Orders 01-20EJ-177 and 01-20EJ-179, dated 
1 May 1947 . . . . These Technical Orders provide[d] for changes in the exhaust manifold 
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“fixes” and eventually resulted in the development of heat shields 
designed to prevent excessive heat which were, as of May 1, 1947, 
(seventeen months before the crash that resulted in the Reynolds case) 
required for every engine of every B-29.80 
B.     Bomber #866 
The particular B-29 bomber that crashed over Waycross, Georgia, 
on October 6, 1948, Bomber #866, had a history of problems that 
impaired its safety.81 A full sixteen months before the crash, a 
maintenance report dated June 19, 1947, stated that the plane was out of 
compliance with a technical order requiring heat shields designed to 
deter engine fires from spreading.82 The report read: “TO 01-20EJ-177 
partially c/w. Exhaust manifold installed. Shields not installed,”83 which 
meant that the technical order requiring heat shields to prevent engine 
fires was only partially complied with.84 Five days later, Bomber #866 
went air borne without the heat shields and was forced, a mere twenty 
minutes after take-off, to return to Wright Field in Ohio because of a 
malfunction.85 At that point the plane was designated unfit for flight 
because of trouble in all four engines.86 Nonetheless, the next day the 
plane departed for Boca Raton, Florida, where it then required 
approximately six weeks of maintenance repairs before the plane was 
considered safe again.87 
 
assemblies for the purpose of eliminating a definite fire hazard.” Independent Action for Relief 
from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, Exhibit J, at 103, 110, Herring v. United States, 
No. 03-cv-05500 (E.D. Pa. 2004) ECF No.1, aff’d, 424 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 
U.S. 1123 (2006), 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *198, *205–06 (providing JOHN W. 
PERSONS, REPORT OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATION OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVOLVING TB-29-
100XX NO. 45-21866 (1950), or the Persons Report, as an exhibit appended to the complaint). 
As it turned out B-29 bomber #866 was not in compliance with these two technical orders. Id. 
 80 See id. at 110, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *205–06. (noting that May 1, 1947 
was the dates the requirements took effect). 
 81 Id. at 115, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *212–13. 
 82 SIEGEL, supra note 3, at 17–18. 
 83 Id. at 17. 
 84 Id. at 17–18. 
 85 Id. at 18. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. In addition to engine problems, Bomber #866 had such other persistent problems 
such as fuel leaks and vibration in the tail section that for about one half the time during the six 
months prior to the crash the plane had been out of commission, and not safe for flight for 
more than fourteen consecutive days at a time. Id. at 34. Indeed, just five days before plane #866 
exploded mid-air, it was “listed as being on ‘red-cross’—grounded, unflyable.” Id. Moreover, 
the Air Force’s investigatory report into the crash of Bomber #866 confirmed that the bomber 
“required more than the normal amount of maintenance,” in that the “aircraft was in 
commission 48.7% of the time since 1 April 1948, as compared to the Air Force average of 57% 
of B-29 aircraft in commission for a similar 6-month period.” Independent Action for Relief 
from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, supra note 79, Exhibit J, at 103, 115, 2005 U.S. 
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On the day of the crash, Bomber #866 was testing what the 
Supreme Court termed “secret electronic equipment”88 that the Air 
Force was developing with the assistance of RCA and the Franklin 
Institute of Technology.89 The purpose of the project, which was termed 
project “Banshee,” was, according to RCA Executive Vice President 
Frank Folsom, the development of a “pilotless aircraft guidance 
system”90 that would permit the flying via remote control of a pilotless 
plane across great distances to drop bombs on a target.91 Although the 
government took the position during the Reynolds litigation that the 
very idea of the early drone system was itself a secret,92 during the years 
just prior to the crash there had been press reports on the development 
of this weapon.93 
The day Bomber #866 crashed, it left the Robins Field runway at 
1:28 PM carrying eight Air Force crew members, five civilian electronic 
experts, and secret military electronic equipment.94 The plane climbed 
without incident until an altitude of about 18,500 feet was attained,95 at 
 
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *212–13 (Persons Report). Thus, Bomber #866 had a track record 
that made it stand out as a plane that had above-average mechanical problems even by 
comparison to other B-29 planes that had well known systemic problems. 
 88 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 3 (1953). 
 89 Letter from Frank M. Folsom, Executive Vice President, RCA, to Hoyt S. Vandenberg, 
Commanding Gen., U.S. Air Force (Nov. 22, 1948) (on file with author) [hereinafter Folsom 
Letter]. 
 90 Id. 
 91 See Anthony Leviero, Robot-Piloted Plane Makes Safe Crossing of Atlantic, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 23, 1947, at 1; Army Tells Secret of Its Robot Pilot, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1943, at 25. 
 92 See Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, supra 
note 79, Exhibit C, at 28, 30, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *129, *131 (Claim of 
Privilege by the Secretary of the Airforce (Finletter Statement), Reynolds v. United States, Civil 
Action No. 10142) (objecting to the production of the crash investigation report, in part, on the 
grounds that the aircraft and its personnel “were engaged in a confidential mission of the Air 
Force,” and that the plane “carried confidential equipment on board”). 
 93 See “Drone” Plane Grounded, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1947, at 11; see also Leviero, supra note 
91, at 1 (“A Douglas C-45 Skymaster with a mechanical brain landed without human aid near 
London today after a robot directed hop from Newfoundland. The revolutionary flight across 
the Atlantic, effected by the push of the button, was hailed by Air Force leaders as a feat with 
vast new possibilities for war and peace.”). As early as 1943, the New York Times reported in a 
lead paragraph: “Details of an electronically controlled automatic pilot, the existence of which 
was not known heretofore outside of military circles, and which is regarded as ‘one of 
America’s best-kept military secrets,’ were disclosed yesterday with Army approval.” Army Tells 
Secret of Its Robot Plane, supra note 41, at 25. 
 94 SIEGEL, supra note 3, at 36. According to Frank M. Folsom, Executive Vice President of 
RCA (which directly employed two of the three civilian engineers killed in the crash, and which 
indirectly employed the third engineer in that he was employed by the Franklin Institute, a 
RCA subcontractor), RCA had been under contract since 1946 with the Air Force to construct 
“several development models of a pilotless aircraft guidance system called Banshee.” This 
experimental equipment was installed in B-29 aircraft and first tested in the spring of 1947 at 
Boca Raton, Florida, before being transferred to the Warner Robbins Field in Macon, Georgia. 
Folsom Letter, supra note 89. 
 95 Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, supra note 
79, Exhibit J, at 103, 132, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *232 (testimony of Herbert W. 
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which point the manifold pressure on number one engine “dropped to 
20 inches [of mercury].”96 The efforts of the plane’s engineer to restore 
the manifold pressure failed, and before the “engine was in a full 
feathered position,”97 a fire broke out in engine one.98 The fire 
extinguishers “helped only momentarily”99 before the fire “engulf[ed] 
the entire engine and the wing area immediately to the rear of No.1 
engine.”100 The fire did not spread to the other three engines.101 
In his attempt to feather engine number one, the pilot 
“inadvertently hit the feather switch on No. 4 engine,”102 and although 
the co-pilot tried to un-feather engine number four,103 the propeller 
blades for engine four were still feathered when it was examined after 
the crash.104 With two engines out, the pilot opened the bomb bay doors 
and according to the co-pilot and the engineer the plane “went into a 
spin to the left immediately after the doors were opened,”105 and the 
centrifugal force caused by the spinning “greatly restricted” the 
movement of the plane’s personnel who had been alerted to abandon 
the aircraft.106 The plane disintegrated during its spinning,107 and 
“[s]everal witnesses on the ground reported hearing a definite explosion 
when the B-29 was at what they estimated to be 15,000 feet and they 
further reported that the left wing came off at the same time.”108 
There were only four survivors.109 The left scanner, Sergeant 
Walter J. Peny, and a civilian engineer, Eugene Meckler, safely jumped 
from the rear of the compartment through the bomb bay, and copilot 
Captain Moore, and engineer, Sergeant Earl E. Murrhee, escaped 
 
Moore, Jr., Captain, U.S. Air Force). 
 96 Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, supra note 
79, Exhibit J, at 103, 110, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *206 (Persons Report). 
 97 Id. at 111, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *207. An engine is “feathered” when a 
propeller’s rotation is stopped and the propeller blades are parallel to the wind. LAURA 
HILLENBRAND, UNBROKEN: A WORLD WAR II STORY OF SURVIVAL, RESILIENCE, AND 
REDEMPTION 117 (2010). 
 98 Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, supra note 
79, Exhibit J, at 103, 111, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *207 (Persons Report). 
 99 Id. at 111, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *207. 
 100 Id. at 111, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *207. 
 101 Id. at 112, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *208. 
 102 Id. at 111, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *207. 
 103 Id. at 133, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *232 (testimony of Herbert W. Moore, 
Jr., Captain, U.S. Air Force). 
 104 Id. at 112, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *208 (Persons Report). 
 105 Id. at 111, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *207. 
 106 Id. at 112, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *208. 
 107 Id. at 115, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *212. 
 108 Id. at 111, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *207–08. 
 109 Id. at 127, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *225 (Memorandum from Murl Estes, 
Lieutenant Colonel, Deputy Chief, Flying Safety Division, U.S. Air Force, to Commanding 
General, Strategic Air Command (Sept. 15, 1950) (regarding Summary of B-29 Aircraft 
Accident)). 
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through the forward compartment via the nose wheel hatch.110 Three 
others—Technical Sergeant Melvin T. Walker, Lieutenant Lawrence N. 
Pence, Jr., and A. Palya—were found free of the plane but “[a]pparently 
all three persons left the aircraft too late to successfully utilize their 
parachutes.”111 
The day following the crash, The Waycross Journal-Herald ran an 
eight-column banner headline across its front page: “NINE KILLED AS 
B-29 EXPLODES OVER CITY.”112 The report’s opening paragraph 
read: “Two fires in one engine and failure of another preceded a 
‘thunder clap’ blast that ripped apart a B-29 Superfortress bomber over 
Waycross.”113 The next paragraph stated that the “craft exploded at an 
altitude of nearly twenty thousand feet,” and two paragraphs later the 
report stated that the “plane was on a special mission testing secret 
electronic equipment, scheduled to land ‘somewhere in Florida.’”114 A 
public relations officer at the air base “told reporters that the bomber 
was on a special research mission to test secret electronic equipment,”115 
and one historian of the crash writes that the newspaper reports 
published within days of the crash “spoke openly about the plane’s 
secret equipment and the civilians on board,” who were employed by 
either the RCA in Camden, New Jersey, or the Franklin Institute of 
Technology in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and who were hired “to assist 
Air Force Personnel with the development and testing of the electronic 
equipment.”116 
C.     First Investigation 
The Air Force conducted two investigations of the crash of Bomber 
#866. The first was designed to be completely ineffective in identifying 
the cause of the crash, and the second, forced upon the Air Force by a 
corporate executive, did explicate the causes of the crash but was 
promptly classified and kept secret. 
The first Air Force investigation into the crash was commenced 
within days of the incident. It consisted of Air Force interviews of the 
three surviving servicemen and an investigation conducted by a five-
 
 110 Id. at 112, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *209 (Persons Report). 
 111 Id. at 113, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at 209. 
 112 NINE KILLED AS B-29 EXPLODES OVER CITY: Four Men Leap to Safety; Plane on 
Special Mission, WAYCROSS J.-HERALD, Oct. 7, 1948, at 1. For a similar story covering the crash, 
see Survivors Describe Plane Wreck Over Waycross Costing 9 Lives, ATLANTA J., Oct. 7, 1948, at 
4. 
 113 NINE KILLED AS B-29 EXPLODES OVER CITY, supra note 112, at 1. 
 114 Id. 
 115 FISHER, supra note 2, at 1–2. 
 116 Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, ¶ 9, at 5, 
Herring v. United States, No. Civ.A.03-CV-5500-LDD, 2004 WL 2040272 (Sept. 10, 2004). 
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person panel. The interviews of the servicemen were conducted by 
Major Robert J.D. Johnson from the inspector general’s office at Langley 
Air Force Base in Virginia on October 11, 1948.117 He interviewed 
Captain Herbert W. Moore, the plane’s copilot,118 Technical Sergeant 
 
 117 See Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, supra 
note 79, Exhibit J, at 103, 129, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *227 (testimony of Herbert 
W. Moore, Jr., Captain, U.S. Air Force); id. at 139, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *239 
(testimony of Earl W. Murrhee, Technical Sergeant, U.S. Air Force); id. at 150, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. 
Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *250–51 (testimony of Walter J. Peny, Staff Sergeant, U.S. Air Force). 
 118 Captain Herbert W. Moore, the plane’s copilot, was assigned to the 3150th Electronics 
Squadron, which was intimately involved with the testing of the Banshee secret electronic 
equipment. See id., at 129, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *228 (testimony of Herbert W. 
Moore, Jr., Captain, U.S. Air Force). Johnson asked Moore thirty-two questions about what he 
knew about the flight and when he knew it. Id. at 129–38, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at 
*229–39. Moore testified that the flight was initially scheduled for 8:00 AM on October 6, but 
that a faulty gasket in engine number four delayed the flight until the afternoon. Id. at 131, 2005 
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *229. The Captain stated that he did not know if he had 
previously flown with the crew, and although he conceded that the 3150th Electronics 
Squadron’s policy required “established crews,” the squadron was unable to “keep to that 
because of shortage of primarily officer personnel.” Id. at 130, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 
2430, at *228–29. Moore also stated that he did not attend any briefing of the crew or 
passengers regarding emergency procedures, even though such briefings were required by Air 
Forces policies. Id. at 131, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *229. Moore described the 
take-off as “normal” and, except for the fact that engines one, two and four were “running a 
little hot” and that the manifold pressure fell to forty inches during the climb, there were no 
reports of “trouble or malfunction of the engines until we reached about 18,500 or 19,000 feet.” 
Id. at 131–32, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *230–31. At that point, the manifold 
pressure in engine one was twenty-three inches, and after climbing to 20,000 feet and efforts to 
increase the manifold pressure failed, Captain Erwin said he would feather engine one, but 
instead of feathering engine one, Captain Erwin accidently pushed the switch to feather engine 
number four. Id. at 132–33, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *232. Moore testified that he 
almost immediately pressed the switch to un-feather engine four. Id. at 133, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. 
Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *232. But given that the engine was feathered when inspected after the 
crash, see id. at 112, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *208 (Persons Report), Moore’s effort 
to correct to un-feather engine four was ineffective. During this series of events, Moore stated 
that Captain Erwin “advised everybody to have their chutes on.” Id. at 132, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. 
Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *231 (testimony of Herbert W. Moore, Jr., Captain, U.S. Air Force). 
Moore then stated that Captain Erwin “put the plane in a descending attitude,” “ordered the 
cabin pressure released,” and directed the “left scanner to keep an eye on that engine and watch 
for a possible outbreak of fire.” Id. at 133, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *233. Moore 
testified that the scanner immediately reported smoke coming from engine number one, and 
after a failed effort to extinguish the fire failed, the fire spread “rapidly.” Id. at 133, 2005 U.S. S. 
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *233. Moore stated that “[s]omebody then said to open the hatch 
leading to the bomb bay,” and after some delay the hatch was opened. Id. at 133, 2005 U.S. S. 
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *233–34. At the point Captain Erwin asked “what’s wrong with 
number two [engine],” and, as Captain Moore stated, “[i]t must have been at this time that the 
airplane was thrown into the spin.” Id. at 134, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *234. 
Moore stated that he “pulled” himself “to the nose-wheel escape hatch” and after he “kicked” a 
person lying face-up in the well “on through,” he “didn’t hesitate and went on through after the 
person that I had pushed out,” and he did that even though Moore stated that he never heard 
Captain Erwin give an “order to abandon the aircraft.” Id. at 134, 136, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 2430, at *234–35, *237. As Moore stated with reference to his parachuting from the 
plane: “I just didn’t see what else could be done except to make for it.” Id. at 137, 2005 U.S. S. 
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *237. 
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Earl W. Murrhee, the flight engineer,119 and Staff Sergeant Walter J. 
Peny, the left scanner.120 Each witness took an oath and was advised of 
his rights under the 24th Article of War.121 
Johnson’s examination of the three servicemen shed very little light 
on the causes of the crash. Therefore, Johnson did not question Moore, 
 
 119 See id. at 139–49, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *239–50 (testimony of Earl W. 
Murrhee, Technical Sergeant, U.S. Air Force). Murrhee had about five hundred hours flying 
time on a B-29, see id. at 140, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *240, or about five times the 
flying time of copilot Moore, who estimated his own B-29 flying time at one hundred hours at 
the time of the crash, see id. at 129, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *228 (testimony of 
Herbert W. Moore, Jr., Captain, U.S. Air Force). Murrhee stated that the morning flight on 
October 6 was canceled because the civilian engineers did not arrive at the field, that the Air 
Force personnel did not receive a briefing, as far as he knew, but that the Air Force crew 
members were “well-informed” about emergency procedures. Id. at 140–41, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. 
Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *240–41 (testimony of Earl W. Murrhee, Technical Sergeant, U.S. Air 
Force). He also stated that he had “nothing to do” with briefing the civilian engineers, but that 
he thought at least two of the engineers—Reynolds and Payla—had been briefed in the past 
because they had been assigned to “our squadron all the time.” Id. at 141, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 2430, at *241. Murrhee stated that no mechanical problems were noticed until the plane 
reached about 20,000 feet, when the manifold pressure in engine number one dropped and he 
was unable to restore it. Id. at 142, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *242. Captain Erwin 
feathered engine number one—Murrhee stated that he was unaware that Captain Erwin 
feathered engine number four inadvertently—and as that was occurring, a fire began in engine 
number one, which he said he saw. Id. at 143, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *243–44. 
Captain Erwin ordered everyone to “stand by to abandon ship,” and within a short moment, 
the bomb bay doors opened, the plane was thrown “violently to the right,” and someone—he 
did not know who—gave the order to abandon ship. Id. at 143, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 
2430, at *244. At that moment, Murrhee stated that he was thrown into the hatch, and that later 
Captain Moore told him that he, Captain Moore, kicked him, Murrhee, out of the hatch and he 
parachuted safely. Id. at 143, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *244. Murrhee also testified 
that while he was in the air the plane exploded. Id. at 143, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at 
*244. 
 120 See id. at 150–54, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *250–55 (testimony of Walter J. 
Peny, Staff Sergeant, U.S. Air Force). Peny had flown about two hundred hours on a B-29 and 
had previously flown with copilot Moore, but not with Captain Erwin. Id. at 150–51, 2005 U.S. 
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *251. Peny stated that he had not been briefed about emergency 
procedures before the flight and that he was not aware of the civilians being briefed. Id. at 151, 
2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *251–52. He did state that he had heard the civilian 
engineer who safely parachuted state that “he didn’t even know how to get out of a B-29.” Id. at 
151, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *252. Peny testified that the fire in engine number 
one followed the loss of engine power. He said that the fire extinguishers put the fire out for 
“five or six seconds,” and then, the fire “broke out completely over number one engine.” Id. at 
152, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *253. At that point Captain Erwin notified the crew 
to put on their parachutes and to prepare to bail out, but Peny stated that he never heard an 
order to abandon the plane. Id. at 152–53, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *253–54. At 
that moment, the bomb bay doors opened, the plane engineer reported that engine number two 
was losing power, and “the whole wing was enveloped in a flame and the ship went into a spin.” 
Id. at 152, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *253. Peny unfastened his buckle, lunged for 
the escape hatch to the bomb bay, and then “blacked out momentarily.” Id. at 152, 2005 U.S. S. 
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *253. He said “the next thing [he] remember[ed] [was] going through 
the hatch,” pulling the rip cord, having his arm caught in the chute line, and landing. Id. at 
152–53, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *254. As he was gliding down, Peny said that he 
heard a “puff in the skies,” and saw “[a] piece of metal” fly by his parachute. Id. at 153, 2005 
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *254. 
 121 Articles of War of 1806 art. 24, 2 Stat. 359, 362 (repealed 1956). 
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Murrhee, and Peny about the cause of the fire in engine number one or 
its spread to the wing. He did not inquire into the plane’s spinning and 
subsequent explosion and crash.122 He did not inquire into whether the 
plane’s engines had the heat shields intended to retard the possibility of 
engine fires.123 Apart from the pilot error that resulted in the inadvertent 
feathering of engine number four, Johnson did not ask about the timing 
of the opening of the bomb bay doors and the failure of the pilot to 
quickly take the plane to a lower altitude which might have given all the 
passengers more time to escape.124 Nor did Johnson ask the three 
surviving servicemen as to why they did not take any steps to assist the 
civilians’ escape.125 In the course of the examinations, not one of the 
three servicemen discussed or mentioned the secret electronic 
equipment or any other matter that might conceivably constitute a 
military secret. 
Within days of the questioning of the three surviving servicemen, a 
five-man investigatory team based at the Warner Robins air base 
interviewed witnesses on the ground, surveyed the damage to the plane, 
noted where the bodies were found, and collected reports concerning 
the plane’s maintenance and flight plan.126 But the team did not “so 
much investigate the accident as chronicle it,”127 and its report failed to 
state that the civilian engineers were not briefed on emergency 
procedures, to explain why the plane went into a spin, to point out that 
the plane lacked heat shields and was thus out of compliance with a 
technical order, and failed to speculate about the cause of the fire.128 
The Air Force’s initial, sharply curtailed inquiry into the crash was 
ineffective.129 Indeed, from all of the evidence, it seems that the Air 
Force initially had had no interest in finding out the real causes of the 
crash or learning any information about the crash that would embarrass 
the Air Force, undermine its public standing, stir up any opposition to 
its various programs that required congressional approval and funding, 
or cause the private corporations retained by the Air Force as 
consultants to lose any trust or confidence in the safety conditions of 
 
 122 See Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, supra 
note 79, Exhibit J, at 103, 129–38, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *239–49 (testimony of 
Herbert W. Moore, Jr., Captain, U.S. Air Force); id. 150–54, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, 
at *250–55 (testimony of Walter J. Peny, Staff Sergeant, U.S. Air Force). 
 123 See supra note 122. 
 124 See id. 
 125 See id. 
 126 SIEGEL, supra note 3, at 62. 
 127 Id. Because I do not have a copy of this first investigatory report, I rely upon Siegel’s 
description of the report. 
 128 Id. at 63. 
 129 The limited nature of the initial Air Force inquiry is apparent when it is compared to the 
Air Force’s second investigation. See infra Part I.E. 
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Air Force experiments.130 In short, the Air Force’s first reaction to the 
crash was to cover up the facts and circumstances surrounding the crash 
so as to avoid any public embarrassment or humiliation that might 
result from a searching investigation. 
D.     Frank M. Folsom’s Letter 
The Air Force’s attempted cover-up of its own negligence and 
malfeasance would have constituted the last word on the crash of 
Bomber #866 but for a letter dated November 22, 1948, written by Frank 
M. Folsom, RCA’s Executive Vice President, to General Hoyt S. 
Vandenberg, Commanding General of the United States Air Force.131 
Folsom was no ordinary high-ranking business executive in a 
corporation doing business with the Defense Department. According to 
one reporter, Folsom was “exceptionally influential and well connected,” 
he “moved across party lines” to build working relations with important 
Democrats and Republicans, and had “many close friends” in business, 
government and the military.132 In fact, Folsom’s connections included 
President Truman with whom he had one private, “OFF THE 
RECORD” meeting,133 and to whom he sent many gifts such as a 
“booklet of Prayers and Poems,” a “fine notebook,” and music 
“recordings,” all acknowledged in letters to Folsom signed by the 
President.134 Because two of the civilian engineers killed in the crash of 
Bomber #866 were employees of RCA, and a third was an employee of 
RCA’s subcontractor, the Franklin Institute of Technology, Folsom 
wanted to know why the bomber crashed.135 
Folsom, who had had some experience serving in the higher ranks 
of the armed services, having been a chief procurement officer for the 
Navy during World War II,136 informed Vandenberg that his 
information about the crash was not “authoritative information from 
the Air Force regarding the cause of the accident,” but was based only 
 
 130 For a discussion of the pressures prompting the Air Force not only to delimit its 
investigation in the crash of Bomber #866, but to submit later in time two false responses to 
plaintiffs’ interrogatories, see infra Part II.C. 
 131 See Folsom Letter, supra note 89. 
 132 SIEGEL, supra note 3, at 67. 
 133 The meeting was on August 25, 1950, at 11:50 AM. Daily Presidential Appointments, 
Friday, August 25, 1950, HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY & MUSEUM, http://www.truman
library.org/calendar/main.php?currYear=1950&currMonth=8&currDay=25 (last visited Mar. 6, 
2013). 
 134 Letters from Harry S. Truman, President of the United States, to Frank M. Folsom, 
Executive Vice President, RCA, (on file in President’s Personal File, Box 563 with the President 
Harry S. Truman Library). 
 135 See Folsom Letter, supra note 89, at 4 (requesting a copy of the official Air Force 
investigation report). 
 136 SIEGEL, supra note 3, at 68. 
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on “informal information and from statements of one survivor.”137 
Nonetheless, Folsom’s letter makes it evident that he was exceptionally 
well-informed about the safety conditions of Bomber #866, Air Force 
policies, the crew members who flew #866 on October 6, and specific 
events leading up to the engine fire and the explosion.138 Thus, Folsom 
wrote: “[I]t appears . . . that one of the engines caught fire, followed 
shortly by a loss of power in a second engine. At about the same time 
the plane went into a spin or tight spiral, and the resulting centrifugal 
force prevented escape for some time.”139 Folsom charged that “[t]he 
civilian engineers had received no preflight briefing in emergency 
bailout procedures and therefore probably did not make the best use of 
the opportunities available to them.”140 
Folsom was also well informed about the dismal maintenance 
record of Bomber #866. Thus, Folsom did not mince his words. He 
wrote that “this particular airplane had a long history of unsatisfactory 
performance,” and that “[d]uring the time the flight test program was 
being conducted at Boca Raton and at Warner Robins Air Base,” 
Bomber #866 “was unavailable for flight tests much of the time because 
of mechanical difficulties.”141 Although Folsom conceded that RCA had 
“no evidence that the plane was in an unsafe condition on its last flight,” 
he made it clear that, based on the information he had, “this particular 
airplane had never, to our knowledge, performed satisfactorily for a 
period as long as one month.”142 
With regard to the flight crew aboard Bomber #866 the day of the 
crash, Folsom accepted that the individual crew members were 
qualified, but insisted that “these men were not accustomed to flying 
together and therefore could not be expected to act as a team, 
particularly in an emergency.”143 Indeed, because the crew had not 
previously flown together, Folsom wrote Vandenberg that “it is 
probable that there was some confusion among the pilot, copilot, and 
flight engineer which delayed actions that might have allowed more 
time for bailing out,” and resulted in more survivors.144 The probability 
of “confusion” in the cockpit, he speculated, may have been the reason 
why the flight crew did not throttle back the engines and put “the plane 
into a glide,” actions which would have allowed “ample time for more, if 
not all, of those aboard to bail out.”145 
 
 137 Folsom Letter, supra note 89, at 1. 
 138 See id. 
 139 Id. at 1. 
 140 Id. at 1–2. 
 141 Id. at 2. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
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Folsom’s letter to Vandenberg listed several changes RCA wanted 
made if its engineers were to continue to participate “in the future in Air 
Force flight test programs.”146 Folsom wanted “additional insurance and 
flight pay” from the Air Force for RCA employees;147 flight testing 
conducted in “relatively safe” and “relatively new” aircraft without “a 
long history of maintenance difficulties”;148 the contractor to have 
control of the “flight test aircraft” or in the alternative strict adherence 
by the Air Force to its own regulations;149 the assignment of only the 
“highest grade” flight and maintenance crews to experimental flights, as 
compared to the variable quality of such crews in the past;150 and the 
flight crew assigned to an experimental flight should have “flown 
together long enough to act as a team.”151 
Folsom did not trust the Air Force to implement the 
recommendations he set forth in the letter.152 Therefore, he stated that 
the RCA engineers would be reassured about the safety of the planes 
used for experimental testing if the Air Force permitted “a frank and 
open disclosure of all facts regarding the maintenance and operation of 
airplanes for experimental projects,” that RCA be given the “privilege of 
having an independent inspector inspect the aircraft from time to time,” 
and that the inspector be permitted to report to RCA “regarding the 
quality of the maintenance and the operation of the aircraft.”153 Folsom 
also requested that the Air Force promptly provide RCA with the Air 
Force’s official investigation report into any crash.154 Lastly, Folsom 
informed Vandenberg that the recommendations set forth in his letter 
represented not only the views of RCA, but the attitude of other 
consulting corporations which worked on experimental projects with 
the Air Force, and that pending a satisfactory response from the Air 
Force to his letter, RCA’s “development programs” will be “slowed 
considerably.”155 
E.     Second Air Force Investigation 
Folsom’s letter to General Vandenberg was widely circulated 
among the Air Force’s hierarchy and caused the Air Force to reopen the 
 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. at 3. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. (“[N]othing arouses fear and suspicion as much as the appearance that some of the 
information is being withheld.”). 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. at 3–4. 
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investigation into the crash of Bomber #866.156 By early December 1948, 
the Air Force’s inspector general, Major General Hugh J. Knerr, ordered 
a new investigation and assigned the task to the Flying Safety Division, 
part of the Office of Air Inspector.157 The completed investigation report 
was dated January 3, 1949, signed by Colonel John W. Persons, Chief of 
the Flying Safety Division, distributed within the Air Force on January 
6, and marked “Secret.”158 
The report stated that the flight’s purpose was a “research and 
development mission” for the purpose of “completing an electronics 
project.”159 It found that when the plane reached 18,500 feet “the 
manifold pressure on No.1 engine dropped to about 20 inches,” and that 
the effort to “bring it back by the use of the manual emergency system 
and by replacing the turbo amplifier was ineffective so the engine was 
feathered.”160 At that point, the pilot advised the crew to put on the 
parachutes, and during the feathering of No.1 engine, “a fire broke out 
that engulfed the aft half of the engine and the flames extended past the 
left scanner’s window.”161 Efforts “to extinguish the fire by use of the 
engine fire extinguishers were to no avail.”162 When the bomb bay doors 
were opened the plane went into a “spin to the left” which was so violent 
that only four of the plane’s occupants were able to escape.163 
The report further stated that the crew members had not 
previously flown together, that the weather was not a factor in causing 
the accident, that the plane had had fifteen hours flying time since the 
last “100 hours inspection,”164 that the civilian passengers and crew were 
“not briefed prior to take-off on emergency procedures,” and that the 
“Commanding Officer of the 3150th Electronics squadron failed to 
exercise adequate supervision to insure that his aircraft commanders 
complied with the briefing requirements for emergency procedures.”165 
Even more importantly, the report stated that two technical orders 
requiring heat shields were “not complied with.”166 These technical 
orders, numbered 01-20EJ-177 and 01-20EJ-178, specified the “exhaust 
manifold assemblies for the purpose of eliminating a definite fire 
hazard.”167 
 
 156 SIEGEL, supra note 3, at 72–73. 
 157 Id. at 73. 
 158 See Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, supra 
note 79, Exhibit J, at 103, 118, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *215 (Persons Report). 
 159 Id. at 108, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *203. 
 160 Id. at 108, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *203. 
 161 Id. at 108, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *203. 
 162 Id. at 108, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *203. 
 163 Id. at 108–09, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *203–04. 
 164 Id. at 110, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *205. 
 165 Id. at 113, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *210. 
 166 Id. at 110, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *205. 
 167 Id. at 110, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *205–06. 
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The report set forth conclusions in three short sentences that 
deserve quoting: 
a. The aircraft is not considered to have been safe for flight because 
of non-compliance with Technical Orders 01-20EJ-177 and 01-
20EJ-178. 
b. Fire developed in the No. 1 engine as a result of the failure of the 
right exhaust collector ring. 
c. AF Regulation 60-5 was violated in that the passengers and crew 
were not properly briefed.168 
In sum, the Persons Report concluded that several factors 
contributed to the crash—the plane was unsafe because it lacked heat 
shields as required by technical orders; the lack of heat shields 
contributed to causing the fire in No. 1 engine; the fire extinguishers did 
not put out the engine fire and the fire engulfed the wing; the crew had 
not previously flown together; and the servicemen and the civilian 
passengers had not been briefed about emergency procedures—and 
therefore the plane was ultimately “not . . . safe for flight.”169 
In reaching its devastating conclusions regarding the causes of the 
crash, the Persons Report did not discuss the secret electronic equipment 
that was tested the day of the crash,170 nor did it include any other 
information about the design or structure of the B-29 bomber or the 
details of the flight of #866 that might constitute a military secret.171 
One last point requires mentioning: The report stated that “copies 
of [the] official Air Force accident report [are] not to be sent to civilian 
agencies.”172 In other words, the report, which was initiated in response 
to Frank Folsom’s inquiry, was classified as “Secret,” and it was not to be 
sent to Folsom and his colleagues who had assigned civilian engineers to 
fly on B-29 bombers to test secret electronic equipment. 
F.     Air Force’s Response to Folsom 
In a letter dated February 17, 1949, roughly six weeks after the date 
on the Persons Report, Major General William F. McKee of the Air 
Force responded to Frank Folsom’s November letter inquiring into the 
crash of Bomber #866. McKee’s letter was another step in the Air Force’s 
effort to minimize and control the potential damage that the crash of 
Bomber #866 constituted to its reputation and public standing. 
 
 168 Id. at 116, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *213–14. 
 169 Id. at 116, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *213–14. 
 170 Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, supra note 
79, Exhibit J, at 103, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, *198. 
 171 See id. at 103, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, *198. 
 172 Id. at 125, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at 224 (testimony of Lt. Moore). 
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The two page letter acknowledges that the “official investigation” of 
the crash was completed and states that this letter is the official reply to 
Folsom’s “specific questions” and “remarks.”173 The letter acknowledges 
a fire in engine number one and a loss of power in engine number two, 
but fails to mention that the pilot inadvertently feathered engine 
number four and that the pilot’s decision to open the bomb bay doors 
contributed to the plane going into a powerful downward spin, thus 
pinning the crew and passengers in place making it extremely hard to 
move toward openings that would allow them to parachute safely. 
Instead, the letter claims that although the crew had not previously 
flown together, the “action taken [by the crew] was as prompt as the 
situation demanded,” and the “factors causing the spin were beyond the 
control of the crew.”174 The letter excused the pilot’s failure to order the 
abandonment of the plane prior to the spinning on the ground that it 
was not warranted. The letter did acknowledge that the survivors were 
unable to establish whether the pilot gave an order to abandon the plane 
once the spinning commenced.175 
The letter fails to acknowledge the technical orders that required 
modifications in the engines to retard engine fires and the highly 
important fact that Bomber #866 was not in compliance with these 
orders. Instead of acknowledging the poor performance history of the 
bomber and the salient conclusion of the Persons Report that Bomber 
#866 was not safe for flight, the reply to Folsom insisted that the “Air 
Force is most anxious to conserve property and life and under no 
condition, except extreme emergency, are aircraft permitted to fly when 
safety is in question.”176 The letter declined to make the official 
investigation report available to Folsom because of the “purpose and 
nature of the Accident Report.”177 
In closing, McKee appealed to Folsom and the industry not to 
abandon the Air Force because of the death of the civilian engineers: 
“The bulk of the Air Force Research and Development program 
depends upon the cooperation and good will of industry.”178 And then 
as if the false statements already made in the letter were inadequate to 
completely impeach the Air Force’s credibility, the letter closed with two 
more mendacious statements: “Every possible action will be taken to 
maintain and foster full mutual confidence and understanding. Your 
personal interest in this matter is deeply appreciated.”179 
 
 173 Letter from William F. McKee, Major Gen., Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, 
to Frank M. Folsom, Exec. Vice President, RCA (Feb. 17, 1949) (on file with author). 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. 
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In retrospect, it is plain that the senior Air Force officials, who 
misled and deceived the three widows, also misled and deceived RCA, 
which was merely trying to secure the safety of its engineers in future 
flights. 
II.     A LAWSUIT 
A.     The Filing 
On June 21, 1949, six months after the completion of the second 
Air Force investigation into the crash of Bomber #866, Phyllis Brauner, 
who had two children, joined with Elizabeth Palya, who had three 
children, in filing a complaint seeking money damages against the 
government for the plane crash that killed their husbands, William H. 
Brauner and Albert H. Palya.180 Three months later, on September 27, 
Patricia Reynolds, who did not have any children at the time, filed a 
separate action against the government for the death of her husband, 
Robert E. Reynolds, who died in the same crash.181 In December, the 
two actions were consolidated for trial before Chief Judge William H. 
Kirkpatrick of the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
in Philadelphia.182 Charles J. Biddle and Francis Hopkinson of the 
prominent Philadelphia law firm Drinker Biddle & Reath represented 
the three widows.183 The suit was commenced against the government 
pursuant to the 1946 Federal Tort Claims Act, which, in addition to 
waiving the government’s sovereign immunity, authorized actions for 
damages against the government on the same terms and conditions that 
would exist if the injured parties were suing a private party.184 
In November of 1949, thirteen months after the crash, the plaintiffs 
submitted interrogatories to the executive branch to answer.185 There 
was nothing exceptional about plaintiffs’ thirty-one questions, which 
sought information about the B-29 bomber in general, Bomber #866 in 
particular, and the events leading up to the crash. The plaintiffs 
 
 180 Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, supra note 
38, ¶ 2–3. 
 181 Id. ¶ 1. 
 182 Id. ¶ 5. 
 183 See Brauner v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468, 469 (E.D. Pa. 1950), aff’d, Reynolds v. United 
States, 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1951), rev’d, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
 184 Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006). 
 185 Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, supra note 
79, Exhibit K, at 163, 164, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *263, *263 (Interrogatories 
Propounded by Plaintiffs for Answer Under Rule 33 (Brauner Interrogatories), Brauner v. 
United States, Civil Action No. 9793 (1950)); id. Exhibit K at 163, 171, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 2430, at *263, *270 (Answer to Interrogatories Propounded by Plaintiffs for Answer 
Under Rule 33 (Answer to Brauner Interrogatories), Brauner, Civil Action No. 9793). 
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requested that the executive branch make available a variety of 
documents, including the Air Force’s investigative report and the 
statements made by the surviving servicemen to investigators.186 
In response to the plaintiffs’ interrogatories, the executive branch 
gave what Judge Kirkpatrick termed “a mass of documents” to the 
plaintiffs.187 According to the executive branch, that “mass of 
documents” included: “current flight engineering records”188 and other 
“records or logs showing mechanical condition, maintenance of 
equipment, repairs and/or flight records”;189 “written standard 
regulations with reference to the operations of army aircraft, and the 
carrying of civilian personnel therein”;190 the pilot’s and the copilot’s 
logs and records;191 documents showing or describing the size and 
location of escape hatches;192 a radio log “kept by the control tower at 
Robins Air Force Base of messages sent to and received by the said TB-
29 for take-off instruction”;193 and pictures taken of the wreckage.194 In 
addition to these documents, the government’s responses to the 
interrogatories gave a brief description of the events minutes before the 
plane’s explosion and the crash. Thus, the executive branch reported 
 
 186 Id. at 164, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *263 (Brauner Interrogatories). 
 187 Brauner, 10 F.R.D. at 471. 
 188 Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, supra note 
79, Exhibit K, at 165, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *264 (Brauner Interrogatories); id. 
at 171, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *271 (Answer to Brauner Interrogatories) 
(responding to plaintiffs’ third interrogatory in the affirmative and attaching the requested 
documents). 
 189 Id. at 165, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *264 (Brauner Interrogatories); id. at 
171, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *271 (Answer to Brauner Interrogatories) 
(responding to plaintiffs’ fourth interrogatory in the affirmative and attaching the requested 
documents). 
 190 Id. at 167, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *268 (Brauner Interrogatories); id. at 
174, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *273 (Answer to Brauner Interrogatories) 
(responding to plaintiffs’ nineteenth interrogatory in the affirmative and attaching the 
requested documents). 
 191 Id. at 168, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *267–68 (Brauner Interrogatories); id. at 
173–74, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *273 (Answer to Brauner Interrogatories) 
(responding to plaintiffs’ twentieth and twenty-first interrogatories in the affirmative and 
attaching the requested documents). 
 192 Id. at 168, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *268 (Brauner Interrogatories); id. at 
174, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *273 (Answer to Brauner Interrogatories) 
(responding to plaintiffs’ twenty-second interrogatory in the affirmative and attaching the 
requested documents). 
 193 Id. at 175, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *274 (Answer to Brauner 
Interrogatories); id. at 169, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *269 (Brauner Interrogatories) 
(requesting radio logs). According to the executive branch, the logs that would have contained 
“enroute messages” were destroyed after a year and were therefore unavailable. Id. at 175, 2005 
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *274 (Answer to Brauner Interrogatories). 
 194 Id. at 175, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *274 (Answer to Brauner 
Interrogatories) (responding to plaintiffs’ twenty-ninth interrogatory in the affirmative and 
attaching the requested pictures); see also id. at 169, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *269 
(Brauner Interrogatories). 
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that the plane’s engine trouble occurred “almost immediately before the 
crash” at an altitude of about 18,500 feet.195 It stated that, between 
18,500 and 19,000 feet, “manifold pressure dropped to [23 inches] on 
No. one engine,” and “[t]hereafter engine No. one was feathered.”196 It 
also stated that when the bomb bay doors were opened to facilitate 
parachuting, the plane “fell into a violent spin,”197 and that the plane 
exploded and crashed at 1408 hours about 500 feet above sea level.198 
The plane had an autopilot that was not in use at the time of the 
accident,199 and it had functional firefighting equipment on board.200 
Although the executive branch gave the plaintiffs a “mass of 
documents,” Judge Kirkpatrick concluded that its responses fell “far 
short of the full and complete disclosure of facts which the spirit of the 
rules requires.”201 But the executive branch’s curtailed and limited 
response to the interrogatories in this case was not exceptional. Indeed, 
it was entirely consistent with its persistent and recognized failure to 
respect the purpose and the spirit of the 1938 discovery rules.202 
B.     Executive’s Answers to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories 
1.     Two False Answers 
The executive branch’s answers to plaintiffs’ interrogatories 
certainly fell short of the expectations of the new discovery rules, but 
failing to comport with the spirit of the new rules was a minor lapse by 
comparison to the executive branch’s more egregious failure. In two of 
its answers to plaintiffs’ questions, the executive branch submitted 
answers that were unequivocally inconsistent with the Persons Report 
prepared for the Air Force. 
 
 195 Id. at 172, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *272 (Answer to Brauner 
Interrogatories) (responding to plaintiffs’ seventh and eighth interrogatories regarding engine 
trouble prior to the crash); id. at 166, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *265 (Brauner 
Interrogatories). 
 196 Id. at 172, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *271 (Answer to Brauner 
Interrogatories). 
 197 Id. at 172, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *271. 
 198 Id. at 173, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *272. 
 199 Id. at 173, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *272; see also id. at 166–67, 2005 U.S. S. 
Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *266 (Brauner Interrogatories) (asking whether the plane was 
equipped with automatic pilot and, if so, whether it was in use at the time of the crash). 
 200 Id. at 167, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *266 (Brauner Interrogatories); id. at 
173, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *272 (Answer to Brauner Interrogatories) 
(responding to plaintiffs’ fourteenth and fifteenth interrogatories). 
 201 Brauner v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468, 471 (E.D. Pa. 1950), aff’d, Reynolds v. United 
States, 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1951), rev’d, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
 202 See infra notes 256, 259 and accompanying text. 
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One question submitted by the plaintiffs inquired as to “any engine 
trouble experienced” by the plane prior to the crash.203 On this matter, 
the Persons Report stated that during the feathering of engine one “a fire 
broke out that engulfed the aft half of the engine and the flames 
extended past the left scanner’s window.”204 The report further stated 
that attempts to extinguish the fire were to “no avail,”205 and that the fire 
in the engine eventually “engulf[ed] the entire engine and the wing area 
immediately to the rear of No. 1 engine.”206 Nonetheless, the executive 
branch stated in an answer labeled 8(c) that the fire was 
“extinguished.”207 
The second question that elicited an answer inconsistent with the 
Persons Report was the very last of the plaintiffs’ interrogatories. That 
three-part question inquired as to whether any “modifications” had 
been prescribed for the engines of the B-29 to “prevent overheating of 
the engines and/or to reduce the fire hazard in the engines”; when the 
modifications had been prescribed; and whether the prescribed 
modifications had been made on the plane that crashed.208 The question 
most likely referred to the heat shields that had been developed to 
reduce the frequent B-29 engine fires,209 and, as already noted, the 
Persons Report had concluded that Bomber #866 was not in compliance 
with the Air Force technical order that required the installation of the 
heat shields in all B-29 planes.210 The executive branch gave a one word 
 
 203 Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, supra note 
79, Exhibit K, at 163, 166, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *263, *265 (Brauner 
Interrogatories). 
 204 Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, supra note 
79, Exhibit J, at 103, 120, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *217 (Memorandum for the 
Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force). 
 205 Id. at 120, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *217. 
 206 Id. at 111, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *207 (Persons Report). 
 207 Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, supra note 
79, Exhibit K, at 172, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *271 (Answer to Brauner 
Interrogatories). The Plaintiffs’ interrogatories contained no 8(c), although 8(b) requested a 
description, “in detail,” of any engine trouble the plane experienced. Id. at 166, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. 
Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *265 (Brauner Interrogatories). 
 208 Id. at 169–70, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *269–70 (Brauner Interrogatories). 
 209 The New York Times reported on its front page on November 19, 1949, that General 
Hoyt S. Vandenberg, the Air Force Chief of Staff, had grounded planes “that have not been 
modernized mechanically” at least in part because, as General Curtis Le May was quoted in the 
same report as stating, “[t]he modification and modernization program we have had in 
progress for some time will now be stepped up because we’ve been having entirely too many 
engine fires with unmodified engines.” U.S. Grounds B-29’s, supra note 78, at 1 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Because plaintiffs’ interrogatories were filed with the Clerk of the 
Court at the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, four days 
later, on November 23, 1949, there is a possibility that plaintiffs’ lawyers in Reynolds framed 
their interrogatories based in part on the New York Times report. That possibility is 
strengthened by comparing the language in the New York Times report and the language of the 
specific question. See id. at 169–70, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *269–70 (Brauner 
Interrogatories). 
 210 The Persons Report made it clear that Bomber #866 was not in compliance with two 
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response to the plaintiffs three-part question, and that one word was 
“no.”211 
Because many of the answers to the plaintiffs’ questions tracked the 
Persons Report and the three statements from surviving servicemen, 
there is no doubt that one or more individuals who prepared the 
answers were familiar with the contents of those documents and utilized 
them in preparing the submitted answers. For example, the substance of 
the government’s answers to questions regarding the overheating of the 
plane’s engines during the flight,212 the plane’s altitude when engine 
trouble commenced,213 the point in time when the pilot instructed the 
plane’s personnel to put on their parachutes,214 and whether or not the 
pilot gave an order that the civilian personnel should bail out215 tracked 
 
technical orders that required important modifications. Under a heading entitled “Facts,” the 
report stated: “Technical Orders 01-20EJ-177 and 01-20EJ-178, dated 1 May 1947, were not 
complied with. These Technical Orders provide for changes in the exhaust manifold assemblies 
for the purpose of eliminating a definite fire hazard.” Independent Action for Relief from 
Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, supra note 79, Exhibit J, at 103, 110, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. 
Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *205–06 (Persons Report). In the “Discussion” section of the report, the 
noncompliance was repeated and linked to the fire in engine one. Id. at 114, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. 
Briefs LEXIS 2430, *211 (“The fire was probably caused, however, by breaks which were found 
in the right exhaust collector ring. The fire may have been aggravated by non-compliance with 
Technical Orders 01-20EJ-177 and 01-20EJ-178.”). And then in the section of the report 
entitled “Conclusions,” the report stated that noncompliance with the technical orders made 
Bomber #866 unsafe. Id. at 116, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, *213–14 (“The aircraft is 
not considered to have been safe for flight because of non-compliance with Technical Orders 
01-20EJ-177 and 01-20EJ-178.”). 
 211 Id. at 175, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *274 (Answer to Brauner 
Interrogatories). 
 212 Compare id. at 172, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *271 (Answer to Brauner 
Interrogatories) (“At between 18,500 or 19,000 feet mainfold [sic] pressure dropped to 23” on 
No. one engine. . . . Thereafter engine No. one was feathered. Fire broke out which was 
extinguished.”), with Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the 
Court, supra note 79, Exhibit J, at 103, 132, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *231 
(“[T]here was no further report of trouble or malfunction of the engines until we reached about 
18,500 or 19,000 feet. At that time either Captain Erwin or the engineer reported that the 
manifold pressure on number one had dropped to 23 inches.”) (testimony of Herbert W. 
Moore, Jr., Captain, U.S. Air Force), and id. at 108, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *203 
(“Upon reaching approximately 18,500 feet the manifold pressure on No. 1 engine dropped to 
about 20 inches.”). 
 213 See supra note 212. 
 214 Compare Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, 
supra note 79, Exhibit K, at 163, 172, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *263, *271–72 
(Answer to Brauner Interrogatories) (“All personnel were instructed by the pilot to put their 
chutes on immediately after leveling off at 20,000 feet, and prior to the outbreak of the engine 
fire.”), with Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, 
supra note 79, Exhibit J, at 103, 132, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *231–32 (“I believe at 
about this time that Captain Erwin advised everybody to have their chutes on. . . . I can only 
guess the time lapse between our noticing the trouble with number one engine and the time we 
reached 20,000 feet.”) (testimony of Herbert W. Moore, Jr., Captain, U.S. Air Force). 
 215 Compare Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, 
supra note 79, Exhibit K, at 163, 173, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *263, *272 (Answer 
to Brauner Interrogatories) (“Testimony does not indicate whether or not order was given.”), 
with Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, supra note 
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the information in the disputed documents. Given that the answers to 
the interrogatories were based in part on the Persons Report and the 
witness statements, it is implausible that the individuals who prepared 
the two false answers that concerned the engine fire and the heat shields 
did so in good faith or that the false answers resulted from inadvertence. 
Indeed, the only plausible explanation of the two false answers is that 
they were submitted by individuals who knew that the answers were 
false and who nevertheless intentionally represented the submitted 
answers to be truthful. 
2.     Attorney Affirmation 
The inclusion of the two false statements in the responses to 
plaintiffs’ interrogatories was facilitated by the fact that the lawyer 
representing the Air Force did not have access to the Persons Report or 
to the three statements of the surviving servicemen. The person who 
signed the executive branch’s answers to the interrogatories was not an 
Air Force official but an Assistant United States Attorney, Thomas J. 
Curtin.216 Thus, at the end of the submitted answers, Curtin affirmed 
under oath that he was an Assistant United States Attorney for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania; that he had “read the foregoing 
Answer to Interrogatories; and that answers set forth therein [were] true 
and correct to the best of his knowledge, being based upon information 
furnished the deponent by the Department of the Air Force.”217 In other 
words, Curtin affirmed that in answering the interrogatories he did not 
read the Persons Report or the three witness statements, but instead 
relied—as he stated—in answering the interrogatories upon one or more 
unidentified Air Force officials for information. 
Curtin’s affirmation of the truth, based on information provided by 
unidentified others, permitted Curtin to submit statements to the court 
that were substantively false without himself actually being responsible 
for the falsity and without those within the Air Force who knew the 
truth having to sign a document indicating that they believed that the 
answers submitted to be in fact true. 
 
79, Exhibit J, at 103, 143, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *244 (“At that time Captain 
Erwin ordered everyone to stand by to abandon ship. . . . Captain Erwin or Captain Moore, not 
positive, but one of them said to abandon ship.”) (testimony of Earl W. Murrhee, Technical 
Sergeant, U.S. Air Force), id. at C153, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *254 (“I never 
received [the order to abandon the aircraft], sir.”) (testimony of Walter J. Peny, Staff Sergeant, 
U.S. Air Force), and id. at C136, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *237 (“I had been off 
interphone since going back to the rear and did not hear him give the word to abandon the 
aircraft.”) (testimony of Herbert W. Moore, Jr., Captain, U.S. Air Force). 
 216 Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, supra note 
79, Exhibit K, at 163, 171, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *263, *270. 
 217 Id. at 176, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *275 (emphasis added). 
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C.     The Context 
Why did the Air Force deliberately submit two false answers to the 
interrogatories? Certainly, the two answers—first, that the fire in engine 
number one was extinguished when it was not, and second, that Bomber 
#866 was not out of compliance when, in fact, Bomber #866 lacked heat 
shields which were required by two outstanding Air Force technical 
orders intended to guard against engine fires—were unrelated to 
national security. As reviewed above, B-29 engine fires were common 
and commonly reported, and conceding that Bomber #866 lacked 
required heat shields would not have revealed the design or 
functionality of the heat shield.218 But if national security or flying safety 
did not prompt the submission of false responses, what did? The context 
in which the Air Force submitted its responses suggests answers. 
On November 18, 1949, just weeks before the Air Force prepared 
its answers to plaintiffs’ interrogatories, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, 
the Air Force Chief of Staff, “ordered [the] grounding of all its B-29 
bombers that have not been modernized mechanically or have been 
carrying ‘maximum operating stress.’”219 Vandenberg’s order followed 
by “only a few hours” the “latest B-29 crash . . . at Tampa [Florida]” 
which killed five men and injured four others as the plane was, 
ironically, taking off “to join the search for another B-29 still lost after it 
reported it was landing on the sea off Bermuda.”220 The same New York 
Times front page report announcing Vandenberg’s order grounding the 
B-29s also reported that just a few days before “eighteen men lost their 
lives when two B-29s on a training flight collided near Stockton, 
Calif[ornia].”221 The report further detailed eleven B-29 crashes in 
which at least ninety-one men were killed during the sixteen-month 
period commencing on August 26, 1948 and ending on November 14, 
1949.222 Although the crashes had various causes, Lieutenant General 
Curtis E. LeMay, “head of the Strategic Air Command,” was quoted in 
the report as emphasizing “engine fires” as a serious problem related to 
the crashes.223 “The modification and modernization program we have 
had in progress for some time will not be stepped up,” LeMay stated, 
“because we’ve been having entirely too many engine fires with 
unmodified engines.”224 
 
 218 See supra Part I.A–B. 
 219 U.S. Grounds B-29s, supra note 78, at 1. 
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. at 2. 
 223 See id. at 1–2. 
 224 Id. at 1. 
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Within the context of so many B-29 crashes during the previous 
sixteen months and the grounding of the B-29s in November 1949, the 
disclosure of embarrassing factors concerning the crash of Bomber #866 
over Waycross, Georgia the previous year could have been a sensitive 
matter because of at least three considerations. First, when Bomber #866 
crashed it had been out of compliance with technical orders requiring 
engine modifications specifically designed to minimize the risk of 
engine fires. Moreover, the Air Force’s own investigation into the cause 
of the crash had concluded that Bomber #866 was unfit for flight. Thus, 
the Air Force may well have considered that the disclosure of this 
information would have been tantamount to throwing gasoline on a hot 
fire that was already threatening the Air Force’s reputation and 
standing. 
Second, the crash of Bomber #866 had an unusual if not a unique 
feature to it by comparison to the other B-29 crashes in that the crash 
killed civilian engineers, as opposed to servicemen, who assume the risk 
of injury or death and have little choice but to follow orders. But those 
considerations do not apply to private companies consulting on the 
development of military equipment. Frank Folsom emphasized that very 
important point to General Vandenberg in his November 22, 1948 letter 
to the General. “This accident,” Folsom wrote, “has firmly impressed 
upon our engineering staff the danger of flying in military aircraft and it 
appears that certain steps will be necessary if we are to participate 
adequately in the future in Air Force flight test programs.”225 
Furthermore, Folsom made it clear to General Vandenberg that the 
killing of the civilian engineers had sent shock waves through other 
firms employing electrical engineers engaged in military projects. Thus, 
Folsom wrote: “Since the crash of 6 October 1948, representatives of 
several other companies have informed us that their electronic 
engineers who would normally participate in flight tests have been very 
reluctant to undertake flights in military aircraft.”226 The threatened 
rebellion within the ranks of consulting civilian engineers whose work 
required them to fly on military planes presented a threat not only to the 
Air Force’s reputation and public standing but also to its capacity to 
advance future research projects. 
Third, the Air Force had only become separate and independent 
from the Army in 1947, and was, as a result, struggling to establish itself 
on equal footing with the Army and Navy in terms of such 
considerations as public standing, an Air Force Academy, congressional 
budgetary allocations, and the development of weapons. But as the Air 
Force sought to establish a sound footing for itself, the Navy sought to 
undermine the new branch of the armed services because the Navy 
 
 225 Folsom Letter, supra note 89, at 2. 
 226 Id. at 3. 
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experienced the emergence of the Air Force as a competitive force that 
not only threatened its congressional budgetary support but even held 
out the possibility that the Air Force would one day come to absorb 
under its command the Navy’s air force capacity. Indeed, the “rivalry” 
between the Navy and the Air Force resulted in such “a running 
publicity battle” which was played out in the national press, that in early 
1949 the Secretary of Defense tried to stop the incessant leaked reports 
by consolidating the public information sections of each of the military 
services.227 
D.     Confidential Documents 
The Air Force’s decision to include two false statements in its 
answers to plaintiffs’ interrogatories gave rise to a new imperative. 
Unless the Air Force was willing to get caught lying to the widows, the 
Air Force was now required to withhold the Persons Report from the 
plaintiffs, the judge, and RCA. Thus, when the plaintiffs requested the 
report, the Air Force denied the request.228 
The executive branch defended its refusal to disclose the 
investigatory report on the ground that the document was “not within 
the scope of an interrogatory filed pursuant to Rule 33” of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.229 The meaning of this claim is unclear. The 
report and the witness statements do not offer any explanation as to 
why they were not within the scope of discovery or why they differed 
from the “mass” of other documents the executive branch did turn over 
to the plaintiffs. 
 
 227 Walter H. Waggoner, Armed Forces News Unified to Stop “Leaks” and Rivalry, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 18, 1949, at 1. 
 228 Although it is uncertain, it would seem that the executive branch’s decision not to 
disclose the three witness statements was entirely dependent on the imperative to keep the 
Persons Report confidential. As reviewed above, the witness statements were taken as part of the 
Air Force’s initial curtailed investigation; the questions asked of the witnesses were limited; and 
the statements themselves contained no information concerning the heat shields, the technical 
orders requiring the installation of heat shields on B-29 bombers, or the fact that Bomber #866 
was not in compliance with those technical orders. The witness statements did disclose that the 
crew members had not previously flown together and that the civilian engineers were not 
instructed about emergency procedures, but those embarrassing failures would not have held a 
candle to the incriminating statements in the Persons Report that Bomber #866 was out of 
compliance with heat shield orders and that the plane was “not . . . safe for flight.” Thus, it 
seems highly plausible that the Air Force officials who made the decision not to disclose the 
witness statements decided that it would be more defensible to maintain that the entire 
investigation into the crash was confidential and to refuse to disclose to the plaintiffs any of the 
investigatory documents than it would be to disclose the witness statements and hold back the 
Persons Report. 
 229 Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, supra note 
79, Exhibit K, at 163, 171, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *263, *270 (Answer to Brauner 
Interrogatories). 
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More importantly, in refusing to turn the documents over to the 
plaintiffs, the executive branch did not claim that the documents were 
privileged—it did not even use that word. Nor did it claim that the 
documents contained military secrets, pertained to confidential foreign 
affairs, implicated intelligence methods or sources, or affected flying 
safety. In other words, weeks before the government first used the word 
“privilege” in its legal papers, months before it invoked concerns about 
national security and flying safety as bases for keeping the disputed 
documents confidential, the executive branch refused to disclose the 
disputed documents because of a vague legal claim that did not invoke 
the words “privilege,” “state secrets,” “military secrets,” “national 
defense,” “diplomatic relations,” “intelligence methods, sources, and 
operations,” or anything comparable. 
E.     Judge Kirkpatrick’s Decision 
In response to the government’s failure to turn over the 
investigation report and the witness statements, the plaintiffs made a 
motion requesting that Judge Kirkpatrick compel the government to 
produce the documents.230 The government opposed the motion for two 
reasons: it claimed that the plaintiffs had failed to show “good cause” 
warranting the production of the documents, and it claimed for the first 
time that the disputed documents were “privileged,”231 but the privilege 
it asserted at this time was unrelated to national security.232 
When the discovery dispute was presented to Chief Judge 
Kirkpatrick,233 the judge was unaware of the Air Force’s initial, curtailed 
October investigation, Frank Folsom’s November letter, Persons’ 
subsequent January investigation and report, the Air Force’s decision 
not to share the Persons Report with Folsom and the other engineering 
firms, or the two lies contained in the executive branch’s answers to 
plaintiffs’ interrogatories. All he knew was that the executive branch had 
refused to hand over to the plaintiffs two documents it conceded it had 
and that plaintiffs claimed they needed to prepare for trial. Moreover, 
 
 230 Brauner v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468, 469 (E.D. Pa. 1950), aff’d, Reynolds v. United 
States, 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1951), rev’d, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
 231 Id. at 469–70. 
 232 See id. at 471–72; see also infra text accompanying notes 250–253. 
 233 Chief Judge Kirkpatrick was no inexperienced judge by the time he granted the plaintiffs 
motion to compel the production of the documents and denied the government’s motion to 
quash. Indeed, the Chief Judge had joined the Army Judge Advocate’s Corps during World 
War I, served one term in the House of Representatives from 1921–1923, was nominated by 
President Calvin Coolidge to the district court judgeship in 1927, and served as Chief Judge 
from 1948–1958. FISHER, supra note 3, at 29. The judge’s broad experience on the bench and his 
experience with discovery disputes involving the government came through in his opinion and 
gave the impression of an intelligent judge who was confident, skeptical, and savvy. 
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until now the reasons publicly offered by the executive branch for 
refusing to turn over the disputed documents gave no hint of the events 
just mentioned, nor did they portend that this discovery dispute had the 
potential to turn into a seminal dispute in which the Supreme Court 
would announce new rules to guide the application of the state secrets 
privilege. 
In ruling for the plaintiffs, Judge Kirkpatrick devoted the longer 
portion of his June 30, 1950, opinion to whether the plaintiffs had “good 
cause”234 for the production of the documents. This was an important 
issue in which the Third Circuit had, in another case, recently reversed 
Judge Kirkpatrick’s decision that a party seeking discovery against the 
government had shown “good cause.”235 Judge Kirkpatrick began by 
emphasizing that a trial judge has “wide” discretion in deciding what 
constitutes “good cause” because each case “presents its own particular 
problems and any attempt to establish rigid rules would seriously impair 
the flexibility and efficiency of the federal discovery procedure.”236 That 
stated, Kirkpatrick went on to respond to the claim that the plaintiffs 
had failed to establish “good cause.” The executive branch “suggested” 
that plaintiffs had failed to establish “good cause” because they had 
failed to take the depositions of the three surviving servicemen, and 
stated that the Air Force “might” bring the witnesses to Philadelphia so 
that plaintiffs could depose them or pay the expenses of the plaintiffs’ 
attorney to travel to Florida where the witnesses were based.237 The 
judge concluded from these statements that he did not understand “that 
any binding commitment to that effect had been made,” and stated that 
he lacked the authority to order the same.238 
But, importantly, Judge Kirkpatrick did not leave the matter at that. 
The judge assumed that the plaintiffs could take the deposition of the 
witnesses and then addressed the question of whether the depositions 
would be an adequate substitute for the disputed documents. The 
“disclosure of the contents of their written statements is necessary to 
enable the plaintiffs to properly prepare their cases for trial,”239 he wrote, 
because “the plaintiffs must have accurate and precise firsthand 
information as to every relevant fact, if they are to conduct their 
examination of witnesses properly and to get at the truth in preparing 
for trial. This only the statements can give them.”240 Emphasizing that 
he was “not suggesting that the witnesses on deposition would not 
 
 234 FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (1948) (repealed 1970). 
 235 See Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949). 
 236 Brauner, 10 F.R.D. at 470. 
 237 Id. 
 238 Id. 
 239 Id. 
 240 Id. at 471. 
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answer the questions asked them truthfully,”241 Judge Kirkpatrick stated 
the obvious: “[T]he accident happened more than 18 months ago and 
what the crew would remember now might well differ in important 
matters from what they told their officers when the event was fresh in 
their minds.”242 
The executive branch also argued that the plaintiffs could not 
demonstrate “good cause” because it had provided the plaintiffs with 
answers to their interrogatories and with a substantial number of 
documents.243 Judge Kirkpatrick did not think that these claims 
dissipated the “good cause” the plaintiffs had in fact established 
warranting the disclosure of the documents.244 The Air Force responses 
to the interrogatories, the judge remarked, “are far short of the full and 
complete disclosure of facts which the spirit of the rules requires.”245 As 
an example of an inadequate answer to an important question the judge 
pointed to the interrogatory that asked the Air Force to “[d]escribe in 
detail the trouble experienced.”246 Judge Kirkpatrick then recited the 
government’s answer: “‘At between 18,500 or 19,000 feet manifold 
pressure dropped to 23 inches on No. one engine.’ Obviously,” the judge 
concluded, “the defendant, with the report and findings of its official 
investigation in its possession, knows more about the accident than 
this.”247 
When the judge addressed the Air Force’s refusal to disclose the 
investigative report, his reasons for compelling disclosure were 
convincing: 
The plaintiffs have no knowledge of why the accident happened. 
So far as such knowledge is obtainable, the defendant has it. When 
the airplane crashed, it was wrecked and much of the evidence of 
what occurred was destroyed. Only persons with long experience in 
investigating airplane disasters could hope to get at the real cause of 
the accident under such circumstances. The Air Force appointed a 
board of investigators immediately after the accident and examined 
the surviving witnesses while their recollections were fresh. With 
their statements as a starting point the board was able to make an 
extensive investigation of the accident. These statements and the 
report of the board’s investigation undoubtedly contain facts, 
information and clues which it might be extremely difficult, if not 
 
 241 Id. 
 242 Id. 
 243 Id. at 469–71. 
 244 Id. at 470–71. 
 245 Id. at 471. 
 246 Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, supra note 
79, Exhibit K, at 163, 166, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *265 (Brauner Interrogatories); 
see also Brauner, 10 F.R.D. at 471 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 247 Brauner, 10 F.R.D. at 471. 
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impossible, for the plaintiffs with their lack of technical resources to 
obtain merely by taking the depositions of the survivors.248 
In short, Judge Kirkpatrick concluded that because there was no 
substitute for the investigatory report, plaintiffs were entitled to it and 
the defendants should turn it over to them.249 
In addition to the “good cause” claim, the executive branch also 
claimed that the material in dispute was privileged. But, as Judge 
Kirkpatrick made plain, no claim was made “that this is a case involving 
the well-recognized common-law privilege protecting state secrets or 
facts which might seriously harm the Government in its diplomatic 
relations, military operations or measures for national security.”250 
Instead, Judge Kirkpatrick wrote that the executive branch sought to 
protect the documents under a general statute aimed at assuring the 
preservation of proper government files, which the judge found not 
pertinent to a discovery dispute in an action brought pursuant to the 
Federal Tort Claims statute.251 Alternatively, Judge Kirkpatrick noted 
that the government sought the judicial creation of “a new kind of 
privilege” which protected the proceedings of boards of investigation of 
the armed services “in order to allow the free and unhampered self-
criticism within the service necessary to obtain maximum efficiency, fix 
responsibility and maintain proper discipline.”252 Judge Kirkpatrick 
rejected the invitation to fashion a new privilege stating that he “could 
find no recognition in the law of the existence of such a privilege.”253 
Thus, between the commencement of the Reynolds litigation in the fall 
of 1949, and June 30, 1950, when Judge Kirkpatrick issued his decision, 
there is no evidence that anyone in the Air Force or the executive 
branch viewed the litigation as implicating or touching upon national 
security considerations in the slightest. 
III.     DIFFERENT ROADS TO A SHOWDOWN 
When the Reynolds case was filed in 1949 as a simple tort action 
following an airplane crash, there was nothing about it that suggested 
 
 248 Id. at 470–71. 
 249 Plaintiffs’ attorney Charles J. Biddle succinctly set forth his views on the issue of “good 
cause” in a letter to a New York lawyer, Theodore Matter, dated June 26, 1950: “We concede 
that the rules require a showing of good cause but take the position that such cause exists where 
the essential information is in the hands of the Government and cannot be obtained elsewhere. 
If there was ever a case in which such compulsory disclosure was necessary it would seem to be 
this one.” Letter from Charles J. Biddle to Theodore Matter (June 26, 1950) (on file with 
author). 
 250 Brauner, 10 F.R.D. at 471–72. 
 251 Id. at 471. 
 252 Id. at 472. 
 253 Id. 
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that it would turn into a groundbreaking national security case that 
would ultimately grant the government a breathtakingly broad privilege 
that is subject to serious abuse and is today extremely controversial. In 
January of 1950, when the Air Force objected to the disclosure of the 
Persons Report and the three witness statements, there was still no hint 
that the discovery dispute implicated national security concerns or that 
the case would result in a major national security decision. And in June 
of 1950, when Judge Kirkpatrick specifically stated that the government 
“does not here contend that this is a case involving the well-recognized 
common-law privilege protecting state secrets or facts which might 
seriously harm the Government in its diplomatic relations, military 
operations or measures for national security,”254 and directed the 
government to turn the disputed documents over to the plaintiffs, it 
again seemed that the Reynolds case would pass into the night as just 
another damage action following a horrible accident. And yet within 
two months, the Secretary of the Air Force and Judge Advocate General 
had submitted a statement to Judge Kirkpatrick that gave the impression 
that disclosure of the disputed documents would reveal secrets about the 
military electronic equipment that was being tested in the B-29 that 
crashed.255 How and why did this turnabout in the Air Force’s position 
occur? And why did the Air Force not give the court the impression that 
this discovery dispute implicated national security until August of 1950, 
more than a year after the initial complaint in the case was filed? 
The answers to these questions are complicated. But from the 
evidence available it appears that the Department of Justice and the Air 
Force joined together in an unexpected and unforeseen way and 
converted a mundane tort action into a seminal Supreme Court decision 
for reasons unrelated to national security. Understanding how and why 
the Air Force and the Department of Justice pushed the Supreme Court 
in the Reynolds case into announcing what has become the controversial 
state secrets privilege is important if the conduct of the executive branch 
as well as the Supreme Court in this case is to be understood. And 
understanding the conduct of the executive, as well as of the high court, 
in this case is important because of what it reveals about the capacities 
of the executive to abuse its power by using it, and the judiciary to abuse 
its authority by not using it. 
A.     Department of Justice 
The Justice Department’s drive to establish a broad executive 
privilege is rooted in discovery provisions embodied in the 1937 reform 
 
 254 Id. at 471–72. 
 255 See infra Part III.C. 
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of civil procedure. It also incorporated into its effort both a British 
House of Lords decision and a law review Article authored by a Justice 
Department attorney. 
1.     Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
As unanticipated as it may be, a major part of the impetus behind 
the government’s assertion of privilege in the Reynolds case is rooted in 
the modern reform of procedures for civil actions in federal courts and 
the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. Those 
rules, and most particularly the discovery rules, were intended, as is well 
known, “to abolish trial by ambush, to banish the old fixed principle of 
keeping an opponent in the dark and the sporting theory of justice.”256 
As a consequence of the new discovery rules, parties submitted to the 
federal government discovery requests in the form of interrogatories, 
depositions, and the production of documents.257 These discovery 
requests gave rise to an important new set of legal questions focused on 
the extent to which the federal government was subject to discovery 
under the new rules and what, if any, restrictions or privileges were 
available to the government that might not be available to a private 
party. 
In the wake of the new rules, the government strenuously resisted 
discovery requests. Indeed, government resistance to discovery became 
such a pattern that two scholars, Raoul Berger and Abe Krash, observed 
in 1950: “No one has more eagerly resorted to the discovery machinery 
than the Government; no one has been more grudging in making it 
reciprocally available.”258 A similar conclusion was echoed by District 
Judge Leon R. Yankwich after years of observing the government’s 
conduct in discovery disputes in anti-trust cases: 
In all these cases, particularly those seeking injunctive relief, the 
Government expects the utmost cooperation of the defendants or 
even prospective defendants in placing their files and records, ranging 
over periods of years, at the disposal of its agents. When objection is 
encountered, the widest use is made of the process of the courts. A 
justified criticism of the Government is, however, that it is not so 
generous in reciprocating. Thus, the government stands on the liberal 
rules which allow them to plead the facts generally and resists at all 
stages, every attempt to compel them, through bills of particulars, to 
 
 256 Raoul Berger & Abe Krash, Government Immunity from Discovery, 59 YALE L.J. 1451, 
1451 (1950) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 257 See James A. Pike & John W. Willis, Federal Discovery in Operation, 7 U. CHI. L. REV. 297 
(1939); see also, e.g., Brauner v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468 (E.D. Pa. 1950), aff’d, Reynolds v. 
United States, 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1951), rev’d, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
 258 Berger & Krash, supra note 256, at 1451. 
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supply data which would give the defendants a definite idea of the 
line of attack which they may expect at the trial.259 
The government vigorously opposed discovery requests on several 
grounds. Because Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at that 
time required that a party seeking an order compelling production of 
documents establish “good cause” for such production,260 the 
government routinely asserted that the moving party seeking 
production had failed to demonstrate “good cause” as required explicitly 
by the rules.261 The government also relied heavily on the “housekeeping 
statute,” adopted in 1789, that provided: “The head of each department 
is authorized to prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the 
government of his department, the conduct of its officers and clerks, the 
distribution and performance of its business, and the custody, use, and 
preservation of the records, papers, and property appertaining to it.”262 
Although the wording of this statute seems to do no more than 
authorize the head of a department to take some steps to organize the 
administration of a department, the government tried to stretch the 
statute from being understood as nothing more than “a provision for 
routine administration by agency heads in handling their internal 
housekeeping” to be “a grant of independent authority, in accordance 
with and as part of the fabric of the constitutional plan of separation of 
powers,” which the government asserted “stems directly from the 
original organic acts establishing the executive departments” and is 
“thus one of the cornerstones of the executive branch.”263 
As the government pressed these claims—one based on the new 
rules and one based on a 1789 statute—in the courts throughout the 
1940s, it failed to secure from the Supreme Court a broad ruling offering 
it the protection from discovery it sought. Thus, two law review 
comments, one at the beginning part of the decade and one at the end, 
striking a similar note, seem to have captured the legal uncertainty at the 
time. One commentator observed in a 1942 law review Article: 
[T]he existing law is at one or the other of two equally undesirable 
extremes. Either . . . the Government is ensconced behind an 
impregnable wall of immunity and privilege, or . . . it stands upon the 
same level as the ordinary private litigant except as to matters 
involving affairs of state. The ideal is probably somewhere between 
the two.264  
 
 259 Leon R. Yankwich, Observations on Anti-Trust Procedures, 10 F.R.D. 165, 168 (1951). 
 260 See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 3 n.3 (1953). 
 261 See Pike & Willis, supra note 257, at 306; see also, e.g., Brauner, 10 F.R.D. 468. 
 262 1 Stat. 28, 49, 65, 69 (1789) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 301 (2006)); see also 
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 4 n.4. 
 263 See Cotton Valley Brief, supra note 20, at *35. 
 264 John D. O’Reilly, Jr., Discovery Against the United States: A New Aspect of Sovereign 
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Seven years later, another student of the subject reached a similar 
conclusion: 
The pattern of the cases indicates that it would be incorrect to 
conclude either that data in the control of executive departments or 
administrative agencies is generally privileged from production, or to 
conclude that it is generally not so privileged. Generalizations based 
on either alternative would not form adequate bases for predicting 
the results of particular cases.265 
2.     Two Cornerstones of the Executive Privilege Argument 
Two legal developments during the 1940s gave rise to what 
eventually became a sweeping claim that the Justice Department termed, 
perhaps for the first time in 1950, “executive privilege.”266 One was a 
1942 decision by the British House of Lords; the other, a 1949 law 
review Article written by a Justice Department attorney. The House of 
Lords decision requires careful review because the Justice Department 
relied upon it in its briefs in the Reynolds case, and because Chief Justice 
Vinson in his Reynolds opinion not only cited and discussed the House 
of Lords decision but substantially relied upon it as a guide for 
fashioning the doctrinal rules in Reynolds. The law review Article 
deserves discussion because Air Force Secretary Finletter’s statement 
submitted to Judge Kirkpatrick relied upon it, and because the Justice 
Department shaped its claims regarding United States law and practice 
in Reynolds based largely on the law review Article. 
a.     House of Lords 
In 1942, the British House of Lords decided Duncan v. Cammell, 
Laird & Co., a damage action resulting from what appears to have been 
the accidental sinking of a submarine during a submergence test that 
killed ninety-nine men.267 During the course of the litigation, the 
 
Immunity?, 21 N.C. L. REV. 1, 13 (1942). 
 265 William V. Sanford, Evidentiary Privileges Against the Production of Data Within the 
Control of Executive Departments, 3 VAND. L. REV. 73, 81 (1949). 
 266 See Cotton Valley Brief, supra note 20, at 30. 
 267 Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., [1942] A.C. 624 (H.L.) 625–26 (appeal taken from 
Eng.). In deciding Duncan, the court distinguished a dispute between private parties in which 
the Admiralty had a direct interest, as in the Duncan case, from two other situations. In one, 
“the Crown (which for this purpose must be taken to include a government department, or a 
minister of the Crown in his official capacity) is a party to a suit,” and in such a suit, the Crown 
“cannot be required to give discovery of documents at all. No special ground of objection is 
needed.” Id. at 632. In the other, the court distinguished the Duncan case from a criminal 
action “where an individual’s life or liberty may be at stake.” Id. at 633–34. Thus, although the 
ruling in Duncan was limited in the United Kingdom to civil cases between private parties in 
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plaintiffs sought design documents from the defendant company, which 
built the submarine under contract with the Admiralty.268 The First 
Lord Admiralty opposed disclosure on the ground that “it would be 
injurious to the public interest that any of the said documents should be 
disclosed to any person.”269 
In deciding Duncan, the House of Lords set out three basic 
questions: Does the Crown have the right to keep certain documents 
confidential on the grounds that disclosure would be contrary to the 
public interest?270 If so, what is the proper form in which objection 
should be made? And lastly, when the Crown objects to disclosure, 
“should it be treated by the court as conclusive, or are there 
circumstances in which the judge should himself look at the documents 
before ruling as to their production?”271 
The House of Lords quickly decided on the basis of past practices 
that in theory the Crown had the right to keep information confidential 
in the name of the “public interest”: 
The principle to be applied in every case is that documents otherwise 
relevant and liable to production must not be produced if the public 
interest requires that they should be withheld. This test may be found 
to be satisfied either (a) by having regard to the contents of the 
particular document or (b) by the fact that the document belongs to a 
class which, on grounds of public interest, must as a class be withheld 
from production.272 
Later in its opinion, the House of Lords amplified on this 
important but brief statement by offering a further description of the 
documents that are properly kept confidential. It stated that documents 
may be withheld if they would be “injurious to national defence, or to 
good diplomatic relations, or where the practice of keeping a class of 
documents secret is necessary for the proper functioning of the public 
service.”273 
But the House of Lords added a strong word of caution which 
further amplified what documents may be properly kept confidential. It 
would not be “out of place,” the Court stated, “to indicate the sort of 
 
which the Crown was not a party or in which the Crown had intervened to protect the 
confidentiality of documents subject to a discovery dispute, the Department of Justice used the 
decision during the 1940s as one of its key building blocks in civil cases in arguing for a broad, 
unqualified, and absolute privilege against discovery whether the government was or was not a 
party. 
 268 Id. at 626. 
 269 Id. at 626–27. 
 270 Id. at 633. 
 271 Id. at 636–37 (posing the latter two questions). 
 272 Id. at 636. 
 273 Id. at 642. 
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grounds which would not afford to the minister adequate justification 
for objecting to production.”274 And then the Court stated: 
It is not a sufficient ground that the documents are “State 
documents” or “official” or are marked “confidential.” It would not 
be a good ground that, if they were produced, the consequences 
might involve the department or the government in parliamentary 
discussion or in public criticism, or might necessitate the attendance 
as witnesses or otherwise of officials who have pressing duties 
elsewhere. Neither would it be a good ground that production might 
tend to expose a want of efficiency in the administration or tend to 
lay the department open to claims for compensation. In a word, it is 
not enough that the minister of the department does not want to 
have the documents produced.275 
In endorsing a privilege for certain documents, the House of Lords 
explained why a privilege was warranted. The Court asserted: 
[T]he public interest is also the interest of every subject of the realm, 
and while, in these exceptional cases, the private citizen may seem to 
be denied what is to his immediate advantage, he, like the rest of us, 
would suffer if the needs of protecting the interests of the country as 
a whole were not ranked as a prior obligation.276 
The second question the Court addressed was the form of the 
objection interposed by the Crown. The Court’s requirements were 
straightforward: 
The essential matter is that the decision to object should be taken 
by the minister who is the political head of the department, and that 
he should have seen and considered the contents of the documents 
and himself have formed the view that on grounds of public interest 
they ought not to be produced, either because of their actual contents 
or because of the class of documents, e.g., departmental minutes, to 
which they belong.277 
The Court made it clear that if the matter arose before the 
commencement of a trial the submission of an affidavit by the minister 
would be sufficient, and that if the matter arose once a trial commenced 
that a minister might, when circumstances required, be required to 
personally attend and testify.278 
The third question—whether a judge should treat an objection 
from a minister as “conclusive”—was the most perplexing and 
important. The Court concluded that it should: “[A]n objection validly 
 
 274 Id. 
 275 Id. 
 276 Id. at 643. 
 277 Id. at 638. 
 278 Id. 
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taken to production, on the ground that this would be injurious to the 
public interest, is conclusive. . . .”279 There is much in the opinion to 
construe this seemingly straightforward claim to mean that a Court will 
uphold a minister’s objection if the minister’s affidavit complies with the 
requirements set forth in the opinion. For example, the Court noted that 
a judge might well be unable to know after reviewing a document in 
private why a minister objects to its being made public, thus requiring 
an inquiry into the objection. Such an inquiry might compromise the 
required secrecy or, the court speculated, that “the same reasons which 
induced the department to say that the report itself ought not to be 
produced might be thought to preclude the department from giving the 
explanation required.”280 Lastly, although the party seeking discovery in 
the Duncan case had argued that “it is obviously better for the litigant 
that there should be discussions behind his back ex parte than that the 
bare word of the Crown officials should automatically prevail,”281 the 
Court concluded that a hearing at which a judge had private 
communications with one party violates what the Court stated was “a 
first principle of justice that the judge should have no dealings on the 
matter in hand with one litigant save in the presence of and to the equal 
knowledge of the other.”282 
Nonetheless, there are two aspects of the opinion that at least raise 
a question as to whether the Court really meant that a minister’s 
objection that satisfied the requirements of an affidavit should be 
conclusive on a court or whether a court might in some limited 
circumstances actually review the documents. The first is the inclusion 
of the phrase “validly taken” in the very sentence in which the Court 
states that a court should treat a minister’s objection as conclusive.283 
Perhaps the phrase refers to nothing more than an objection that 
conforms with the requirements for an affidavit set forth in the opinion. 
But if that is what the Court meant, it could have made that meaning 
plain by simply stating that an objection supported by an affidavit that 
satisfies the requirements set forth above is conclusive. Instead, the use 
of the term “validly taken” suggests that a claim of privilege should be 
sustained provided that the documents satisfy the substantive 
requirements for the privilege. 
Of course, it is obvious that such a construction undercuts the idea 
that a Court should treat a minister’s objection as conclusive and, as a 
result, absent any other cause for doubt as to the Court’s meaning such a 
 
 279 Id. at 642. 
 280 Id. at 640. 
 281 Id. at 628. 
 282 Id. at 640–41. 
 283 Id. at 642 (“[A]n objection validly taken to production, on the ground that this would be 
embarrassing to the public interest, is conclusive.” (emphasis added)). 
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construction would be dismissed as simply an oversight in writing the 
opinion. But there is more, and it is part of the very sentence that asserts 
that a court should treat a minister’s objection as conclusive and the 
sentences that follow. The court insists that “it is important to 
remember that the decision ruling out such documents is the decision of 
the judge,” and that “[i]t is the judge who is in control of the trial, not 
the executive.”284 Perhaps these assertions were mere window dressing, 
meant to be exhortations without consequences and thus without any 
effect whatsoever on the Court’s conclusion that a minister’s objection is 
conclusive. But if that is what the Court meant, it could have improved 
upon its text to clarify its meaning. Although the Court’s language in 
Duncan qualifies the idea that it set forth an absolute rule, the 
government and the Supreme Court understood Duncan to present an 
absolute and conclusive rule.285 
b.     Herman Wolkinson 
The Duncan decision left the Department of Justice with a foreign 
court opinion that it could use as persuasive authority as it shaped its 
litigation strategy to defend itself from discovery requests. But the 
Duncan decision did not provide the department with historical 
background and precedential citations rooted in U.S. law and history 
that it needed to construct a legal argument that supported the position 
that the executive branch had a right—more or less equivalent to what 
the House of Lords gave the Crown in the Duncan case—to keep 
documents and information confidential. That missing link was 
provided by Herman Wolkinson, an attorney in the Justice Department 
who wrote a long essay—almost 130 pages in total—entitled, Demands 
 
 284 Id. Chief Justice Vinson quoted this very language from Duncan in footnote twenty-one 
of his opinion. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8 n.21 (1953). 
 285 Although this ambiguity exists in the opinion, the Third Circuit understood the Duncan 
opinion to grant the government minister conclusive authority to decide what information and 
under what circumstances the government would disclose. In distinguishing the rule in Duncan 
from the American rule, the Third Circuit stated: “But we do not regard the case as controlling 
in any event. For whatever may be true in Great Britain the Government of the United States is 
one of checks and balances. One of the principal checks is furnished by the independent 
judiciary which the Constitution established.” United States v. Reynolds, 192 F.2d 987, 997 (3d 
Cir. 1951). The executive’s brief in the Reynolds case characterized the Duncan opinion as 
granting a conclusive and absolute privilege. Thus, in relevant part the brief read:  
The House of Lords held that discovery could not be obtained [in the Duncan case]. 
“The principle to be applied in every case is that documents otherwise relevant and 
liable to production must not be produced if the public interest requires that they 
should be withheld.” And the sole arbiter of when the public interest so requires is 
the cabinet minister who heads the department to which the documents belong. 
Brief for the United States at 38–39, Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (No. 21), 1952 WL 82378, at *38–39 
(citation omitted). 
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of Congressional Committees for Executive Papers, that was published in 
three parts in the Federal Bar Journal, a publication of the Federal Bar 
Association, between April and October 1949.286 
Wolkinson’s unqualified conclusion was exactly what the 
Department of Justice would have written: “[O]ur Presidents have 
established, by precedent, that they and members of their Cabinet have 
an undoubted privilege and discretion to keep confidential, in the public 
interest, papers and information which require secrecy.”287 And then to 
add to his fundamental claim, Wolkinson wrote: “Courts have 
uniformly held that the President and the heads of departments have an 
uncontrolled discretion to withhold the information and papers in the 
public interest, and they will not interfere with the exercise of that 
discretion.”288 In support of his conclusion, Wolkinson reviewed 
thirteen presidencies claiming that events in each one of those thirteen 
presidencies supported his conclusion.289 He also reviewed seven 
circumstances in which he claimed that the courts upheld his 
conclusion.290 In the middle of Part III of the Article, Wolkinson made 
reference to the House of Lords decision in Duncan, and asserted that 
the “English view supports the American cases” he referenced in Part II 
of his Article, “that the executive has complete and sole discretion to 
withhold papers and information from the courts, in the public 
interest.”291 
Wolkinson spends little time developing a theory to support his 
conclusion, but what he does provide by way of theory suggests that his 
view is primarily normative rather than functional. Thus, Wolkinson 
has two starting points: One, there are three coequal branches and no 
one branch controls the other.292 And two, the President has total 
control over the executive department, and to the extent that he is 
accountable for his actions, he is accountable to the people, not to 
Congress or to the courts.293 From these two primary positions, 
Wolkinson asserts that the executive branch must have total discretion 
in deciding what information to disclose, to whom to make the 
disclosure, and when to make whatever disclosure it decided in its 
discretion to make. 
 
 286 See Herman Wolkinson, Demands of Congressional Committees for Executive Papers, 10 
FED. B.J. 103 (1949) [hereinafter Wolkinson, Part I]; Herman Wolkinson, Demands of 
Congressional Committees for Executive Papers: Part II, 10 FED. B.J. 223 (1949) [hereinafter 
Wolkinson, Part II]; Herman Wolkinson, Demands of Congressional Committees for Executive 
Papers: Part III, 10 FED. B.J. 319 (1949) [hereinafter Wolkinson, Part III]. 
 287 Wolkinson, Part I, supra note 286, at 103. 
 288 Id. 
 289 Id. at 107–46. 
 290 Wolkinson, Part II, supra note 286, at 226–36. 
 291 Wolkinson, Part III, supra note 286, at 334. 
 292 Wolkinson, Part I, supra note 286, at 103–04. 
 293 Id. at 104–06. 
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As is apparent, Wolkinson’s view is not dependent on establishing 
that the preservation of confidentiality in communications is essential to 
a functioning administration that may require the giving of candid 
instructions and the receiving of candid advice, or to maintaining a 
strong defense, or to the implementation of effective foreign relations. 
These would surely be subsidiary considerations, but Wolkinson does 
not rely upon such consequential arguments. Rather he bases his 
conclusion solely on a normative position that rests on the proposition 
that restricting executive branch discretion in any way in deciding what 
information to disclose would subordinate the executive branch to the 
congress or to the courts in contravention of the first principles 
underlying the constitutional scheme.294 In promoting this position, 
Wolkinson dismisses any value from the contravening principles 
embodied in the checks and balances doctrine that forms one of the 
primary underpinnings of the constitution. 
Wolkinson’s historical claims are unreliable,295 but the merits of 
Wolkinson’s historical analysis were beside the point from the Justice 
Department’s perspective. Wolkinson’s Article provided the Justice 
Department with a citation to a legal periodical and to historical and 
 
 294 Id. at 107. 
 295 Wolkinson’s unqualified conclusion that the executive has an absolute executive privilege 
to decide for itself what information to disclose, when to disclose, and to whom to disclose is 
contradicted by the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
Part IV of that unanimous opinion is entitled “The Claim of Privilege,” and concludes, in 
relevant part: 
Notwithstanding the deference each branch must accord the others, the ‘judicial 
Power of the United States’ vested in the federal courts by Art. III, § 1, of the 
Constitution can no more be shared with the Executive Branch than the Chief 
Executive, for example, can share with the Judiciary the veto power, or the Congress 
share with the Judiciary the power to override a Presidential veto. Any other 
conclusion would be contrary to the basic concept of separation of powers and the 
checks and balances that flow from the scheme of a tripartite government. We 
therefore reaffirm that it is the province and duty of this Court ‘to say what the law is’ 
with respect to the claim of privilege presented in this case. 
Id. at 705–06 (citations omitted) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 
(1803)). The Nixon opinion then further states: 
However, neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for 
confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, 
unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all 
circumstances. The President’s need for complete candor and objectivity from 
advisers calls for great deference from the courts. However, when the privilege 
depends solely on the broad, undifferentiated claim of public interest in the 
confidentiality of such conversations, a confrontation with other values arises. 
Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security 
secrets, we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important 
interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished 
by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a 
district court will be obliged to provide. 
Id. at 706. 
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legal information—no matter how inaccurate or unreliable the claims 
might be—to support an argument that the executive branch retained 
absolute control over what information to disclose to Congress and the 
courts in discovery disputes. And although Wolkinson does not use the 
phrase “executive privilege” in setting forth his position, that is the term 
the Department of Justice used in describing its version of the 
Wolkinson position in a legal brief it prepared shortly after the 
Wolkinson Article was published.296 
The Duncan decision and the Wolkinson Article set the stage for 
the executive branch’s next strategic step: to secure from the Supreme 
Court some protection from the discovery rules authorized by the 1938 
reform of the civil procedure rules. 
B.     Cotton Valley 
The authority of Congress and the courts to demand information 
and documents from the executive branch has never been definitively 
prescribed by the courts, and until the second half of the twentieth 
century the issue was essentially unaddressed by the Supreme Court. 
Indeed, apart from the very limited and oblique discussion of the issue 
in the case of Totten v. United States in 1875,297 the nation’s highest 
court did not issue an opinion that addressed the degree to which the 
executive branch was immune for one reason or another from 
congressional or judicial requests for information until the Reynolds 
case in 1953, and then again twenty-one years later in United States v. 
Nixon.298 
But before the executive branch succeeded in securing a broad 
common law state secrets privilege in the 1953 Reynolds decision (let 
alone a constitutionally-based executive privilege in Nixon in 1974), it 
decided to use its appeal in United States v. Cotton Valley Operators 
Committee299 to press the Supreme Court for the much broader 
privilege—an executive privilege not at all dependent on national 
security considerations—it had been seeking throughout the 1940s.300 
Thus, in the development of the executive branch’s effort to secure from 
the courts a broadly defined privilege, Cotton Valley was much more 
than a dry run for the Reynolds case. Cotton Valley indicates that the 
executive branch had made the judicial creation of a broadly conceived 
 
 296 See Cotton Valley Brief, supra note 20, at 19–20. 
 297 92 U.S. 105 (1875). 
 298 418 U.S. 683 (1974). Of course, there was discussion of the important issue by Chief 
Justice Marshall sitting as a District Judge in United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C.D. Va. 
1807) (No. 14,694). 
 299 339 U.S. 940 (1950) (per curiam). 
 300 See Cotton Valley Brief, supra note 20. 
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executive privilege an important priority before it fastened on the 
Reynolds case as a litigation vehicle to advance this claim. From that 
perspective, the Justice Department’s use of the Reynolds case to press 
the high court for a judicially defined privilege must be understood to be 
simply another step in a series of strategic steps unrelated to national 
security considerations taken by the Justice Department to push the 
Supreme Court to define a broad privilege the executive branch could 
use to protect its documents and information from disclosure. 
In Cotton Valley, the United States sued Cotton Valley Operators 
Committee for a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law.301 The 
defendant had made a motion to require the United States to produce 
for inspection various documents, including reports of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation.302 After consulting Attorney General Tom 
Clark, who became a Justice on the Supreme Court by the time the 
Court decided Reynolds a few years later, the government refused to 
comply with the order to produce claiming that the Attorney General 
“himself” had the right to “determine the question of privilege.”303 In 
response, the trial judge rejected the Attorney General’s position on the 
ground that the grant of such absolute authority to the executive would 
constitute an “abdication of the Court’s duty to decide the matter.”304 At 
that point, the trial judge gave the Justice Department additional time to 
consider whether to comply with the court order, and when the Justice 
Department refused to comply, the court dismissed the government-
initiated anti-trust action against the company.305 
The government appealed to the Supreme Court, and its brief, 
dated March 29, 1950, was filed while the discovery dispute in Reynolds 
was pending before Judge Kirkpatrick.306 Perhaps for the first time ever, 
the brief submitted by the Justice Department to the Court sets forth a 
legal argument it termed “executive privilege.”307 In presenting its 
“executive privilege” argument favoring a broad and unqualified 
executive privilege, the Justice Department relied extensively on the 
Wolkinson Article and on the House of Lords opinion in the Duncan 
case.308 
In Point II of its brief, the Justice Department emphasized that 
“there is, at the minimum, a substantial claim of executive privilege 
 
 301 United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Comm., 75 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. La. 1948), aff’d, 
339 U.S. 940 (1950) (per curiam). 
 302 United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Comm., 9 F.R.D. 719, 720 (W.D. La. 1949), 
aff’d, 339 U.S. 940 (1950) (per curiam). 
 303 Id. 
 304 Id. 
 305 Id. at 720–21. 
 306 See Cotton Valley Brief, supra note 20. 
 307 Id. at 18, 30. 
 308 Id. at 36–37, 44–49. 
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standing in the way of discovery,” and that this claim of “executive 
privilege” is “an independent barrier to the production of the 
documents which the district court ordered.”309 The brief maintained 
that the concept of executive privilege is constitutionally based because 
it is “part of the fabric of the constitutional plan of separation of 
powers.”310 The brief also asserted that the executive branch must have 
the authority to decide for itself whether or not to comply with a request 
for disclosure, and that that is the case whether it is Congress that is 
seeking information or particular documents, or the courts.311 Thus, the 
brief stated: 
The determination of what documents should not be disclosed in the 
public interest is a determination necessarily within the discretion 
and distinctive knowledge of the executive branch. It is the executive 
who day in and day out is responsible for the administration of the 
laws and for the national security, and who is able to evaluate the 
importance of the particular piece of information sought in relation 
to an entire course of government policy or action. To the extent that 
the public interest is at stake in these circumstances, the public 
interest necessarily requires that the determination of what is 
privileged be made by the agency responsible for the national 
program for the protection of which the privilege is asserted. To 
divorce discretion from responsibility is in itself a denial of the public 
interest.312 
The brief sought to support its major contentions by claiming that 
Congress “cannot know the importance of having the doings of the 
executive department kept secret.”313 It claimed that the final political 
check on executive branch of this enormous authority was periodic 
election or impeachment.314 Further, the brief asserted that the courts 
have continuously upheld its legal position: “The courts have repeatedly 
held that they will not and cannot require the executive to produce such 
papers when in the opinion of the executive their production is contrary 
to the public interests.”315 
By the time the appeal in Cotton Valley was presented to the 
Supreme Court, President Harry Truman had appointed Tom Clark to 
the high court.316 Because of his earlier involvement in the matter, 
 
 309 Id. at 30–31. 
 310 Id. at 35. 
 311 Id. at 38–39. 
 312 Id. at 55–56. 
 313 Id. at 38. 
 314 Id. 
 315 Id. at 41. Such authority must rest with the executive branch, and that branch will then be 
held accountable “to the people, and to the House, upon a case of impeachment” if the head of 
the executive department is “causeless, malicious, willfully wrong, or to the detriment of the 
public interests.” Id. at 38. 
 316 See MIMI CLARK GRONLUND, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE TOM C. CLARK: A LIFE OF 
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Justice Clark disqualified himself from participating in the adjudication 
of the case, and because the remaining eight justices divided four-to-
four, the lower court judgment became the law of the case and the broad 
issue of executive privilege that the government was seeking to establish 
was left unresolved.317 
At that point, the Justice Department had to identify another case 
in which it could present its claims for a broadly defined executive 
privilege. Moreover, the Justice Department had to be hopeful about its 
prospects on the assumption that four Justices supported their executive 
privilege claim in the Cotton Valley case, and that Tom Clark’s 
appointment to the Court almost certainly meant that a majority of five 
justices now supported their position.318 And to the extent that the 
 
SERVICE 144–46 (2010). 
 317 United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Comm., 339 U.S. 940 (1950) (per curiam). 
 318 Apart from the outcome in Cotton Valley, other reasons supported such a surmise. 
Justice Department attorneys assessing how the justices would vote on the executive privilege 
claim raised in Reynolds would have assumed, based on prior decisions, see, e.g., Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Dennis v. United States, 341 
U.S. 494 (1951), that Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Reed and Minton would support the 
Justice Department’s claim for a broad executive privilege. In addition, they would have 
assumed based on Tom Clark’s views as Attorney General, especially in the Cotton Valley 
litigation, that Justice Clark would support a broad privilege. 
At that point, a government lawyer would have expected that Justice Robert Jackson would 
provide a sixth vote favoring the privilege. Justice Jackson had been an Attorney General and 
thus could be counted on to appreciate the delicacy of executive branch decisions and the 
deeply-felt need of executive branch officials for confidentiality, in general, and for tightly-
guarded secrecy, when the nation’s security was even possibly at stake. In addition, Jackson had 
penned one of the most frequently-quoted passages powerfully urging judicial deference to the 
executive branch when the nation’s security was at stake. He wrote: 
The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation’s organ for foreign 
affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports are not and ought not to be 
published to the world. It would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant 
information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on 
information properly held secret. Nor can courts sit in camera in order to be taken 
into executive confidences. But even if courts could require full disclosure, the very 
nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such 
decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the political departments of the 
government, Executive and Legislative. They are delicate, complex, and involve large 
elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly 
responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions 
of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and 
have long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial 
intrusion or inquiry.  
Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948). 
Justice Felix Frankfurter would have been another Justice likely to support the claim of 
executive privilege. Although the evidence to support the view that was less dramatic than 
Justice Jackson’s powerful passage, Justice Frankfurter had earned a reputation as a Justice who 
emphasized the importance of judicial deference to the coordinate branches of government, 
and whose conception of the role of the courts in the governing scheme was a modest one. As 
one scholar recently concluded: “For nearly two decades, Frankfurter’s theory of judicial 
restraint would become the unofficial constitutional philosophy of the movement that would 
itself become known as American liberalism.” NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND 
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Justice Department had reason to believe that five members would 
probably support an executive privilege claim, the Justice Department 
may also have felt some sense of urgency to identify an appropriate case 
to present to the high court before the Court’s membership 
unexpectedly changed because of a resignation or a death.319 
C.     The Reynolds Intersection 
Because of the outcome in Cotton Valley and District Judge 
Kirkpatrick’s decision in Reynolds, the interests of the Justice 
Department and the Air Force intersected. The Air Force needed new 
legal grounds for keeping the disputed documents confidential, and the 
Justice Department needed a new case it could use to press its claim for 
executive privilege.320 
 
TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 32 (2010); see also LUCAS A. POWE, JR., 
THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 137 (2000). 
  The government in Reynolds would likely have predicted that Justices Black and Douglas 
would rule against their position because both had ruled against President Truman in the Steel 
Seizure case they and were the only dissenters in the Dennis case. See Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 
582 (Black, J.); id. at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring); Dennis, 341 U.S. at 579 (Black, J., 
dissenting); id. at 581 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Thus, Justices Black and Douglas might have 
been expected to require in Reynolds that the government nonetheless submit the disputed 
documents for an in camera inspection because such an inspection would have left the door 
open for the government to prevail by persuading a judge that the documents in question had 
to be kept secret in whole or in part. 
As it turned out, speculation by government lawyers along the lines suggested above as to 
how the individual Justices would vote on the asserted claim of privilege contained three errors. 
Instead of supporting the government’s claim for privilege, Justices Jackson and Frankfurter 
voted against the government and joined Justice Black to form the three dissenters, whereas 
Justice Douglas supported the government’s claim, thus providing the sixth vote in the 
majority. 
 319 As things turned out, such a concern would have been well placed. Chief Justice Vinson 
died within six months of the Reynolds decision, on September 8, 1953. JAMES E. ST. CLAIR & 
LINDA C. GUGIN, CHIEF JUSTICE FRED M. VISION OF KENTUCKY: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 336 
(2002). Justice Jackson died a little more than one year later, on October 9, 1954. EUGENE C. 
GERHART, AMERICA’S ADVOCATE: ROBERT H. JACKSON 468 (1958). Justice Minton retired three 
years after the Reynolds decision, Justice Reed retired four years after the decision, and Justice 
Burton retired five years after the decision. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES & PRESIDENTS: A 
POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT app. d, at 420–27 (1992). Thus, 
four of the six Justices supporting the Reynolds decision were off the Court within five years of 
the judgment. 
 320 From the Justice Department’s perspective, the Reynolds case presented more compelling 
facts than did the Cotton Valley case. In Cotton Valley, the government commenced the 
litigation, thus presenting the court with the option of forcing the government to choose 
whether to comply with the disclosure order or to have its Sherman Anti-Trust complaint 
dismissed. 339 U.S. 940. In Reynolds, the government did not drag a private party into court. 
Instead, private parties dragged the government into court pursuant to the recently adopted 
Federal Tort Claims Act seeking damages because of a crash of an Air Force plane involved in 
the testing of secret military electronic equipment. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
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1.     Secretary of the Air Force 
On or around July 20, 1950, the Attorney General was notified that 
Judge Kirkpatrick had ordered the Air Force to disclose to the plaintiffs 
the disputed documents.321 His office in turn probably notified Thomas 
K. Finletter, who up to that point had been Secretary of the Air Force for 
about three months,322 of Judge Kirkpatrick’s order, for Finletter almost 
immediately sent a letter to Judge Kirkpatrick objecting to the disclosure 
of the “confidential” report because the disclosure of the report would 
threaten flying safety.323 Finletter’s letter, which Justice Department 
lawyers later stated Finletter sent “on his own initiative”324 and without 
consultation with the Justice Department, made no mention of military 
secrets, state secrets, or national security; his claim for confidentiality 
was based solely on flying safety.325 
 
 321 Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 990 (3d Cir. 1951), rev’d, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
 322 Finletter’s stepping stone to succeeding Stuart Symington as the Secretary of the Air 
Force occurred in 1947, when Finletter chaired President Truman’s Air Policy Commission, 
which generated a report entitled “Survival in the Air Age.” PRESIDENT’S AIR POLICY COMM’N, 
SURVIVAL IN THE AIR AGE (1948). The lengthy report concluded that “[w]orld peace and the 
security of the United States are now the same thing,” and that the United States must build a 
“Military Establishment [which] must be built around the air arm” because “[o]ur military 
security must be based on air power.” Id. at 4, 8. 
 323 Finletter’s letter stated: 
Acting under the authority of Section 161 of the Revised Statutes (5 U.S.C. 22), 
it has been determined that it would not be in the public interest to furnish this 
report of investigation as requested by counsel in this case. This report was prepared 
under regulations which are designed to insure the collection of all pertinent 
information regarding aircraft accidents in order that all possible measures will be 
developed for the prevention of accidents and the optimum promotion of flying 
safety. Because this matter is one of such primary importance to the Air Force, it has 
been found necessary to restrict the use of aircraft accident reports to the official 
purpose for which they are intended. Under our regulations, this type of report is not 
available in courts-martial proceedings or other forms of disciplinary action or in the 
determination of pecuniary liability. 
It is hoped that the extreme importance which the Department of the Air Force 
places upon the confidential nature of its official aircraft accident reports will be fully 
appreciated and understood by your Honorable Court. 
Reynolds, 192 F.2d at 990 (quoting Letter from Thomas K. Finletter, Sec’y of the Air Force, to 
the U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Penn. (July 24, 1950)). At that very time, the plaintiffs’ 
attorney had the strong impression that the Air Force would not disclose the investigation 
report. Thus, in a letter dated, July 25, 1950, or one day after the date on the letter Secretary 
Finletter sent to Judge Kirkpatrick, Charles J. Biddle wrote: “The United States Attorney advises 
me that the Government flatly refuses to produce the report inasmuch as the Air Force takes 
the position that these reports are confidential and it is not in the public interest that they 
should be produced.” Letter from Charles J. Biddle to Theodore Mattern (July 25, 1950) (on file 
with author). 
 324 Brief for the United States at 5, Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1(1952) (No. 21), 1952 WL 82378, at 
*5 (“After having been notified of this action, the Secretary of the Air Force, on his own 
initiative, caused a letter to be presented to the District Court.” (emphasis added)). 
 325 As noted, we now know that the disputed documents did not contain such information, 
see supra Part I.C–E, and since Finletter knew that the documents contained no such 
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Finletter sent Judge Kirkpatrick a second statement, dated August 
9, 1950,326 which was six pages in length, consisted of nine paragraphs, 
and was drafted in conjunction with Justice Department lawyers.327 
Finletter offered several grounds to support the claim of confidentiality. 
First, he claimed that plaintiffs were not entitled to the documents 
because they had failed to establish “good cause” or a “necessity” for the 
production of the documents. He buttressed this point by emphasizing 
that the Air Force had offered to make the three military witnesses 
available to the plaintiffs for examination.328 
Next, the Secretary claimed that confidentiality was required to 
advance flying safety. He asserted that the investigative report and the 
witness statements were “prepared under regulations which are 
designed to insure the disclosure of all pertinent factors which may have 
caused, or which may have had a bearing on, the accident in order that 
every possible safeguard may be developed so precautions may be taken 
for the prevention of future accidents and for the purpose of promoting 
the highest degree of flying safety.”329 He maintained that the statements 
“are obtained in confidence, and these reports are prepared for intra-
departmental use only.”330 The Secretary stated that the disclosure of the 
witness statements “would have a deterrent effect upon the much 
desired objective of encouraging uninhibited statements in future 
inquiry proceedings instituted primarily in the interest of flying 
safety.”331 
The Secretary next object[ed] to the production” of the report and 
the witness statements on the ground that the “aircraft in question, 
together with the personnel on board, were engaged in a confidential 
mission of the Air Force.”332 He stated that the plane “carried 
confidential equipment on board and any disclosure of its mission or 
 
information, that explains why Finletter’s letter to Judge Kirkpatrick made no such claim. 
 326 See Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, supra 
note 79, Exhibit C, at 28, 29, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *129, *129 (Finletter 
Statement); see also Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the 
Court, supra note 79, Exhibit D, at 35, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *138 (Affidavit of 
the Judge Advocate General, United States Air Force (Harmon Statement), Reynolds v. United 
States, Civil Action No. 10142 (1950)). Both of these statements were reproduced as Exhibits C 
and D, respectively in Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Herring v. United States, 424 F.3d 384 (3d 
Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1123 (2006) (No. 05-821). 
 327 Finletter’s letter recounted in detail the historical claims regarding executive privilege, 
which the Justice Department had presented in legal papers in the Cotton Valley litigation and 
which had formed an important part of Wolkinson’s law review Article. Independent Action 
for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, supra note 79, Exhibit C, at 28, 31–34, 
2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *129, *132–38 (Finletter Statement). 
 328 Id. at 29, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *129–30. 
 329 Id. at 30, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *130. 
 330 Id. at 30, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *131. 
 331 Id. at 30, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *131. 
 332 Id. at 30, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *131. 
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information concerning its operation or performance would be 
prejudicial to this Department and would not be in the public 
interest.”333 
Further, Finletter stated it was the “historic position of the 
executive branch of the Government”334 that it was “beyond judicial 
authority”335 to order the executive branch to disclose confidential 
documents. In support of this sweeping assertion, the Secretary listed 
sixteen separate historical incidents beginning with President 
Washington and ending with President Truman which he maintained 
supported his claim that “executive files and investigative reports are 
confidential and privileged.”336 Following the listing of sixteen historical 
incidents, and in further support of what the Secretary characterized as 
the executive’s “historic position,” the Secretary cited a 1941 opinion of 
Associate Justice Robert Jackson, which he rendered when he was 
Attorney General, a statute, a handful of military regulations, two 
Supreme Court opinions, one circuit opinion, ten district court 
opinions, and four additional opinions of the Attorney General.337 
The Secretary concluded his statement by claiming that he declined 
to disclose the disputed documents because he considered the 
“compulsory production of the Reports of Investigation conducted by 
the Board of Officers” to be “prejudicial to the efficient operation of the 
Department of the Air Force,” “not in the public interest,” and 
“inconsistent with national security.”338 
A cursory reading of Finletter’s statement might well cause a reader 
to conclude that the Secretary claimed that the disputed documents 
contained information that constituted a military secret and that the 
disclosure of that information would injure national security. But the 
Secretary never made that claim; he did not state that the documents in 
 
 333 Id. at 30, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *131. 
 334 Id. at 31, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *132. 
 335 Id. at 31, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *132. 
 336 Id. at 31, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *133. 
 337 Id. at 33–34, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *135–37. These claims were similar to 
the claims that the Justice Department pressed in the Cotton Valley litigation, and the historical 
examples offered to support the substantive points were drawn from Wolkinson’s law review 
Article. Wolkinson, Part I, supra note 286. 
 338 Id. at C34. Plaintiffs’ attorney, Charles J. Biddle, thought the idea that the Air Force 
investigatory report into the cause of the B-29 plane crash contained national security 
information was “perfect nonsense.” Letter from Charles J. Biddle to Theodore Mattern (July 
25, 1950) (on file with author) (“To my mind it is perfect nonsense after all these years when B-
29s have had accidents all over the world and have been forced down nearly everywhere, 
including Russia, to say that a report on what caused this accident is a secret which should not 
be disclosed.”). Mr. Biddle speculated that the contents of the investigatory report may have 
been “very unfavorable to the Government’s case.” Id. (“The violent objection to producing 
[the investigatory report] on the part of the Air Force naturally makes one suspicious that it 
may contain some conclusions very unfavorable to the Government’s case, although the refusal 
may be merely a matter of policy.”). 
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question contained information relating to military secrets, foreign 
affairs, or intelligence matters. Nor did he state that the documents 
themselves contained any information pertaining to the secret electronic 
equipment. Finletter’s statement gave the impression that he was 
making these claims, but his precise words stopped short of actually 
making that claim. Instead, what Finletter did claim was that the courts 
lacked authority to compel disclosure and that “compulsory 
production” of the documents would prejudice the Air Force, 
undermine the public interest, and diminish national security. 
A difference between a claim that the disputed documents 
contained military secrets and that compulsory disclosure threatened 
national security is a substantial difference. One claim focuses on the 
content of the documents and the other on the authority of the judiciary 
to compel disclosure. That is not a difference careful lawyers would 
overlook, and Finletter was an experienced and successful Wall Street 
lawyer.339 
Because the lawyers who assisted the Secretary in drafting his 
statement would have favored making the strongest possible claim that 
supported the claim of privilege, they surely would have urged the 
Secretary to include in his affidavit the bolder, more forceful claim— 
that the disputed documents actually contained military secrets. The 
fact that Finletter did not include such a claim must have been because 
the Secretary would not sign such a statement, and the only plausible 
reason for Finletter not signing such a statement would have been that 
the claim was false. If Finletter refused to sign a statement that the 
Justice Department lawyers almost certainly would have sought to have 
Finletter sign, the lawyers who drafted Finletter’s statement must have 
appreciated its deceptiveness. 
2.     Judge Advocate General of the Air Force 
The August 9th two page affidavit submitted to Judge Kirkpatrick 
by Reginald C. Harmon, the Air Force’s Judge Advocate General,340 
focused on two matters. 
 
 339 Finletter began his practice about 1920 with the firm of Cravath, Henderson, Leffingwell 
& de Gersdorff, a precursor of Cravath, Swaine & Moore. After six years he joined the firm 
Coudert Brothers, where he was an active partner, except for a three-year period, 1941–1944, 
when he was a Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, 1926–1950. After serving as Secretary 
of the Air Force, Finletter returned to Coudert Brothers as a partner, from 1953–1961. Profile of 
Thomas K. Finletter, TRUMAN LIBRARY, http://trumanlibrary.org/profile/viewpro.php?pid=68 
(last visited Aug. 6, 2012). 
 340 See Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, supra 
note 79, Exhibit D, at 35, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *138 (Harmon Statement). 
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The first was to make a specific offer to permit the plaintiffs to 
depose the three surviving servicemen at a time and place convenient 
for the plaintiffs and at the government’s expense.341 This offer was in 
direct response to Judge Kirkpatrick’s June 30th opinion in which he 
had stated that he did not understand the Air Force to have made “any 
binding commitment to that effect.”342 
Harmon emphasized that the servicemen will be “authorized to 
testify regarding all matters pertaining to the cause of the accident 
except as to facts and matters of a classified nature.”343 Also, in response 
to Judge Kirkpatrick’s concern that so much time had passed since the 
crash that the servicemen’s recall of the crash’s details would be stale by 
comparison to the statements they provided within a few days of the 
crash, Harmon stated that in preparation for examination the 
servicemen would be permitted to “refresh their memories” by reading 
the statements they gave regarding the accident as well as “other 
pertinent and material records.”344 
In the last two paragraphs of his affidavit, Judge Advocate General 
Harmon stated a different reason for keeping the disputed documents 
confidential. He stated that the disclosure of the disputed documents 
“would have a deterrent effect upon the much desired objective of 
encouraging uninhibited admissions in future inquiry proceedings 
instituted primarily in the interest of flying safety,”345 and he claimed 
that the documents “cannot be furnished without seriously hampering 
 
 341 Id. at 36–37. 
 342 Brauner v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468, 470 (E.D. Pa. 1950), aff’d sub nom. Reynolds v. 
United States, 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1951), rev’d, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
 343 See Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, supra 
note 79, Exhibit D, at 35, 37, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *138, *139 (Harmon 
Statement). 
 344 Id. at 37, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *139. The litigation strategy advanced by 
Harmon’s affidavit substantially cut the ground out from under any claim of privilege based on 
any claim that the witness statements could not be disclosed because they contained 
information that constituted a military secret that would injure the national security. As noted, 
what Harmon did was to offer the deposition of the three servicemen as a substitute for 
disclosing the signed statements and to state that the depositions would be the equivalent of the 
signed statements minus classified information. Since the plaintiffs had no interest in classified 
information, redacted witness statements and depositions would be—using Harmon’s words as 
a guide—essentially the same, and it made no sense for the Air Force to deny the witness 
statements when they were willing to offer the equivalent. Indeed, if the Air Force actually 
meant to make good on its representations and to make the depositions of the servicemen the 
equivalent to the signed statements, it ran the risk of inadvertent disclosure during the 
depositions, which would not exist if redacted witness statements were turned over. It is 
uncertain what reasoning prompted this tactic to offer the depositions instead of redacted 
witness statements. But one likely consideration stemmed from the Air Force’s determination 
not to disclose the Persons Report and the Air Force’s concern that disclosure of a redacted 
witness statement would create powerful pressure to turn over a redacted Persons Report. 
 345 Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, supra note 
79, Exhibit D, at 35, 37, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *138, *140. 
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national security, flying safety, and the development of highly technical 
and secret military equipment.”346 
This statement gives the impression that the documents cannot be 
“furnished” because the documents themselves contain information that 
could not be disclosed without hampering “national security, flying 
safety and the development highly technical and secret military 
equipment” if disclosed.347 But Harmon did not state that the 
documents themselves contained information bearing on these subjects. 
Such a statement would have been easy to write.348 
The difference between the statements—asserting that the disputed 
documents contain substantive information that constitutes a military 
secret, and that the disputed documents “cannot be furnished” without 
hampering national security—is not hairsplitting. The former asserts 
that the content of the document prevents its disclosure; the latter 
claims that the grant of authority to the judiciary to review the judgment 
of senior Air Force officers threatens national security.349 
Given the similarities between the positions set forth in Finletter’s 
and Harmon’s statements and the legal position presented by the 
Department of Justice in the Cotton Valley case, it seems that the Justice 
Department hoped to secure a ruling from Judge Kirkpatrick in the 
Reynolds litigation stating that the courts lacked the authority to compel 
the Air Force to disclose documents it characterized as confidential. 
* * * 
On September 21, 1950, Judge Kirkpatrick ordered the Air Force to 
permit an in camera, ex parte review of the disputed documents to 
determine whether the documents satisfied the legal standard for a 
privilege.350 The Air Force refused to comply with the order, and on 
October 12, 1950, Judge Kirkpatrick made factual findings against the 
Air Force on the issue of liability.351 That ruling in turn left only the 
question of damages unresolved, and after a hearing on damages, Judge 
 
 346 Id. 
 347 See id. 
 348 It might have read as follows: “The documents cannot be furnished without disclosing 
information contained therein that would injure national security, flying safety, and the 
development of highly technical and secret military equipment.” 
 349 Judge Advocate General Harmon’s position was entirely in keeping with the Department 
of Justice’s position, namely that any review by the judiciary of an executive branch decision 
about what documents to disclose and when to do so would threaten a variety of important 
interests, including those itemized by Harmon. 
 350 Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 990–91 (3d Cir. 1951), rev'd, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
 351 Id. at 991. 
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Kirkpatrick rendered a judgment for the plaintiffs in the amount of 
$225,000 on February 27, 1951.352 
IV.     THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against the executive in 
its appeal in the Reynolds case, and the three Supreme Court Justices, 
who eventually dissented from Chief Justice Vinson’s majority 
opinion—Associate Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson—and had 
voted to affirm the Third Circuit’s judgment, took the unusual step of 
stating that they dissented “substantially for the reasons set forth in the 
opinion of Judge Maris below.” Thus, Judge Maris’s opinion constitutes 
a response by the three Supreme Court dissenters to Vinson’s majority 
opinion. 
On behalf of a three judge panel, Judge Maris began by reviewing 
the facts of the case and the lower court proceedings and orders, noting 
that the plane was engaged in the “experimental testing of secret 
electronics equipment.”353 The court then turned to the district court’s 
judgment that the plaintiffs had shown the required good cause for the 
disputed documents. In explaining why it “[could not] say that in 
reaching his conclusion that good cause ha[d] been shown the district 
judge erred,”354 the court quoted four lengthy paragraphs from Judge 
Kirkpatrick’s June 1950 district court opinion which set forth the 
reasons supporting his finding that the plaintiffs had satisfied the good-
cause requirement.355 It then added over two hundred of its own words 
explaining why it thought good cause existed: 
Where, as here, the instrumentality involved in an accident was 
within the exclusive possession and control of the defendant so that it 
was as a practical matter virtually impossible for the plaintiffs to have 
made any independent investigation of the cause of the accident, 
considerations of justice may well demand that the plaintiffs should 
have had access to the facts, thus within the exclusive control of their 
opponent, upon which they were required to rely to establish their 
right of recovery. We agree with the district judge that it is not, under 
the circumstances of these cases, a sufficient answer to say that since 
the names of the witnesses whose statements were sought had been 
supplied in answer to the interrogatories, their depositions might 
 
 352 Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, supra note 
38, ¶ 18, at 7, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *104, *114; see also Herring v. United States, 
No. 03-CV-5500-LDD, 2004 WL 2040272, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2004) (noting that the 
district court made a finding of fact against defendant and awarded plaintiff damages for this 
amount). 
 353 Reynolds, 192 F.2d at 989. 
 354 Id. at 991. 
 355 Id. 
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have been taken by the plaintiffs. Obviously, this is no answer at all to 
their demand for the production of the investigation report. And 
under the circumstances here disclosed, as the district judge has 
cogently pointed out, it may well have been of vital importance to the 
plaintiffs to have knowledge of the contents of the statements made 
by the survivors immediately after the crash even though their 
depositions could also have been taken.356 
The court next addressed the executive branch’s sweeping 
executive-privilege claim that it summarized as follows: 
The Government’s claim of privilege is based primarily on 
Section 161 of the Revised Statutes. The primary contention is that 
this section in giving to the Secretary of the Air Force authority to 
prescribe regulations for the custody and use of the records and 
papers of his Department necessarily confers upon him full 
discretionary power in the public interest to refuse to produce any 
such records for examination and use in a judicial proceeding and 
that such records thereby become “privileged.” The doctrine of 
separation of powers of the executive and judicial departments of the 
Government which is embodied in the Constitution is said to place 
the exercise of this discretionary power by the Secretary wholly 
beyond judicial review. In passing upon the validity, as applied to 
these cases, of this contention by the Government that it cannot be 
compelled to produce any records of the Department of the Air 
Force which the Secretary of that Department deems it not to be in 
the public interest to produce, it is necessary to consider the precise 
setting in which the contention is made.357 
Without describing each turn of its analysis here, the court 
concluded that the Federal Tort Claims Act “divested the United States 
of its normal sovereign immunity to the extent of making it liable in 
actions . . . in the same manner as if it were a private individual,”358 and 
in so doing withdrew the right of the executive departments, at least in 
tort claims, “to determine without judicial review the extent of the 
privilege against disclosure of Government documents sought to be 
produced for use in the litigation.”359 
The court next turned to the government’s broad argument that 
the witness statements and the investigatory reports were privileged in 
that they were secured to advance flight safety, and that promising 
confidentiality to individuals was necessary to that goal and would be 
defeated if the documents were disclosed to a private party in 
litigation.360 Here again the court rejected the government’s claim, in 
 
 356 Id. at 992. 
 357 Id. (footnote omitted). 
 358 Id. at 993. 
 359 Id. 
 360 See id. at 993–94. 
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part based on the reasoning that in passing the Federal Torts Claim Act 
Congress decided that the “greater public interest involved in seeing that 
justice is done to persons injured by governmental operations” 
outweighed the value of confidentiality, at least in government 
documents related to an accident.361 
But the court did not rest its response there. It directly confronted 
the executive branch’s effort to establish an evidentiary privilege based 
on a general claim of confidentiality by asserting that it constituted a 
“sweeping privilege” which it judged “contrary to a sound public 
policy.”362 The court stated that if it endorsed such a privilege it would 
be “but a small step to assert a privilege against any disclosure of records 
merely because they might prove embarrassing to government 
officers.”363 Indeed, it was at this point in its argument that the court 
stated that the privilege the government sought had no logical stopping 
point. It wrote, “it requires no great flight of imagination to realize that 
if the Government’s contentions in these cases were affirmed the 
privilege against disclosure might gradually be enlarged by executive 
determinations until, as is the case in some nations today, it embraced 
the whole range of governmental activities.”364 
But the court was not satisfied with leaving its assessment of the 
government’s claim for confidentiality even at that point. It continued: 
We need to recall in this connection the words of Edward Livingston: 
“No nation ever yet found any inconvenience from too close an 
inspection into the conduct of its officers, but many have been 
brought to ruin, and reduced to slavery, by suffering gradual 
imposition and abuses, which were imperceptible, only because the 
means of publicity had not been secured.” And it was Patrick Henry 
who said that “to cover with the veil of secrecy the common routine 
of business, is an abomination in the eyes of every intelligent man 
and every friend to his country.”365 
The court then tackled another issue. When the government 
refused to permit Judge Kirkpatrick to examine the disputed documents 
in camera, he found against the government pursuant to the rules of 
civil procedure on the issue of negligence and barred the government 
from submitting evidence to controvert this finding. In affirming this 
result, the appeals court referred to the established rule in criminal law 
which is that it “reveal all evidence within its control which bears upon 
 
 361 Id. at 994–95. 
 362 Id. at 995. 
 363 Id. 
 364 Id. 
 365 Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting 1 EDWARD LIVINGSTON, THE COMPLETE WORKS 15 (New 
York, Nat’l Prison Ass’n of the United States 1873); and 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 170 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 
Washington 1836)). 
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the charges or let the offense go unpunished,” and concluded that the 
Federal Tort Claims Act “offers the Government an analogous choice in 
tort claims cases.”366 Thus, the court concluded that, under the relevant 
statutes, the government could “recognize the public interest involved in 
according justice to the private claimant . . . by producing relevant 
documents,” or it could “give priority to the public interest which it 
believes to be involved in preserving the documents from disclosure by 
declining to produce them” knowing that “the facts to which the 
documents are directed [will be] taken by the court to be established” 
against it.367 Here, the government had the same choice: It could comply 
with the court’s order to permit judicial inspection of the documents or 
it could have relevant factual findings made against it.368 
The court addressed the government’s claim of a state secrets 
privilege in the last three pages of its opinion. The court, quoting from 
Secretary Finletter’s statement, stated that the Air Force claimed that 
“the aircraft in question, together with the personnel on board, were 
engaged in a confidential mission of the Air Force. The plane likewise 
carried confidential equipment on board and any disclosure of its 
mission or information concerning its operation or performance would 
be prejudicial to this Department and would not be in the public 
interest.”369 
By comparison to the government’s other claims of privilege, the 
court stated that this claim was “of a wholly different character” in 
that—and here Judge Maris was plainly misled by Secretary Finletter’s 
statement—Secretary Finletter “asserts in effect that the documents 
sought to be produced contain state secrets of a military character.”370 
 
 366 Id. 
 367 Id. 
 368 The court stated: 
We think that the Federal Tort Claims Act offers the Government an analogous 
choice in tort claims cases. The Government may decide to recognize the public 
interest involved in according justice to the private claimant who has brought suit 
against it by producing relevant documents in its possession upon an order of the 
court under Rule 34. On the other hand the Government may decide to give priority 
to the public interest which it believes to be involved in preserving the documents 
from disclosure by declining to produce them upon the order of the court at the cost, 
if its claim of privilege is overruled, of having the facts to which the documents are 
directed taken by the court to be established against the United States under Civil 
Procedure Rule 37(b)(2)(i). This last is the alternative which the Government chose 
in the cases now before us. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure offer such a choice 
to private litigants under similar circumstances and we are satisfied that under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act the same choice is presented to the Government which, as 
we have seen, has been placed by Congress in this respect in the position of a private 
individual defending against a tort action. 
Id. at 995–96. 
 369 Id. at 996 (quoting Claim of Privilege by the Secretary of the Air Force at 2, Civil Action 
No. 10142 (E.D. Pa. 1950)). 
 370 Id. 
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On the assumption that the disputed documents did indeed 
contain information that constituted military secrets, Judge Maris then 
proceeded with his analysis of the remaining issues. The judge quickly 
conceded that “[s]tate secrets of a diplomatic or military nature have 
always been privileged from disclosure in any proceeding and 
unquestionably come within the class of privileged matters referred to in 
Rule 34.”371 But he noted that the district judge “fully recognized” this 
privilege: 
[H]e directed that the documents in question be produced for his 
personal examination so that he might determine whether all or any 
part of the documents contain, to use the words of his order, 
“matters of a confidential nature, discovery of which would violate 
the Government’s privilege against disclosure of matters involving 
the national or public interest.”372 
Thus the appellate court concluded the government was “adequately 
protected . . . from the disclosure of any privileged matter contained in 
the documents in question.”373 
In response to the government’s claim it was “within the sole 
province of the Secretary of the Air Force to determine whether any 
privileged material is contained in the documents and that his 
determination of this question must be accepted by the district court 
without any independent consideration of the matter by it,” the Court 
stated it “cannot accede to this proposition.”374 And then to make 
certain there was no doubt as to what it thought of the government’s 
position, how it assessed judicial competence to assess national security 
matters, and what it considered the judiciary’s role in the governmental 
structure, the court wrote: 
[W]e are satisfied that a claim of privilege against disclosing evidence 
relevant to the issues in a pending lawsuit involves a justiciable 
question, traditionally within the competence of the courts, which is 
to be determined in accordance with the appropriate rules of 
evidence, upon the submission of the documents in question to the 
judge for his examination in camera. Such examination must 
obviously be ex parte and in camera if the privilege is not to be lost in 
its assertion. But to hold that the head of an executive department of 
the Government in a suit to which the United States is a party may 
conclusively determine the Government’s claim of privilege is to 
abdicate the judicial function and permit the executive branch of the 
 
 371 Id. at 996 (footnote omitted). 
 372 Id. 
 373 Id. 
 374 Id. at 996–97. 
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Government to infringe the independent province of the judiciary as 
laid down by the Constitution.375 
But the government had another turn in its argument and that was 
the claim that the court should follow the 1942 decision rendered by the 
British House of Lords.376 The court of appeals flatly rejected the claim: 
“[W]hatever may be true in Great Britain,” the court maintained, “the 
Government of the United States is one of checks and balances.”377 And 
“[o]ne of the principle checks,” it wrote, “is furnished by the 
independent judiciary which the Constitution established.”378 Neither of 
the politically accountable branches of government, the court 
continued, “may constitutionally encroach upon the field which the 
Constitution has reserved for the judiciary by transferring to itself the 
power to decide justiciable questions” properly presented to the 
judiciary.379 
The Third Circuit panel had little patience for the argument that “a 
danger to the public interest”380 existed when a question of privilege was 
submitted to the judiciary. “The judges of the United States,” the court 
wrote, “are public officers whose responsibility under the Constitution 
is just as great as that of the heads of the executive departments.”381 
Moreover, the court asserted, in cases involving alleged state secrets, 
“the judges may be depended upon to protect with the greatest of care 
the public interest in preventing the disclosure of matters which may 
 
 375 Id. at 997 (footnotes omitted). 
 376 Id. 
 377 Id. A few years before Judge Maris criticized the British rule in Duncan v. Cammell, Laird 
& Co., [1942] A.C. 624 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.), Judge Clark of the Second Circuit had 
leveled the following negative evaluation: 
The English experience seems not wholly untroubled; compare the earlier case of 
Robinson v. State of South Australia (1931) A.C. 704, and the discussions in 56 
Harv.L.Rev. 806; 58 L.Q.Rev. 1, 31, 232, 243, 436, 462, 59 Id. 51; 8 Camb.L.J. 328; 58 
Scot.L.Rev. 102; 60 Id. 1, with extensive reliance upon the classic limitations on 
executive power stated by Wigmore, 8 Evidence, 3d Ed. 1940, Secs. 2378a, 2379. Now 
that the war is over, these scholarly discussions and frequent criticism of some of the 
grounds taken in the Duncan case, supra (1942) A.C. 624 (though not of the decision, 
which clearly involved war secrets), may lead to a reexamination of the important 
issue. 
Bank Line, Ltd. v. United States, 163 F.2d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 1947) (Clark, J., concurring). 
 378 Reynolds, 192 F.2d at 997. 
 379 Id. 
 380 Id. 
 381 Id. at 997–98. For an entirely different assessment of Article III judicial competence and 
responsibilities, see Justice Jackson’s opinion in Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. 
Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948). It is important to note that although 
Justice Jackson penned the powerful paragraph found on page 111, arguing that the judiciary 
should defer to the executive in matters affecting national security, he was one of the three 
dissenters in the Reynolds case, which meant that in this case he favored a judge reviewing the 
disputed documents ex parte and in camera to decide whether the executive’s claim of privilege 
should be sustained. 
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fairly be characterized as privileged.”382 And then with an abbreviated 
nod to a well-worn claim that judges lack a background in the relevant 
facts necessary to decide a matter of privilege, the appeals court stated 
that “those facts also may be presented to the judge in camera.”383 
V.     THE SUPREME COURT PROCEEDINGS 
A.     The Executive’s Brief 
The only brief filed in the Supreme Court in the Reynolds case that 
requires review for our purposes was the brief filed by the executive.384 
That brief did not try to prevail on narrow and limited grounds. Instead, 
it was based on the premise that the executive would prevail on 
exceedingly broad grounds. As a result, the executive branch pressed the 
Court, as it had in Cotton Valley, to grant it a sweeping privilege—an 
absolute privilege—to keep confidential any information the head of an 
executive department concluded should be kept confidential. 
1.     Legal Claim 
The executive’s ambitious hopes were stated in the executive’s 
framing of the basic question the case raised: “This case presents the 
question whether the judiciary can compel executive officials to disclose, 
in the course of litigation, departmental documents which the officials 
believed should be withheld in the public interest.”385 Two aspects of the 
question framed by the lawyers are highly revealing. First, the executive 
argued that the courts had no authority to review or modify the 
judgment of an executive branch official who concluded that the “public 
interest”—and the concept of “public interest” was defined broadly to 
include an array of interests such as efficiency in administration, 
confidentiality in communications, as well as more traditional 
considerations such as the identity of informers, diplomatic relations, 
and military secrets—required that “departmental documents” should 
 
 382 Reynolds, 192 F.2d at 997. 
 383 Id. The plaintiffs’ attorney, Charles J. Biddle, thought so highly of the Third Circuit 
opinion he considered relying exclusively upon it as his argument as to why the Supreme Court 
should not grant the executive’s petition for writ of certiorari in the case. Letter from Charles J. 
Biddle to Theodore Mattern (Mar. 18, 1952) (on file with author). 
 384 Thus, in this Article no attention is paid to the brief submitted on behalf of the widows or 
to the oral argument. 
 385 Brief for the United States at 15, United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) (No. 21), 
1952 WL 82378, at *15. 
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remain confidential.386 Second, the government argued that courts 
should treat a decision by the executive branch as to what information 
to disclose, to whom to disclose it, and when to disclose it as conclusive 
and without any review whatsoever by the courts.387 The executive 
branch labeled this legal claim, which gave it absolute control over what 
information to disclose, an “executive privilege,” and it maintained that 
its version of “executive privilege” was mandated by the constitution, 
federal statutes and federal common law.388 
Although the executive did argue that the court could grant it the 
relief it sought on the basis of a statute, this was a mere rehashing of a 
position that courts had rejected and its presentation was brief and 
lacking conviction. At that point the brief shifts its focus to a 
constitutional claim, namely a claim that the constitution grants the 
executive an “executive privilege” that is absolute in nature and that 
permits the executive to make—without any oversight whatsoever by 
the judiciary—a decision as to whether the public disclosure of certain 
papers or information is or is not consistent with the “public interest.”389 
The executive asserted that its absolute, constitutionally rooted privilege 
was a complete and total shield protecting it from “Congressional 
attempts to require production by the executive branch, often of the 
very type of documents involved in this case,”390 and that it was “well 
established”391 that courts “will not and cannot require the executive to 
produce such papers when in the opinion of the executive their 
production is contrary to the public interests.”392 
In developing its argument, the executive relied substantially on 
Herman Wolkinson’s Article, Demands of Congressional Committees for 
Executive Branch Papers,393 and on Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co. 
Under a heading that asserted that “Considerations of Public Policy 
Recognized by the Common Law” supported the claim that the 
Secretary of the Air Force had an absolute right to decide what 
documents may be publicly disclosed, the brief extensively cited the 
Crown’s privilege defined by the House of Lords decision in Duncan as 
 
 386 Id. at 36–37. 
 387 Id. at 15–16; see also id. at 23–24. 
 388 Id. at 23, 52, 57. 
 389 Id. at 22, 30–31. 
 390 Id. at 22. 
 391 Id. at 31. 
 392 Id. at 34. 
 393 Wolkinson, Part III, supra note 286. For example, relying exclusively upon the 
Wolkinson Article, the brief asserted with regard to congressional demands for information 
from the executive branch: “From the administration of Washington to the present, Presidents 
have repeatedly asserted the privilege, and when forced to a showdown, Congress has always 
yielded and ceased to press its demands.” Brief for the United States at 24 n.8, Reynolds, 345 
U.S. 1 (No. 21), 1952 WL 82378, at *24 n.8. 
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a model for its new executive privilege.394 The brief urged the court to 
place “[g]reat weight” on the Duncan case, and it argued that the legal 
and policy considerations that prompted the Duncan decision apply 
with even greater force to the United States.395 Thus, the brief 
maintained that “[t]he constitutional and public policy considerations 
which underlie the result in Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., 
have . . . even greater significance in the present case than in the English 
case, because the English constitution does not embody the doctrine of 
separation of powers and there is no extensive history of executive 
independence like that we have discussed in the preceding 
subsection.”396 
The government’s legal brief not only argued for a sweeping claim 
of privilege but it constructed its brief so as to place the courts in a 
position so that they were forced to decide the case on this ground. It 
did this in several ways. First, it abandoned a claim that it had 
emphasized in the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and that 
would have constituted an alternative, independent, and much narrower 
ground for a decision. That claim was that a decision of the Secretary of 
the Air Force not to disclose the documents could only be challenged 
“in a proceeding directed against the Secretary personally,” as opposed 
to an action against the United States.397 Second, although the brief 
twice opened the door to the possibility of a narrow ruling that accepted 
that judges might review documents involved in a discovery dispute in 
deciding whether they were privileged, each of these two references was 
fleeting.398 Third, the executive’s legal brief referred to the state secrets 
privilege only as support for the broad proposition that the Secretary of 
the Air Force had the constitutional authority to make the final 
determination as to whether certain documents should or should not be 
privileged.399 Thus, the brief claimed that there were two common law 
 
 394 Brief for the United States at 36–38, Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (No. 21), 1952 WL 82378, at 
*36–38. 
 395 Id. at 38. 
 396 Id. at 41–42. 
 397 Id. at 73 n.47. 
 398 In the first, the brief stated that “courts should not interfere” in executive branch 
judgments “without, at least, a showing that the executive determination is plainly arbitrary,” 
and given that “[n]o such reasons exist here” because “the Secretary’s determination was clearly 
founded on adequate considerations.” Id. at 12. The second reference to the possibility of a 
court reviewing the judgment of the Secretary of the Air Force was contained in Point heading I 
(C) of the “Argument” section of the brief. That position hypothesized that “Even if a 
Department Head’s Refusal to Produce Might be Reviewable in other Circumstances, there is 
no Occasion Here to Review or Disturb the Secretary’s Determination.” Id. at 47. After 
repeating that point once in this four-page subsection of the brief, the balance of this section of 
the brief was devoted to why the court should treat the secretary’s judgment in this case as 
conclusive. 
 399 The brief referred to the state secrets privilege to illustrate the point, as expressed by the 
brief in a point heading, that the Secretary’s broad authority was “Supported by Considerations 
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privileges—one was the state secrets privilege and the other was the 
informer’s privilege—which “support[ed] the Secretary’s power to 
refuse to produce the documents even for the judge alone.”400 At that 
point the brief offers as support a citation to the Wigmore treatise on 
evidence, the Totten case, and three cases cited in a previous footnote, 
two of the cases being district court opinions and one being a circuit 
court opinion.401 Three pages later, at page 45, the brief made its second 
and last reference to the state secrets privilege: “Also, to the extent that 
the report reveals military secrets concerning the structure or 
 
of Public Policy Recognized by the Common Law.” Id. at 36. 
 400 Id. at 42. A few pages prior, the brief made reference to the state secrets privilege without 
using the phrase: “Among the categories of public policy recognized in this way by the law 
[is] . . . the interest in secrecy in matters of foreign policy, security and national defense . . . .” 
Id. at 36. In support of that claim, the brief inserted spare footnote number 15, which referred 
to two district court decisions, one court of appeals decision, and one Supreme Court decision. 
The note states in full: 
Thus, in actions between private parties, Government officials as witnesses have 
asserted a privilege against disclosure of confidential military matter. The privilege is 
the Government’s, not the party’s. Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 199 
Fed. 353 (E.D. Pa.); In re Grove, 180 Fed. 62 (C.A. 3); Pollen v. Ford Instr. Co., 26 F. 
Supp. 583 (E.D. N.Y.). Compare Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, in which an 
action on a contract for espionage made with President Lincoln was held not to lie on 
the ground that such a contract was so confidential that public policy would not 
permit action to be brought on it. 
Id. at 36 n.15. 
 401 Id. at 42. As if even the executive doubted the validity or substantiality of the state secrets 
privilege, the brief characterized Wigmore as the “doughtiest opponent of executive privilege,” 
but then maintained that even he “affirms that there is a common law privilege for matters 
concerning military or international affairs.” Id. at 42 (citing 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE 
ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 2378–2378a, 
at 785, 798 (3rd ed. 1940)). Footnote 25 of the brief states in full: “Wigmore seems, however, to 
place in the courts the determination of whether military matters are actually involved.” Id. at 
42 n.25 (emphasis added) (citing 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN 
SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2379 (3rd ed. 1940)). Wigmore is hardly 
grudging on the need for a state secrets privilege. Indeed, he firmly acknowledged the existence 
and necessity of a state secrets privilege: “There must by a privilege for secrets of State, i.e. 
matters whose disclosure would endager [sic] the Nation’s governmental requirements or its 
relations of friendship and profit with other nations.” 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE 
ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2212a (3d ed. 1940). 
What Wigmore does do is to claim that the privilege is “improperly invoked” and “loosely 
applied,” which in turn requires that “a strict definition of its legitimate limits must be made.” 
Id. Not only was Wigmore not ambivalent about the existence of a state secrets privilege, he was 
unequivocal about the fact that the courts determine whether the information claimed to be 
privileged is in fact privileged. Id. § 2379. Wigmore explained: 
[A] court which abdicates its inherent function of determining the facts which the 
admissibility of evidence depends will furnish to bureaucratic officials too ample 
opportunities for abusing the privilege. The lawful limits of the privilege are 
extensible beyond any control if its applicability is left to the determination of the 
very official whose interest it may be to shield a wrongdoing under the privilege. 
Both principle and policy demand that the determination of the privilege shall be for 
the court. 
Id. 
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performance of the plane that crashed or deals with these factors in 
relation to projected or suggested secret improvements it falls within the 
judicially recognized ‘state secrets’ privilege.”402 
In its seventy-four page brief, the executive referred to the state 
secrets privilege twice, in two separate sentences on two different pages 
two thirds of the way through the brief and, then, only to claim that a 
common law evidentiary privilege supported the idea that the executive 
had the authority to decide for itself what information or documents 
should or should not be kept confidential. 
2.     Presentation of Finletter and Harmon’s Claims 
Given that it is now known that the Investigation Report and the 
three witness statements did not contain information injurious to the 
national security even though the Supreme Court stated that “there was 
a reasonable danger that the accident investigation report would contain 
references to the secret electronic equipment which was the primary 
concern of the mission,” the question arises as to whether the executive’s 
brief was the basis for the court’s statement that “there was a reasonable 
danger that the accident investigation report would contain references 
to the secret electronic equipment.”403 
The executive’s brief referred to the Secretary and the Judge 
Advocate General’s claim of privilege twice. The first time the brief 
represented that the Secretary had claimed that “disclosure of the 
Board’s reports and the statements would seriously hamper national 
security and flying safety as well as the development of highly technical 
military equipment.”404 That was a misrepresentation. The Secretary did 
not claim that mere “disclosure” would hamper national security. He 
claimed that “compulsory disclosure” would hamper national security.405 
By eliminating the phrase “compulsory disclosure,” the brief changed 
the meaning. The Secretary’s statements emphasized judicial 
compulsion of disclosure and thus highlighted the government’s general 
objection to judges second-guessing the judgment of the heads of 
executive departments. By eliminating the idea of compulsion, the brief 
shifts the focus of the Secretary’s objection from judicial compulsion of 
disclosure to the content of the documents ordered disclosed, and thus 
encourages a perception that the Secretary objected to the disclosure of 
the documents because of their content. 
 
 402 Brief for the United States at 45, Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (No. 21), 1952 WL 82378, at *45. 
 403 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10. 
 404 Brief for Petitioner at 2, Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (No. 21), 1952 WL 82378, at *2. 
 405 Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, supra note 
79, Exhibit C, at 28, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *129 (Finletter Statement). 
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The brief’s other characterization of the Secretary’s position was 
even more subtle. As noted, the Secretary’s carefully worded statement 
never claimed that the disputed documents contained information that 
described the plane’s “mission,” “operation,” or “performance.” In 
contrast, the brief, in referring to the “report of the Accident 
Investigation Board,” stated: “Also, to the extent that the report reveals 
military secrets concerning the structure or performance of the plane 
that crashed or deals with these factors in relation to projected or 
suggested secret improvements it falls within the judicially recognized 
‘state secrets’ privilege.”406 Although the phrase “to the extent” does not 
entirely foreclose the possibility that there is no “extent” to which the 
report reveals such matters, such an understanding would be a 
distortion. By using the phrase “to the extent” the brief plainly implied a 
substantive point—the investigation report contained information that 
constituted military secrets concerning the plane’s structure or 
performance—which the Secretary or the Judge Advocate General did 
not make. 
3.     Lawyers Not “Permitted” to “See” Documents 
The executive’s litigation strategy goes one layer deeper. The 
Justice Department lawyers stated in their brief filed with the Supreme 
Court in Reynolds that the Secretary of the Air Force did not permit 
them to review the disputed documents. Thus, the brief stated: 
“[c]ounsel for the Government in the tort action cannot compel [the 
Secretary of the Air Force] to do so and, indeed, are not permitted by 
him to see the documents.”407 The lawyers stated that the Secretary had 
not “permitted” them “to see” the disputed documents, which in turn 
meant that the brief’s representations as to the content of the documents 
were based on statements of the Secretary or the Judge Advocate 
General.408 
Under ordinary circumstances, the Secretary of the Air Force 
might well have, as a practical matter, the last word as to whether the 
disputed documents would or would not be shared with the Justice 
Department lawyers presenting the matter to the Supreme Court. But as 
a theoretical matter the Secretary surely did not have the last word. The 
Secretary of the Air Force was part of a chain of command that ended 
with the President as Commander-in-Chief, and the capacity of the Air 
Force’s Secretary to dictate orders to the Justice Department was 
dependent upon the President. More importantly, as influential as the 
 
 406 Brief for Petitioner at 45, Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (No. 21), 1952 WL 82378, at *45. 
 407 Id. at 63. 
 408 Id. 
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Air Force may have been because of the new strategic importance of air 
power, it seems implausible that the Air Force could force, over the 
objections of the Department of Justice and the White House, a 
confrontation between the executive branch and the judiciary over such 
an important legal and policy issue. After all, the authority of the 
judiciary to review executive branch documents affected every executive 
department and agency, not just the Air Force. 
What seems much more likely is that the lawyers for the Justice 
Department did not demand access to the documents in dispute because 
they did not want access.409 If the lawyers had secured access to them 
they would have had actual knowledge that Finletter’s and Harmon’s 
statements filed with the court were misleading and deceptive. Such 
knowledge would have imposed an obligation on them to correct the 
deceptiveness, and that in turn would have destroyed the national 
security aura that the lawyers were seeking to fabricate in the Reynolds 
case. And because the Justice Department lawyers had participated in 
the drafting of at least Finletter’s statement, they had some reason to 
suspect that the disputed documents contained no military secrets, and, 
thus, not having access to the disputed documents facilitated the Justice 
Department’s presentation of a legal position to the court that it wished 
to present. 
This was the second time in the Reynolds litigation that lawyers for 
the executive branch insulated themselves from knowing the real facts of 
the case. In the district court the government lawyer submitted 
responses to plaintiffs’ interrogatories based on information provided 
by the Air Force that contained two lies. And now in the brief filed in 
the Supreme Court the lawyers characterized the allegations of the 
Secretary and the Judge Advocate General to encourage the view that 
the disputed documents contained information damaging to the 
national security. 
 
 409 The policy of the Obama administration requiring the submission by executive 
departments to the Department of Justice of all potential claims of the state secrets privilege 
indicates that the President has the authority to require executive officers to submit disputed 
documents to the Justice Department for review. Memorandum from the Office of the Attorney 
Gen. to Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies and Heads of Dep’t Components (Sept. 23, 2009) 
(on file with author) (regarding “Policies and Procedures Governing Invocation of the State 
Secrets Privilege”). I found one file in the Harry S. Truman Library prepared in the fall of 1948, 
originally classified “CONFIDENTIAL,” and declassified in 1961, which supports the position 
that at that time, President Truman, acting through the Department of Justice, asserted 
authority over executive agencies and required to disclosure of information and documents to 
the President via the Justice Department. Memorandum on the “Amerasia Case” from the 
Office of the Attorney Gen. to President Truman (1948) (on file with the Harry S. Truman 
Library, White House Central Files). 
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B.     The Conference 
The nine Justices on the Supreme Court discussed United States v. 
Reynolds at the Court’s weekly confidential conference on October 25, 
1952, and voted five to four to reverse the Third Circuit’s judgment. 
President Truman’s four appointments to the court—Chief Justice 
Vinson and Associate Justices Clark, Burton, and Minton—joined by 
Associate Justice Reed, all voted to reverse the lower court, while 
Associate Justices Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, and Jackson voted to 
affirm.410 
At the conference, the Chief Justice spoke first. Vinson stated that 
he disagreed with the circuit court’s decision because a rule that 
permitted a trial judge to review documents the executive branch 
claimed contained national security information and thus privileged 
would open the door to counsel claiming that it had a right to review the 
documents.411 Thus, Vinson asserted, the judiciary cannot review the 
documents “without taking away” the privilege altogether from the 
executive branch.412 In offering this view to his colleagues, Vinson was 
following closely in the footsteps of the judges in the Duncan case 
decided by the House of Lords. According to Vinson’s reasoning, a 
judge should not examine in camera, ex parte documents the executive 
branch claims are privileged because such a rule would eventually 
become a shoehorn that permitted opposing counsel to review the 
documents, and such a disclosure will destroy the executive branch’s 
privilege.413 
Justice Douglas’s notes of the decisions at the conference suggest 
that Justice Reed’s position was close to Vinson’s position of granting 
the executive branch an absolute privilege that permitted it, and it alone, 
to decide what information it would disclose, to whom, and when.414 
Justice Reed stated the United States should have a privilege at least 
equal to that of the commonly recognized spousal privilege, the priest-
 
 410 Notes on Preliminary Vote for United States v. Reynolds (Oct. 25, 1952) (on file with the 
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Justice Robert Jackson, Box 222). 
 411  See Notes from Justice William O. Douglas on Judicial Conference for United States v. 
Reynolds (No. 21) (Oct. 25, 1952) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, 
William O. Douglas Papers, Box 223) [hereinafter Douglas Notes (Box 223)]. 
 412 Id. 
 413 Here are the Duncan tracks that Vinson followed:  
In many cases there is a further reason why the court should not ask to see the 
documents, for where the Crown is a party to the litigation, this would amount to 
communicating with one party to the exclusion of the other, and it is a first principle 
of justice that the judge should have no dealings on the matter in hand with one 
litigant save in the presence of and to the equal knowledge of the other. 
Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., [1942] A.C. 624 (H.L.) 640–41 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 414 Douglas Notes (Box 223), supra note 411. 
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parishioner privilege, and the privilege against self-incrimination.415 He 
stated that some high official within the executive branch, such as the 
“Secretary of War,”416 should take personal responsibility for the 
claiming the privilege, but if that were done, Reed thought that the 
executive branch should have an absolute privilege. 
Neither Justice Douglas’s notes nor Justice Burton’s notes reveal 
the views of Justices Minton, Burton, and Clark on whether a judge 
could in some cases review the arguably privileged documents to 
determine the appropriateness of the privilege, but given that the 
Reynolds decision did not explicitly grant the executive an unqualified, 
absolute privilege, one or more of these three Justices must have insisted 
on a privilege that was slightly less absolute than the privilege Vinson 
and Reed favored.417 
 
 415 Id. Douglas’s notes on what Reed said at the conference state: “US can protect itself 
against disclosure of secret intelligences—every citizen has privilege of not some information, 
e.g., incriminating evidence, confidence of wife—confessions to priest etc.,—US should have 
the same—reverses, provided US Sec of War himself joined in the privilege.” Id. 
 416 Id. 
 417 The evidence pertaining to Justice Burton’s position leaves the matter unsettled. Justice 
Burton wrote on a page of a memorandum prepared by one of his law clerks that the executive 
departments right to withhold “confidential military and policy dates and under appropriate 
circumstances other matters affecting public interest is long recognized—both as against 
congress & courts.” Notes from Justice Harold Burton on Bench Memo Regarding United 
States v. Reynolds (No. 21) (Oct. 19, 1952) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript 
Division, Harold Burton Papers, Box 227) [hereinafter Burton Notes (Box 227)]. Burton 
conceded the possibility that the Congress and the executive could waive the privilege in 
varying degrees, but in his view the Federal Tort Claims Act did not constitute such a waiver. 
As a result of these two conclusions, Burton noted that he did not have to reach the question as 
to whether the plaintiffs had established “good cause,” but that if the privilege had been waived 
he would have decided that good cause was shown. Id. Douglas’s notes provide that Burton said 
at the conference that he believed the lower court judgment had violated the executive branch’s 
privilege. Douglas Notes (Box 223), supra note 411. As a result of Burton’s willingness to find 
“good cause” under some circumstances, it is possible that Burton is a Justice who prevented 
Vinson and Reed from announcing in Reynolds that the executive branch had an absolute 
common law executive privilege at least in disputes involving national security information. 
The evidence pertaining to Justice Clark is no more definitive than the evidence pertaining 
to Justice Burton. Because Tom Clark had been Attorney General when the executive branch 
filed its brief in the Supreme Court in the Cotton Valley case, in which the government sought 
an absolute executive privilege similar to that defined in the Duncan case, there is some reason 
to think that Clark agreed with Vinson that the Court should grant the executive an absolute 
privilege. Moreover, Douglas’s notes make it plain that Clark favored reversal, but the notes are 
inconclusive as to Clark’s reasoning, and thus the notes do not indicate whether Clark favored 
an absolute privilege or not. Douglas Notes (Box 223), supra note 411. In contrast to Douglas’s 
notes on Clark’s comments, Burton’s notes emphasize that Clark thought the trial judge had 
erred by not requiring the plaintiffs to take the deposition of the three surviving servicemen. 
Burton Notes, supra note 417 (“[Judge Kirkpatrick] did not exhaust the means before him—did 
not exhaust the depositions of the witnesses.”). And the notes actually repeat the same point 
again. There is nothing inconsistent between Douglas’s notation and Burton’s. Clark’s meaning 
is uncertain. On the one hand, Clark’s point may have been that the trial court’s upholding of 
an executive privilege in this case did not preclude the possibility of plaintiffs’ proving what 
they needed to prove to prevail, especially given that the government had offered to make the 
servicemen available for a deposition. If that is what Clark meant, then he might have favored 
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Because Vinson was in the majority, he had the prerogative to 
assign the writing of the majority opinion to any of the Justices in the 
majority. Though it surely is not a rule, it is not unheard of when the 
Justices who compose a majority are in disagreement over the substance 
of an opinion for the Justice who assigns the writing of the opinion to 
assign the writing to the Justice whose vote may be the most 
conditioned or uncertain.418 The assumption underlying such an 
assignment is that the member of the majority whose views are most 
conditioned or limited will not produce an opinion that causes 
disaffection by one of the other Justices in that majority, whereas it 
might be possible that an opinion written by one of the other Justices 
might cause the most narrowly committed of the five Justices in the 
majority to vote differently and thus dissolves the majority. By assigning 
the writing of the opinion to himself, Vinson bucked this “play-it-safe” 
approach. Perhaps Vinson did that because he knew, based on past 
experience, that he could draft an opinion that would be acceptable to 
the four Justices he needed to retain to reverse the lower court 
judgment.419 If that is why he assigned the opinion to himself, he 
succeeded. Indeed, he not only kept intact his majority of five, but he 
captured Justice Douglas, who wrote the Chief a note after reading the 
opinion. “I voted the other way but will go along. It’s a nice opinion.”420 
 
the absolute privilege the government sought. On the other hand, the use of the word “exhaust” 
suggests that Clark held out the possibility that the plaintiffs should have access to the 
Investigation Report and the written witness statements of the depositions proved inconclusive. 
If that is what Clark had in mind, then he would have favored a qualified executive privilege. 
 418 For example, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 
(1985), which overruled National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), Justice Brennan 
assigned the writing of the majority opinion to Justice Blackmun, whose vote was necessary to 
reach a majority. Justice Blackmun had, nine years earlier, voted in the majority in Usery and 
wrote a separate concurrence. Another example would be Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 
(2008), in which Justice Stevens was the senior judge in the majority, who assigned the writing 
of the majority to Justice Kennedy. Kennedy has been identified in the press as the most 
tentative member of the majority. Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Answer Detainee Rights 
Question, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2007, at A32. 
 419 ST. CLAIR & GUGIN, supra note 319, at 179 (“Vinson maintained a tight control over the 
assignment of opinions by bending himself to the majority. He was in the majority in over 86 
percent of the cases. He averaged only nine dissents per term, far less than Stone’s annual 
average of eighteen.”). 
 420 Memorandum from William O. Douglas, Assoc. Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, to 
Fred M. Vinson, Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court (Mar. 6, 1953) (on file with the 
University of Kentucky Library, Papers of Fred Vinson, Box 285) (regarding United States v. 
Reynolds draft opinion). It is not known why Justice Douglas changed his mind. Given the 
available historical record, two explanations are plausible. 
First, Douglas may have found Chief Justice Vinson’s opinion persuasive. And that could 
have been the case, even though it is likely that Justice Douglas understood that Chief Justice 
Vinson’s opinion granted the executive a de facto absolute privilege that invited abuse of the 
privilege. Although Douglas had a reputation of favoring individual substance and procedural 
rights so that the individual was protected from unchecked executive branch authority, 
Associate Justice Robert Jackson had a more complicated understanding of Douglas, one that 
suggested that there was a substantial gap between Douglas’s reputation and his actions. Thus, 
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That switch made the final vote in Reynolds six to three.421 
 
consider Jackson’s understanding of Douglas’s conduct in the appeal of Julius and Ethel 
Rosenberg to the Supreme Court in the spring of 1953, which occurred during the same weeks 
that Vinson had circulated his draft opinion in Reynolds and Douglas decided to switch his 
position and to support it. In the Rosenberg appeal to the Supreme Court, Jackson concluded, 
after observing Douglas changed his mind during that contentious and divisive appeal, that 
Douglas was seeking to manipulate the appeal process so that he could portray himself as a 
public critic of the lower court proceedings, but to do so without actually causing the high court 
to vote to review the merits of the appeal and thus without providing the Rosenbergs any 
procedural or substantive victory. Indeed, Jackson was so suspicious of Justice Douglas’s 
motives that at a May 23, 1953, conference of the justices he called what he characterized as 
“Douglas’s ‘bluff.’” Snyder, supra note 2, at 905. Jackson was furious after Douglas had 
informed his colleagues on the Court that he intended to dissent from the denial of certiorari 
because “Jackson was certain that Douglas had no desire for the Court to hear the Rosenbergs’ 
case.” FELDMAN, supra note 318, at 390. As Jackson saw it, “Douglas could have made that 
result far more likely by joining Black and Frankfurter only a few days earlier in voting to have 
the case heard.” Id. Since Douglas declined to do that, Jackson reasoned that Douglas’s “only 
possible motive . . . was to grandstand, drawing attention to his own liberal credentials without 
actually putting the Court in a position to hear the case.” Id. In short, Jackson thought that 
Douglas’s threatened dissent from a denial of certiorari was no more than a bluff. Thus, Jackson 
decided that he would call Douglas’s bluff at a conference when he said that he was willing to 
provide the fourth vote to grant certiorari (Frankfurter, Black, Douglas, and Jackson). 
FELDMAN, supra note 318, at 390; Snyder, supra note 2, at 905. At that point, Jackson watched 
as Douglas stated that he would withdraw his threatened dissent and his vote to grant certiorari. 
FELDMAN, supra note 318, at 390. Thus, as Jackson understood the events as they unfolded, 
Douglas was willing to dissent publicly from the denial of certiorari in the case so long as his 
vote favoring certiorari would not in fact result in the granting of certiorari, and that Justice 
Douglas favored such a course of conduct so as to strengthen his reputation as a staunch 
defender of individual justice. Snyder, supra note 2, at 905–06. 
Second, it is possible that Douglas switched his vote in the Reynolds case because he had an 
ex parte communication with the very first Secretary of the Air Force, W. Stuart Symington, 
later a U.S. Senator from Missouri. Justice Douglas and Secretary Symington were active friends 
beginning at least in the mid-1940s and continuing on from then. Communications between 
Douglas and Symington document the friendship. See Communications Between William O. 
Douglas, Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court & W. Stuart Symington, Secretary of the Air 
Force (on file with the President Harry S. Truman Library, W. Stuart Symington Papers, Box 
4). Furthermore, Symington was the Air Force Secretary when the B-29 crash that killed the 
civilian engineers and resulted in the Reynolds case occurred. He was also the Secretary when 
Air Force officials submitted false statements in response to plaintiffs’ interrogatories and when 
the Air Force initially submitted papers to the trial judge—Judge Kirkpatrick—in Reynolds 
opposing the plaintiffs request that the Air Force disclose the Persons investigation report and 
the signed witness statements. Thus, because of the active nature of their friendship, it is 
conceivable that Douglas and Symington might have discussed the Reynolds case sometime 
between Douglas’s initial vote favoring affirmation of the Third Circuit decision and his note to 
Vinson that he would endorse Vinson’s opinion and vote to reverse the Third Circuit. Such a 
conversation need not have been lengthy or extensive. Indeed, it is possible that all that 
Symington had to state was something comparable to the following: “The outcome in this case 
is important to the Air Force,” in order for Douglas to reconsider his view of the case and 
change his vote. 
 421 The three dissenters were Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson. As noted earlier, they 
stated that they dissented “substantially for the reasons set forth in the opinion of Just Maris 
below.” United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953). 
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C.     The Opinion 
In contrast to his lengthy opinions in the Dennis422 and Steel 
Seizure423 cases in which he belabored and detailed the international 
crises that presented a national security threat, Vinson’s majority 
opinion in Reynolds devoted only two, quite limited sentences to the 
national security challenges confronting the United States at the time. 
This brief treatment suggests that while the case was decided against the 
backdrop of the overarching Cold War with the Soviet Union, the land 
war in Korea, and the dawn of the modern day national security state, 
national security considerations were peripheral to Vinson’s argument 
in his Reynolds opinion.424 
1.     “Well Established” 
Against the context of “vigorous preparation for national 
defense,”425 Vinson fully understood that the executive sought in the 
Reynolds case a sweeping and absolute executive privilege.426 He 
characterized the executive’s position as follows: “On behalf of the 
Government it has been urged that the executive department heads have 
power to withhold any documents in their custody from judicial view if 
they deem it to be in the public interest.”427 Although Vinson 
acknowledged in a footnote that this claim of “executive power to 
suppress documents” is based most directly on Revised Statutes section 
161,428 he also noted the government’s claim that section 161 is “only a 
legislative recognition of an inherent executive power” which is 
constitutionally “protected” by the doctrine of separation of powers.429 
But Vinson then pivoted in his opinion and claimed that it was 
unnecessary for the Court to pass on this sweeping claim that had 
“constitutional overtones” since there was a “narrower ground for 
decision,” and it was that narrower ground that became the basis for the 
opinion and the contemporary state secrets privilege.430 
 
 422 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
 423 Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 667 (Vinson, J., dissenting). 
 424 In the first reference Vinson noted that “we cannot escape judicial notice that this is a 
time of vigorous preparation for national defense,” and in the second he acknowledged that 
World War II had “made it common knowledge that air power is one of the most potent 
weapons in our scheme of defense, and that newly developing electronic devices have greatly 
enhanced the effective use of air power.” Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10. 
 425 Id. 
 426 Id. at 6 n.9. 
 427 Id. at 6. 
 428 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1952) (currently codified at 5 U.S.C. § 2006). 
 429 Id. at 6 n.9. 
 430 Id. at 6. 
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The narrower ground Vinson had in mind was the “privilege 
against revealing military secrets,”431 a privilege Vinson stated the 
Secretary of the Air Force had invoked when he filed his formal claim of 
privilege.432 Although Vinson stated that the “privilege against revealing 
military secrets” was “well established in the law of evidence,”433 he 
conceded that judicial experience in the United States with the state 
secrets privilege “has been limited,” which was certainly accurate and 
evidenced by the footnote he wrote to support the claim that the 
privilege was “well established.”434 That footnote contained not one 
Supreme Court decision that directly involved the state secrets privilege. 
The only Supreme Court decision referenced in the footnote was Totten 
v. United States, in which the Court dismissed an action on the ground 
that the case involved a dispute over wages arguably resulting from a 
secret agreement—which the Court stated must remain secret because 
the parties had agreed that it would remain secret—between President 
Lincoln and a self-described Union spy.435 The other cited cases in the 
footnote were four district court opinions436 and one Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals decision.437 These five lower court citations were 
followed by references to two evidence law treatises438 and one law 
review Article.439 
Thus, when Vinson claimed that the state secrets privilege was 
“well established,” he must have meant that it was assumed that courts 
had historically respected such a privilege but that the privilege had 
rarely been asserted in the United States, and that the scope of the 
privilege, and the terms and conditions upon which it was to be applied, 
were undefined.440 In fact, Vinson’s opinion even suggests a degree of 
 
 431 Id. 
 432 Id. at 4. Although Chief Justice Vinson used the term “military secrets” or “military 
matters” five times in his opinion and only used the phrase “military and state secrets” once, it 
is quite clear from the opinion, that Vinson’s narrow ground was the common law rule of 
evidence commonly termed the “state secrets privilege.” 
 433 Id. at 6–7. For a discussion of the history of the privilege, see William G. Weaver & 
Danielle Escontrias, Origins of the State Secrets Privilege (Feb. 10, 2008) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1079364. 
 434 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6–7. 
 435 Id. at 7 n.11 (citing 92 U.S. 105 (1875)). 
 436 Id. (citing Cresmer v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1949); Bank Line, Ltd. v. 
United States, 68 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 26 F. Supp. 583 
(E.D.N.Y. 1939); Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 199 F. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1912)). 
 437 Id. (citing Bank Line, Ltd. v. United States, 163 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1947)).  
 438 Id. (citing 8 WIGMORE, supra note 401, §§ 2212(a), 2378(g)(5) (3d ed.); 1 GREENLEAF ON 
EVIDENCE §§ 250–251 (16th ed. 1899)). 
 439 Id. (citing Sanford, supra note 265, at 74–75)). 
 440 Vinson thought that the state secrets privileged was well established with regard to only 
military secrets. Thus, Vinson stated that the Secretary of the Air Force formally lodged a 
“Claim of Privilege” against what he termed as revealing “military secrets.” Reynolds, 345 U.S. 
at 6. But again, the Court conceded that judicial experience in the United States with regard to 
the state secrets privilege, a privilege which it characterized as a “military and state secrets” 
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unease at the idea that the Court’s decision in the case was based on an 
evidentiary privilege with almost no precedential support as evidenced 
by the fact that Vinson labored to point out that the “existence of the 
privilege,” was “conceded by the “court below,” and by the “most 
outspoken critics of governmental privilege.”441 If the purpose of 
referring to these authorities was to give legitimacy to the idea of the 
state secrets privilege, then the effort was weak to say the least since the 
authorities cited were hardly authoritative. Instead of Vinson actually 
thinking that the privilege was truly well established, what seems more 
likely is that Vinson thought that the privilege was of questionable 
legitimacy in the absence of any statute authorizing it, but that he 
nonetheless endorsed it and was going to wring what support for its use 
he could out of the available precedent and scholarly commentary. 
In short, the state secrets privilege announced by the Court in 
Reynolds had been rarely invoked and rested on few United States 
judicial decisions which did not foreshadow the convoluted rules 
Vinson announced in Reynolds. Thus, the Reynolds heritage had no 
relationship with the rules Vinson announced in Reynolds, and as it 
turns out, the rules announced in Reynolds have only a slight 
relationship with the rules of the contemporary state secrets privilege. In 
other words, Reynolds was a departure from the past, and modern 
courts have departed from Reynolds. 
 
privilege, had been “limited.” Id. at 7. The court continued to repeat many times over its 
characterization of the military nature of the privilege. Thus, the court stated: “It is . . . apparent 
that these electronic devices must be kept secret if their full military advantage is to be exploited 
in the national interests.” Id. at 10. Or as the court emphasized: “On the record before the trial 
court it appeared that this accident occurred to a military plane which had gone aloft to test 
secret electronic equipment.” Id. Or, as yet again: “Thereafter, when the formal claim of 
privilege was filed by the Secretary of the Air Force, under circumstances indicating a 
reasonable possibility that military secrets were involved, there was certainly a sufficient 
showing of privilege . . . .” Id. at 10–11. 
 The majority’s emphasis on military secrets protecting weapon development hardly 
means that it would refrain from applying the privilege to intelligence or diplomatic affairs, but 
the emphasis on military weapon development secrets does place information merely 
characterized as confidential or secret because it promotes administrative efficiency in sharp 
contrast. Further there was certainly not a whisper of a suggestion in the opinion that the 
privilege may be properly invoked to shield improper or illegal conduct, which the executive 
branch did do in the late 1970s. See, e.g., Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1979) 
(Bazelon, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“Unlike Reynolds, where the ‘state 
secret’ was only coincidental to the plaintiffs’ tort suit, and did not preclude litigation of the 
case, upholding the privilege in this case precludes all judicial scrutiny of the signals intelligence 
operations of NSA, regardless of the degree to which such activity invades the protections of the 
Fourth Amendment.”). Nor is there is any suggestion in the Reynolds opinion that the privilege 
may be invoked before the information that may be privileged is specifically identified or before 
it is certain that the litigation of a case will in fact force the disclosure of certain information. 
Although in later decades the circuit courts expanded the privilege to these circumstances, that 
expansion has no explicit or direct roots in the Reynolds opinion. See supra note 8. 
 441 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7. The critics were Wigmore, Greenleaf, and Sanford. See id. at 7 
nn.11 & 13; supra note 439. 
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2.     Controlling Principles 
Although Vinson conceded that courts in the United States had 
had almost no experience with the privilege, he also claimed that “the 
principles which control the application of the privilege emerge quite 
clearly from the available precedents.”442 For Vinson these two claims 
were not in conflict with each other since the available precedents 
Vinson referred to were not United States judicial decisions. Instead 
Vinson relied very heavily on one 1942 House of Lords decision, 
Duncan v. Camell, Laird & Co.,443 which the Justice Department had 
relied upon in Cotton Valley and then again in its legal papers in 
Reynolds.444 
The first two rules Vinson offered to guide the exercise of the 
privilege were straightforward. Vinson stated that the privilege belonged 
solely to the government; it must be asserted by the government, and it 
cannot be claimed or waived by a private party.445 The privilege must be 
formally claimed by the head of a department which controls the 
information in question, and the claim of privilege may only be asserted 
by the department head “after actual personal consideration.”446 
It was the third guiding rule that Vinson stated presented any “real 
difficulty.”447 The problem was who should decide whether the material 
in dispute was or was not privileged. Vinson first insisted that it must be 
the courts that have final authority in deciding whether the material in 
dispute is privileged. “The court itself,” Vinson wrote, “must determine 
whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege,”448 
and whether the exercise of such authority is necessary to avoid abuse of 
the privilege, or what Vinson termed executive “caprice.”449 At the same 
time that judges must determine for themselves whether the 
circumstances warrant a privilege and must guard against executive 
caprice, Vinson stated that they must “do so without forcing a 
disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.”450 
 
 442 Id. at 7. 
 443 Id. at 7 n.15 (citing Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., [1942] A.C. 624 (H.L.) (appeal 
taken from Eng.)). 
 444 See supra Part III.A.2. 
 445 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7. 
 446 Id. at 7–8. 
 447 Id. at 8. 
 448 Id. 
 449 Id. at 10. 
 450 Id. at 8. In reaching this result, Vinson equated the state secrets privilege with the 
privilege against self-incrimination. He asserted that submitting to a judge for review 
documents allegedly containing military secrets would destroy the state secrets privilege, just as 
an intrusive examination of an individual would destroy the privilege against self-
incrimination. Id. At its most superficial level, this reference to the self-incrimination privilege 
relied upon by the majority to support its conclusion that courts should not insist upon 
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Given the tension between these considerations Vinson stated that 
a “formula of compromise must be applied.”451 Thus, he insisted a court 
may not “automatically require a complete disclosure to the judge,” even 
to a judge “alone, in chambers,” before the claim of privilege “will be 
accepted in any case,” if it is “possible to satisfy the court, from all the 
circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger that 
compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the 
interest of national security, should not be divulged.”452 When such 
circumstances exist, circumstances that permit a court to conclude that 
compulsion does in fact pose a “reasonable danger” to national security, 
Vinson concluded that the “occasion for the privilege” is not only 
“appropriate,” but a court “should not jeopardize the security which the 
privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon an examination of the 
evidence.”453 
In setting forth this guideline, Vinson did not explicate the term 
“reasonable danger,” thus leaving the magnitude of the required danger 
that warrants a privilege undetermined. Nor did he address the question 
of whether there was a minimum probability that the dangerous harm 
will in fact be inflicted if there were disclosure to uphold a privilege, or 
explore the degree to which the danger might be imminent or remote in 
order to sustain the privilege. Vinson also did not explain why the 
disclosure of the information to a judge “alone, in chambers” in any way 
jeopardized the security of the information. 
In addressing the question of how intrusive a judge should be in 
probing whether a judge should sustain the executive’s assertion of 
privilege, Vinson stated that when a plaintiff makes a “strong showing 
of necessity” for the material in dispute, a court should not accept a 
claim of privilege “lightly.”454 “[B]ut,” he continued, “even the most 
 
reviewing disputed documents may seem plausible. It would make no sense to force a person 
claiming the constitutional right against self-incrimination to publicly disclose the 
incriminating information as a prerequisite for asserting the right. Thus, the majority in 
Reynolds reasoned, it behooves a court to force the executive as a prerequisite for asserting a 
state secrets privilege to divulge the very information it asserts should not be divulged. But this 
position makes no sense when the disclosure is to the judge alone, in chambers. An ex parte, in 
camera disclosure to a judge is not a public disclosure and does not prejudice the executive 
branch invoking a privilege. The lower court judgment did not require the government to make 
a disclosure to the public or to the opposing party. The lower court recognized that there was a 
distinction between information that was properly privileged and information that was not and 
was merely seeking to monitor the boundary by inspecting the documents in the privacy of 
chambers. 
 451 Id. at 9. 
 452 Id. at 10. 
 453 Id. The Vinson majority assumed that the judge could make a reliable judgment 
regarding the likelihood that certain documents contained privileged material from all of the 
circumstances of the case. That, of course, was not true, even in the Reynolds case. See supra 
Parts I.E, III.C, VI.A.2. 
 454 Id. at 11. 
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compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court 
is ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at stake,” and “[a] fortiori, 
where necessity is dubious, a formal claim of privilege . . . will have to 
prevail.”455 In other words, if a judge concludes from the circumstances 
of a case that a “reasonable danger” exists that the documents contain 
military secrets, a judge must sustain the privilege without personally 
reviewing the documents no matter how essential, important, or 
necessary they might be to plaintiffs. The privilege was absolute and the 
practical consequences of Vinson’s rules had the effect of protecting the 
executive’s assertion of privilege from judicial review.456 
3.     Application 
Applying these considerations to the Reynolds case, the court 
quickly decided that its first two principles were satisfied: a formal claim 
of privilege submitted by the Secretary of the Air Force had been 
submitted after actual personal consideration of the documents in 
dispute. It was the third issue—whether the Air Force must submit the 
investigation reports and the witness statements to the judge for an ex 
parte in camera review—to which Vinson devoted most of his opinion. 
Based on the legal standard set forth by the majority, that third issue 
depended on the response to the following question: Whether a judge 
could conclude from “all the circumstances of the case, that there is a 
reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military 
matters, which in the interest of national security, should not be 
divulged.” 
In answering these inquiries, Vinson stated that “[t]here is nothing 
to suggest that the electronic equipment, in this case, had any causal 
connection with the accident,” and that “[t]herefore, it should be 
possible for [the widow respondents] to adduce the essential facts as to 
causation without resort to material touching upon military secrets.”457 
At that point Vinson focused on the Air Force’s offer to permit the 
plaintiffs to take the deposition of the three surviving servicemen, and 
assumed that because the depositions might disclose the cause of the 
crash or lead to non-privileged evidence that might disclose the cause of 
 
 455 Id. 
 456 At least Vinson and Reed told their colleagues in the conference in the case that they 
favored an outright absolute privilege. See supra notes 411–416 and accompanying text. That 
view lacked a majority, but the formulation of the standard in Reynolds more or less gave 
Vinson and Reed the result they preferred while permitting the courts to appear judicious by 
insisting that judges would remain in charge of evidentiary rulings and guard against executive 
caprice. Chief Justice Vinson almost certainly took these factors from the House of Lords 
decision in the Duncan case and in fact tracked the language of Duncan. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8 
& nn.19–22. 
 457 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11. 
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the crash, the plaintiffs had presented a “dubious showing of necessity” 
for gaining access to the disputed documents.458 Having concluded that 
the plaintiffs had presented a dubious necessity for access to the 
documents, Vinson then concluded that the lower courts had erred in 
requiring the Air Force to submit the disputed documents to the trial 
judge for an in camera inspection, especially since there was “a 
reasonable danger that the accident investigation report would contain 
references to the secret electronic equipment which was the primary 
concern of the mission.”459 
The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit’s decision and 
remanded the action to permit the plaintiffs to carry through with the 
Air Force’s offer to permit the plaintiffs to take the depositions of the 
three surviving Air Force crew members.460 
The decision left the widows little choice but to take the deposition 
of the servicemen.461 Although no transcript of the deposition 
survives,462 it is implausible to think that the servicemen made 
statements during the deposition that shed any more light on the cause 
of the crash than their written statements, and since those statements 
contain no definitive information on mechanical cause of the crash, the 
depositions were inconclusive if not useless in helping the plaintiffs 
prove their case. At that point while the parties prepared for trial, they 
reached an out-court-settlement in the amount of $170,000, which the 
trial judge approved.463 
VI.     THE FAUSTIAN BARGAIN 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Reynolds gives the appearance of 
a judicious compromise rejecting the executive branch’s request for a 
sweeping constitutionally based executive privilege but granting the 
executive a limited privilege that skillfully accommodated competing 
delicate considerations by defusing a confrontation between the 
executive branch and the judiciary, protecting the national security, 
 
 458 Id. 
 459 Id. at 10. 
 460 Id. at 11–12. 
 461 Id. at 11. 
 462 Interview with Wilson M. Brown, III, Partner, Drinker, Biddle & Reath LLP. (Apr. 29, 
2010) (notes on file with author). Wilson M. Brown, III was one of the lawyers who represented 
the three widows in the original damage action. See Independent Action for Relief from 
Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, supra note 38, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at 
*104. 
 463 See Herring v. United States, No. Civ.A.03-CV-5500-LDD, 2004 WL 2040272, at *2 (E.D. 
Pa. Sept. 10, 2004), aff’d, 424 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that on remand from the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Reynolds the parties settled their claims for seventy-five percent of the 
district court’s judgment). 
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holding out the possibility of providing a remedy to injured individuals, 
guarding against executive branch abuse of an evidentiary privilege, 
protecting the court’s important role in the governmental scheme, and 
upholding the court’s role in advancing the ideals of the rule of law. The 
Court created this impression by doing several things at once. It denied 
the executive branch the broad and unqualified absolute privilege it 
sought—to decide for itself what information it was required to disclose. 
Simultaneously, it required lower court judges to sustain a government’s 
claim for a state secrets privilege if “from all the circumstances of the 
case, . . . there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence 
will expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, 
should not be divulged.”464 It further insisted that courts “must 
determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of 
privilege”465 so that “judicial control over the evidence in a case” is not 
“abdicated to the caprice of executive officers,”466 but it directed that 
courts must “do so without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the 
privilege is designed to protect.”467 Lastly, it defused the confrontation 
between the courts and the executive branch by reversing the lower 
court judgment favoring the plaintiffs while holding out the possibility 
that the plaintiffs should be able to determine the cause of the crash 
without relying upon privileged information.468 
Upon closer scrutiny, however, it is apparent that this blending of 
competing interests was not as prudent or as judicious as it may seem. 
Indeed, the Court’s ruling masked the opinion’s own deceptiveness and 
disguised the many considerations that formed the underpinnings of the 
opinion. These considerations were complex and cumulatively 
constituted a betrayal by the Court of its responsibility to uphold the 
rule of law, to provide a remedy to an injured party asserting a legal 
right, to fulfill its role in a scheme of government dependent upon 
checks and balances, and to set forth a candid statement of the reasons 
for its judgment. Thus, instead of being a judicious, Solomonic ruling, 
the Court’s decision in Reynolds constituted a Faustian bargain. 
 
 464 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10. 
 465 Id. at 8. 
 466 Id. at 9. 
 467 Id. at 8. 
 468 Id. at 11. 
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A.     Vinson’s Masks 
1.     The Substantive Rule 
The Court stated in setting forth the rules to guide the application 
of the state secrets privilege that it was determined to guard against 
executive branch caprice and to uphold the Court’s historic rule in 
having the final say as to the merits of the government’s claim that 
certain information was protected from disclosure by the state secrets 
privilege.469 Thus, the Court insisted that it was not granting the 
executive branch the authority it requested to decide for itself—without 
any judicial oversight of any kind—what information it would and 
would not disclose. And, as a formal matter, the Court did not grant the 
executive branch such a privilege. 
But what the Court did do by means of the rules it set forth was to 
grant the executive branch an absolute privilege as a de facto matter. It 
did that by adopting a substantive standard for the administration of the 
privilege that permitted the executive branch to shape a case so that a 
trial judge, who was required to respect the Reynolds rules, was 
prohibited from inspecting documents the executive claimed to be 
privileged. Thus, the Reynolds rules, which required courts to sustain the 
state secrets privilege when “from all the evidence of the case, . . . there is 
a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military 
matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be 
divulged,”470 constituted an open door to the executive to shape the 
circumstances of every case to satisfy this minimal standard.471 Thus, in 
other words, while the rule of Reynolds is not always fatal in theory, it is 
fatal in fact. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Reynolds eventually unleashed a 
legal doctrine that resulted in the opposite of what the Court stated it 
was trying to accomplish.472 Instead of guarding against executive 
branch caprice, the Reynolds rules permitted and even encouraged 
executive branch caprice. Instead of upholding the rule of law by 
providing parties a forum in which to adjudicate claims, the effect of the 
 
 469 Id. at 9–10 (“Judicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to 
the caprice of executive officers.”). 
 470 Id. at 10. 
 471 See Berger & Krash, supra note 256, at 1453 (“The contention that a Government agency 
may decide for itself what documents it will divulge to the court is tantamount to a claim of 
blanket immunity from discovery procedure. If the court is not permitted to pass on a claim of 
privilege, ‘discovery’ against the Government comes to mean that those facts will be disclosed 
which the Government wishes to disclose.”). 
 472 See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010); El-Masri v. 
United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007); Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F. 2d 268 
(4th Cir. 1980); Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
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Reynolds rules is to deny individuals a forum to adjudicate their 
claims.473 Instead of insisting that the courts not surrender to the 
executive branch the decision of whether disputed material fits within 
the ambit of the state secrets privilege, the Reynolds majority 
surrendered it. 
The grant to the executive of a de facto absolute privilege was no 
oversight. The justices were experienced lawyers and many were 
familiar with the exercise of executive authority and must have 
appreciated the consequences of their ruling.474 
2.     The Rule’s Application 
The masquerading of the Reynolds legal rules is one matter; 
Vinson’s applications of those rules to the facts of the case is quite 
another and exceedingly problematic in their own right. 
a.     No Reasonable Danger 
Central to the application of the Reynolds rules to the Reynolds 
facts was the majority’s conclusion that there was a reasonable danger 
based on all of the circumstances of the case that the disputed 
documents contained information that constituted a military secret that 
should not be disclosed. Vinson’s opinion made it seem that the 
majority was convinced that a reasonable danger existed in Reynolds. 
But a careful reading of Vinson’s opinion suggests just the opposite. 
For example, after concluding that the disputed documents in this 
case were privileged,475 and after making it clear that the case was being 
remanded to give the plaintiffs the opportunity to take the deposition of 
 
 473 See, e.g., Jeppesen Dataplan, 614 F.3d 1070; El-Masri, 479 F.3d 296. 
 474 Although the Court almost certainly was aware that the legal standard it announced in 
Reynolds constituted a grant of a de facto absolute privilege to executive branch, it might well 
have failed to foresee that the executive branch would eventually use the state secrets privilege 
much more frequently in the future than it had the past. If that was the Court’s perspective, it 
might well have accepted the executive branch’s deceptiveness in Reynolds as having little or no 
consequence since the executive would only rarely invoke the privilege. Recent history has 
proven that judgment naïve. During the last four decades, the executive has utilized the 
privilege frequently and done so in highly prominent and controversial cases which in turn 
have underscored not only the de facto conclusive absolute character of the privilege but the 
fact that the Reynolds rules have completely blunted judicial control of the evidence when the 
privilege is invoked; tolerated, if not encouraged executive caprice, undermined the important 
judicial role in maintaining checks and balances; denied judicial remedies to individuals 
claiming injury at the hands of executive officials; and betrayed the judiciary’s ultimate 
responsibility to uphold the rule of law. See supra notes 5, at 8–9. 
 475 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6 (“Since Rule 34 compels production only of matters ‘not 
privileged,’ the essential question is whether there was a valid claim of privilege under the Rule. 
We hold that there was . . . .”). 
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the three surviving servicemen, Vinson offered the following two 
statements as encouragement to the plaintiffs: “There is nothing to 
suggest that the electronic equipment, in this case, had any causal 
connection with the accident. Therefore, it should be possible for 
respondents to adduce the essential facts as to causation without resort 
to material touching upon military secrets.”476 Those were peculiar 
statements. If the electronic equipment did not cause the accident, and if 
the investigative report was a report into the causes of the crash, the 
report seeking to explain the accident might not even mention—let 
alone describe—the equipment, since the equipment was unrelated to 
the accident. If the report might not mention the equipment—let alone 
describe the equipment—because the equipment was unrelated to the 
accident, how could Vinson conclude that there was a reasonable 
danger that the report contained information about the equipment that 
constituted a military secret? That is an important question that arises 
effortlessly from Vinson’s text that casts considerable doubt on Vinson’s 
claim that the circumstances of the case gave rise to a reasonable danger. 
Further, Vinson concluded that there was a “reasonable danger” in 
Reynolds that the investigatory report contained what he termed as 
“references to the secret electronic equipment.”477 In this case a reference 
to secret electronic equipment hardly constituted a military secret since 
the newspapers reporting the crash referred to the secret equipment as 
did a military public relations officer.478 Perhaps Vinson meant by the 
word reference a description of the equipment that revealed for example 
its purpose, its design, or its capability. But he did not state that even 
though he could have stated that point in a few words.479 As a result, 
Vinson’s use of the word reference in this part of the opinion is another 
indication that the court was suspicious of the claim that the disputed 
documents qualified for a privilege. 
There is another signal in the opinion that the Court was doubtful 
that Reynolds’s factual record satisfied Reynolds’s legal standard. In 
addition to using the phrase “references to the secret electronic 
equipment” Vinson also wrote that the disputed documents contained 
information “touching upon military matters.” Both Finletter’s and 
Harmon’s statements created the impression—misleading as it turns 
out—that the disputed documents contained military secrets but neither 
statement actually made that claim. Vinson’s specific choice of words—
that the disputed documents might contain information “touching 
 
 476 Id. at 11. 
 477 Id. at 10 (emphasis added). 
 478 See supra notes 112–114 and accompanying text. 
 479 For example, Vinson could have written: “There was a reasonable danger that the 
accident investigation report would contain references to the secret electronic equipment which 
would reveal the equipment’s purpose, design, or capability.” 
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upon” military secrets—signaled that Vinson was alert to Finletter’s and 
Harmon’s limited claims and thus was not claiming that the disputed 
documents actually contained information that amounted to a military 
secret.480 The idea that the disputed documents contained information 
touching upon military matters is quite different from the idea that the 
documents actually contained military secrets. One is ambiguous and 
uncertain; the other is definite and unequivocal. 
There is yet one more indication in the opinion that the majority 
was doubtful that the record in the case satisfied the reasonable danger 
test. In its fourth paragraph, the opinion stated that Secretary Finletter 
had submitted a letter to the district judge that objected to the discovery 
request on the ground that “it has been determined that it would not be 
in the public interest to furnish this report.”481 Because Finletter’s letter 
was peripheral to the outcome of the case,482 Vinson had no warrant to 
mention it unless he intended to send signals to the Justice Department. 
First, it is likely that Vinson was signaling that he was aware of the 
possibility that Finletter’s letter, which was crafted without consultation 
with the Justice Department lawyers, may have meant that the disputed 
documents contained absolutely no information implicating national 
security. Second, Vinson may have been putting the Justice Department 
on notice that if it forced another “showdown” following the plaintiff’s 
taking of the servicemen’s depositions over whether a judge could 
inspect ex parte the documents, the executive branch might not prevail 
because the judge might probe the question of whether a reasonable 
danger existed more exhaustively and might then conclude that 
Finletter’s letter to Judge Kirkpatrick—as opposed to his affidavit—
altered that assessment. 
Vinson misapplied his own legal standard in Reynolds to the facts 
and circumstances in Reynolds as he identified them. Apart from merely 
asserting that the circumstances established a reasonable danger, there 
was no evidence in Reynolds to support the claim. Indeed, the evidence 
mentioned by Vinson pointed in the other direction. 
 
 480 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11. The carefulness and the oddity of Vinson’s choice of words is 
highlighted by comparing Vinson’s statements with Judge Maris’s Third Circuit opinion, which 
states that Secretary Finletter “asserts in effect that the documents sought to be produced 
contain state secrets of a military character.” Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 996 (3d 
Cir. 1951), rev’d, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); see also infra notes 515–516 and accompanying text. In 
short, Maris was fooled by Finletter’s deceptiveness; Vinson was not. 
 481 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 482 See supra Part III.C. 
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b.     Redaction 
The oddities of Vinson’s opinion go deeper. The opinion makes it 
appear that the Court is doing what it can to protect the widows’ right to 
a remedy while protecting the national security. This is yet one more 
mask. If the Court accepted that the disputed documents contained 
information that would injure national security if disclosed, but also 
concluded that that information was not inextricably intertwined with 
other information contained in the investigation report, the Court 
should have ordered the Air Force to excise the sensitive information 
and make the redacted documents available to the plaintiffs. But 
Vinson’s opinion did not raise or address the question of redacting the 
disputed documents.483 This was odd since even Vinson stated that at 
most there was only a possibility that the disputed documents contained 
“references” “touching upon” the electronic equipment. Thus, there was 
no hint in Vinson’s opinion that the Air Force would confront a difficult 
problem in isolating sensitive military secrets from the balance of the 
information and disclosing to the widows the balance of un-redacted 
portions of the documents. 
3.     Depositions 
The peculiarities of Vinson’s opinion are even further compounded 
by Vinson’s other claim that the depositions of the surviving servicemen 
would be a substitute for the Air Force investigatory report or might 
result in the discovery of evidence that would be a substitute for the 
investigative report. 
Identifying the cause or causes of the crash required exceptional 
expert knowledge of the intricacies of this sophisticated plane and it 
required access to all of the evidence that might shed any light 
whatsoever on the crash itself. As Judge Kirkpatrick stated in insisting 
that the Air Force make the Investigation Report available to the 
plaintiffs, “[o]nly persons with long experience in investigating airplane 
 
 483 The lawyer for the plaintiffs was well aware that the Air Force could redact the disputed 
documents, and he favored such a solution. Thus, in a letter dated July 25, 1950, addressed to 
another attorney, Theodore Mattern, Charles J. Biddle stated that the plaintiffs had no interest 
“in any secret devices which may have been on board [the crashed plane] but which had 
nothing to do with causing the accident. And in any event, the answer, which has been made 
several times in similar cases, is to let the Court look at the report and if there is anything which 
should not be made public, the Judge can authorize that it be withheld.” Letter from Charles J. 
Biddle to Theodore Mattern (July 25, 1950) (on file with author). Furthermore, the Air Force 
was also familiar with the idea of redaction. Thus, the Air Force offered in effect to “redact” the 
testimony of the servicemen so that they would not testify about classified matters. So, the very 
idea of eliminating military secrets from a document—or from testimony—was an idea present 
in the litigation. 
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disasters could hope to get at the real cause of the accident.”484 
Furthermore, the plaintiffs did not have access to the plane parts that 
survived the crash and that were in the Air Force’s custody, and access 
to those parts was essential to determine the cause of the crash.485 As a 
result, plaintiffs’ request for the Persons Report—which had the stamp of 
authoritativeness because it was the Air Force’s report—was not only a 
routine request in such litigation but required if the plaintiffs were to 
know the causes of the crash.486 
Moreover, the servicemen inside the plane had limited information 
about the design and construction of the plane and limited information 
about the events in the plane during the minutes just prior to the crash. 
Further, they were unschooled in the overall complexity of the plane’s 
design, inexperienced in investigating plane crashes, and denied access 
to all of the information an experienced expert in plane crashes would 
consider relevant before drawing any conclusion as to what may have 
caused the accident. Thus, the idea that these servicemen would have an 
 
 484 Brauner v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468, 471 (E.D. Pa. 1950), aff’d sub nom., Reynolds v. 
United States, 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1951), rev’d, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
 485 Id. at 470–71. 
 486 The lawyer for the plaintiffs in the case, Charles J. Biddle, understood this point precisely. 
In his letter dated July 25, 1950, to Theodore Mattern, Biddle speculated that the plaintiffs 
could go to trial without the report and the witness statements “purely on the presumption that 
since the airplane was entirely under the control of the Government and the accident was 
something that would not have normally occurred had the plane been properly maintained and 
handled, therefore the mere happening of the event is sufficient proof of the government’s 
fault.” Letter from Charles J. Biddle to Theodore Mattern (July 25, 1950) (on file with author). 
Biddle added that the plaintiffs could “add” the “testimony of Mechler that no instructions were 
given before the flight with respect to how to get out of the plane in case of emergency,” and 
based on all of that, Biddle concluded that the plaintiffs would have “a good chance of success.” 
Id. But Biddle stated that “it would be a mistake to go to trial without first exhausting every 
effort to get the report of the investigation.” Id. In a letter to the same New York lawyer and 
dated June 26, 1950, Biddle addressed the issue of whether plaintiff could conceivably go to trial 
even if the trial judge denied the motion to compel disclosure on the ground that plaintiffs had 
failed to demonstrate good cause for compelling disclosure of the investigatory report and the 
three witness statements as required by the rules for civil procedure. Letter from Charles J. 
Biddle to Theodore Mattern (June 26, 1950) (on file with author). He wrote: 
Even if we should not be successful in obtaining the Air Force report on the cause of 
the accident, the Georgia law is that where the instrumentality which causes an 
accident is completely in the control of the defendant and what occurs is something 
which would not normally occur if the instrumentality involved were properly 
maintained and operated, the showing of such facts gives rise to the presumption of 
negligence. Consequently, it should be possible to make out a case even though we 
are not able to show exactly what it was that caused the accident to take place. I have 
looked up Georgia law on this and have checked it with Georgia counsel. 
Nevertheless, I would much prefer before going to trial to be in a position to prove 
exactly what did cause the accident. For one thing, if it could be shown that the Army 
was definitely at fault in the way it maintained and operated the plane in question, 
this would naturally have a substantial effect on the mind of the Judge when it came 
to fixing the damage. 
Id. 
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informed opinion that was authoritative in any meaningful sense on the 
causes of the crash was unsupportable and implausible, if not fanciful. 
Against these considerations, it is no surprise that Judge Advocate 
General Harmon, who was the Air Force official who offered that the 
Air Force would permit the plaintiffs to depose the servicemen, did not 
claim that the depositions would be an adequate substitute for the 
investigatory report, establish the cause of the crash, or even lead to 
evidence that would establish the cause of the crash.487 Harmon only 
made the offer and did not make any representations regarding its 
utility.488 
There was another twist to Vinson’s remand to permit the plaintiffs 
to take the depositions. The Judge Advocate General’s affidavit stated 
that the Air Force would permit the witnesses to “refresh their 
memories by reference to any statements made by them . . . as well as 
other pertinent and material records that are in the possession of the 
United States Air Force,” and that the Air Force would permit the 
witnesses to “testify regarding all matters pertaining to the cause of the 
accident except as to facts and matters of a classified nature.”489 The 
Judge Advocate General’s representations were supplemented by a 
statement offered in the executive’s brief that the plaintiffs and the court 
have the “assurance of the Air Force that these witnesses will be fully 
cooperative and will have complete and detailed knowledge of the 
events.”490 In short, the Air Force made the following representations: 1) 
the three surviving servicemen will testify truthfully at a deposition; 2) 
their testimony at a deposition will be the equivalent to the statements 
they made shortly after the crash because the servicemen will have 
refreshed their recollection; and 3) the Air Force assures that the 
survivors will testify fully and honestly to all matters except matters that 
are classified. In short, the Air Force argued that the depositions are the 
equivalent to the written statements, and thus plaintiffs have no reason 
to gain access to the written statements.491 
 
 487 Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, supra note 
79, Exhibit D, at 35, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *138 (Harmon Statement). 
 488 Id. at 37, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *139. 
 489 Id. at 37, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *139. 
 490 Brief for Petitioner at 71, United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) (No. 21), 1952 WL 
82378, at *71. 
 491 As we now know, the Air Force’s representation rang hollow against its past conduct in 
the litigation. It is now known that the Air Force had lied when it responded to the plaintiff’s 
interrogatory number eight by stating that the engine fire was extinguished and to 
interrogatory number thirty-one that no modifications for the engines to prevent fires had been 
prescribed. In addition, recall the government’s answer to the reasonable interrogatory number 
eight that requested a “detailed” statement of the “trouble” experienced by the plane just before 
the crash. The government’s response to a request for a detailed statement was, in full: “At 
between 18,500 and 19,000 feet manifold pressure dropped to 23 on No. one engine. Thereafter 
engine No. one was feathered. Fire broke out which was extinguished.” Independent Action for 
Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, supra note 79, Exhibit K, at 163, 172, 
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As is apparent, the Air Force’s position was double edged. The 
more the Air Force closed the gap between the servicemen’s testimony 
at a deposition and the witnesses’ written statements, the more 
diminished the government’s reasons for not providing the plaintiffs 
with the written statements redacted to excise what it claimed was 
“classified material.” 
As is now known and as the senior Air Force officials knew at the 
time, Vinson’s statements that the taking of the depositions might 
provide non-privileged evidence regarding the cause of the crash were 
meritless. And it is implausible to think that Vinson thought otherwise. 
In retrospect it would seem that the only aim of Vinson’s statements 
regarding the depositions was not to provide a really promising avenue 
of inquiry for the widows but to give the appearance that the Court was 
doing that. 
4.     Remand 
With the remand to take depositions, the question arose as to 
whether the trial judge could inspect the disputed documents if the 
depositions were inconclusive. Following through with one thread of 
Vinson’s reasoning, presumably at some point in the litigation, the 
plaintiffs’ necessity for gaining access to the investigation report would 
be increased, which might in turn cause a judge, after probing more 
deeply into whether the circumstances of the case warranted the 
sustaining of the privilege absent judicial inspection of the documents, 
to conclude that the circumstances supporting a finding that a 
reasonable danger for sustaining the privilege did not exist. Such an 
outcome would at least be a logical extension of Vinson’s reasoning. But 
such a line of thought would encounter a contrary one in Vinson’s 
opinion. At the beginning of the opinion Vinson suggested that the 
Court had already concluded that a valid claim of privilege existed in the 
case, which in turn suggested that no degree of necessity warranted the 
disclosure of the documents.492 What Vinson actually wrote was:  
Since Rule 34 compels production only of matters “not privileged,” 
the essential question is whether there was a valid claim of privilege 
under the Rule. We hold that there was, and that, therefore, the 
 
2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *263, *271. As Judge Kirkpatrick quipped in understated 
disbelief: “Obviously, the defendant . . . knows more about the accident than this.” Brauner v. 
United States, 10 F.R.D. 468, 471 (E.D. Pa. 1950), aff’d Reynolds v. United States 192 F.2d 987 
(3d Cir. 1951), rev’d, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
 492 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6. 
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judgment below subjected the United States to liability on terms to 
which Congress did not consent by the Tort Claims Act.493 
Vinson’s opinion took away with one hand what the logic of his opinion 
appeared to grant with the other, leaving uncertain whether the 
Supreme Court was prepared to support a trial judge who had ordered 
the production of the investigatory report and the three witness 
statements for judicial inspection.494 
It is doubtful that this uncertainty was an oversight. There was no 
basis to assume that depositions would be anything but inconclusive 
and thus only delay the conclusion of the litigation. That delay in turn 
would only pressure the parties—especially the widows—either to 
accept more years of litigation with an uncertain outcome or to try to 
settle the case, which is what they did. And from all of the evidence, the 
 
 493 Id. 
 494 Vinson’s opinion left the lower courts in the dark about one additional important matter, 
namely the scope of a trial judge’s remedial authority if the executive branch failed to comply 
with a lawful discovery order following the assertion of a state secrets privilege. Thus, Vinson’s 
opinion left open the slim possibility—but a possibility, nonetheless—that a judge could not 
decide based on all of the circumstances of a case that a “reasonable danger” existed and that 
the disclosure of the allegedly privileged documents would be inconsistent with national 
security, and thus order an in camera, ex parte inspection in chambers. If the executive refused 
to transmit the documents to the judge, what was the scope of the judge’s authority to sanction 
the executive? Or, if the judge denied the privilege and directed the executive to make the 
disputed documents available to the opposing party, and the executive refused to comply with 
the order, what sanction, if any, might the judge impose? When the government refused to 
make the disputed documents available to District Judge Kirkpatrick to review in camera, the 
judge found the facts to which the documents pertained—facts pertaining to the government’s 
negligence—as established and barred the government from introducing any evidence to 
controvert those findings. Reynolds, 192 F.2d at 991. In doing so, the trial judge equated a 
plaintiff’s lawsuit for damages against the government pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act 
with the government’s decision to criminally prosecute an individual. Because in the criminal 
context, the government could only invoke an evidentiary privilege at the price of letting the 
“defendant go free,” the trial judge case concluded that the government could refuse to submit 
the disputed documents to the court for an in camera inspection, but only at the price of having 
the pertinent facts found against the government. Brauner, 10 F.R.D. 468. The Supreme Court 
concluded that this “rationale has no application in a civil forum where the Government is not 
the moving party, but is a defendant only on terms to which it has consented.” Reynolds, 345 
U.S. at 12. In addition, given that the government, in passing the Federal Tort Claims Act, only 
consented to comply with discovery compulsion orders for not privileged material, the Court 
concluded that the government had—at least up until this point—asserted a “valid claim of 
privilege” regarding the investigation report and the witness statements, and as a result, the 
lower court order finding the facts about negligence against the government was improper. Id. 
at 6. Vinson set forth one other important guideline: the Federal Tort Claims Act expressly 
made the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applicable to suits against the United States, and 
“Rule 34 compels production only of matters ‘not privileged.’” Id. Thus, if material is 
privileged, it is improper to sanction a party pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(i), which authorizes a 
judge to make findings of fact against a noncompliant party. Presumably then, such a remedy is 
proper if a judge properly decides that the disputed documents are not privileged. That would 
at least seem to be the logical conclusion of Vinson’s analysis. But Vinson did not explicate his 
thinking to make clear the remedial powers of a trial judge if and when the executive refused to 
comply with a lawful order compelling the submission of disputed material to the judge for 
review. 
RUDENSTINE.34.4 (Do Not Delete) 4/19/2013  12:07 PM 
1380 C A R D O ZO  L AW  R E V I E W  [Vol. 34:1283 
settlement of the case may have been precisely what Vinson hoped 
would occur. 
5.     Purposes 
The explanation for these many masks is multi-layered. First, to 
protect the federal judiciary from high stakes confrontations with the 
executive in national security cases, Vinson wanted to avoid what he 
termed a “showdown” between the judiciary and the executive over the 
authority of the judiciary to inspect the disputed documents in camera 
and ex parte. This was a showdown that Vinson stated had 
“constitutional overtones” and his goal was to defuse it.495 Hence, he 
constructed a brand new standard for the application of the state secrets 
privilege that had no support in prior United States case law and then he 
sustained its application in the Reynolds case even though the court’s 
opinion contains strong signals that the court itself doubted that the 
record in Reynolds actually satisfied Reynolds’s legal rule. 
Second, to protect the Court’s reputation and image as upholding 
the rule of law and assuring judicial checks on executive potential abuse, 
Vinson wanted the Reynolds opinion to make it appear that the Court 
was upholding its duty to control the evidence and to guard against the 
executive’s abuse of the privilege in which the executive asserted a state 
secrets privilege. Thus, Vinson included in his opinion lofty claims but 
claims that were undermined by the guidelines Vinson set forth for 
implementing the privilege. 
Third, to protect the Court’s image, Vinson wrote the Reynolds 
opinion so it appeared as if the Court was “doing justice” for the three 
widows by holding out hope that the reversal and the remand in the case 
would permit the widows to secure non-privileged evidence that 
allowed them to establish the cause of the accident. But the fact was that 
the remand to take the depositions placed the widows in a difficult 
position of either settling the litigation or risking more years of 
litigation. 
Lastly, to increase the possibility that both parties in Reynolds were 
inclined to settle the litigation on remand, Vinson’s opinion left 
uncertain the authority of the trial judge in the case to inspect the 
disputed documents if the depositions were inconclusive. The opinion 
contained some words useful to each side, which created a dynamic in 
the litigation which motivated each side to settle the case.496 
 
 495 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6. 
 496 There is some evidence that one of the plaintiffs was worried about how long the 
litigation was taking almost three years before Vinson’s opinion became public. In a letter dated 
June 26, 1950, addressed to Theodore Mattern, Charles J. Biddle wrote: “Mrs. Brauner called 
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In sum, Vinson wanted to defuse the showdown, protect the image 
and reputation of the Court, and pressure the parties to settle the 
dispute. And he succeeded. 
B.     Vinson and Truman 
Why does one fairly short opinion—eleven pages—give rise to so 
many questions? Although there is no definitive answer to these 
questions, it does seem highly improbable that the opinion’s perplexities 
resulted from happenstance or oversight. The opinion’s needle work is 
too intricate to accept that its content was anything but deliberate. 
One possible explanation is that Vinson’s opinion simply reflected 
what he thought regarding the relevant legal doctrine. There is some 
merit to this perspective, and at least part of Vinson’s opinion can be so 
explained. For example, Vinson did tell his colleagues at the conference 
during which Reynolds was discussed that he favored granting the 
executive an absolute state secrets privilege that more or less tracked the 
position set forth by the British House of Lords in the Duncan case.497 
That view was consistent with Vinson’s deep respect for presidential 
prerogatives in matters affecting national security and with Vinson’s 
estimation of the dangers and threats the nation confronted during the 
early 1950s, and thus there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of his 
position. Given that Vinson was unable to persuade enough of his 
Supreme Court colleagues to endorse the Duncan position, one can 
understand Vinson’s opinion granting the executive a de facto absolute 
privilege as an extension of those views. 
But any effort to explain fully Vinson’s opinion in Reynolds solely 
by reference to his general views on executive authority and the role of 
courts in national security matters fails to explain all of the twists and 
turns reviewed above in Vinson’s opinion and it ignores the obvious. 
Truman and Vinson were extremely close friends, had profound 
affection and respect for each other, and discussed all matters of 
importance to each other with each other. Truman considered Vinson 
“one of the best men in government.”498 He appointed him Secretary of 
the Treasury, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and, throughout 
much of 1951, urged him to run for the 1952 Democratic Party 
presidential nomination.499 Truman considered Vinson part of his inner 
 
me the other day when she was in town and she was naturally anxious to know what happened 
to her case and in view of the long delay, I can understand perfectly why she should be 
concerned about it.” Letter from Charles J. Biddle to Theodore Mattern (June 26, 1950) (on file 
with author). 
 497 See supra Part V.B. 
 498 DAVID MCCULLOCH, TRUMAN 404 (1992). 
 499 See id. at 887 (claiming that Truman tried to persuade Vinson to seek the 1952 
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circle and such an intimate500 that Vinson was “practically ‘family.’”501 
Indeed, “Mrs. Truman and their daughter Margaret called the chief 
justice ‘poppa Vin.’”502 
For his part, Vinson was a Truman loyalist and he considered the 
President a close personal friend. Vinson was an advisor to the 
President and he regularly spoke to the President, met with the 
President, and even accompanied the President on vacations.503 Perhaps 
even more importantly, Vinson was more than an intimate presidential 
confidant; he was a strong, active, and unwavering advocate for the 
President and the executive branch in all cases before the Supreme 
Court in which President Truman had an interest.504 As Chief Justice 
 
Democratic Party nomination for President); CABELL PHILLIPS, THE TRUMAN PRESIDENCY: THE 
HISTORY OF A TRIUMPHANT SUCCESSION 156 (1966) (“In 1951 Truman did his unavailing best 
to persuade his old friend to accept the Democratic nomination for President.”); see also 2 
HARRY S. TRUMAN, MEMOIRS: YEARS OF TRIAL AND HOPE, 1946–1952, at 489 (1956) (noting 
that in the spring of 1951, Truman thought “[t]he most logical and qualified candidate” to be 
the next president was Vinson); Edward T. Folliard, Vinson Figures Large in the Talk of the 
Truman Heir, WASH. POST, April 1, 1951, § 11, at 1B; Paul R. Leach, It Could Be Fred Vinson 
for Democrats in 1952, CHI. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 27, 1951, at 2. 
 500 Truman considered Vinson a “devoted and undemonstrative patriot” with a “sense of 
personal and political loyalty seldom found among the top men in Washington.” MCCULLOCH, 
supra note 498, at 507. 
 501  ST. CLAIR & GUGIN, supra note 319, at 192. 
 502 Id.; see also David McCullough states in his biography of Truman that Truman “liked 
games with wild cards, and especially a version of ordinary stud poker that he called ‘Papa 
Vinson,’ after Fred Vinson, who was a particularly skillful player.” MCCULLOUGH, supra note 
498, at 511. 
 503 WILLIAM M. RIGDON, LOG OF PRESIDENT TRUMAN’S EIGHTH VISIT TO KEY WEST, 
FLORIDA, MARCH 12–APRIL 10, 1950, at 42 (1950), available at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/
calendar/travel_log/key1947/eighthtrip_toc.htm (photograph of President Truman and Chief 
Justice Vinson as Vinson prepares to return from Florida to Washington); WILLIAM M. 
RIGDON, LOG OF PRESIDENT TRUMAN’S TENTH VISIT TO KEY WEST, FLORIDA, NOVEMBER 8–
DECEMBER 9, 1951, at 58 (1951), available at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/calendar/travel_
log/key1947/tenthtrip_toc.htm (photograph of Chief Justice Vinson and his wife, with the 
handwritten inscription, “A most pleasant vacation with Chief Justice + Mrs. Vinson.—Harry 
Truman”). 
 504 In Truman and the Steel Seizure Case, Maeva Marcus wrote, in reference to Truman’s 
four appointments to the Supreme Court (Fred Vinson, Harold Burton, Tom Clark, and 
Sherman Minton): “It was widely assumed that the four Truman appointees to the Court would 
support the President. Each was a personal friend of Truman’s. Each had a record of upholding 
government action whatever the issue, and all often voted the same way.” MAEVA MARCUS, 
TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 188 (1977). 
Although Chief Justice Vinson’s close relationship with President Truman raised eyebrows, 
Vinson was not the only member of that high court to advise a sitting President. In writing 
about the Warren Court, Professor Lucas A. Powe, Jr., has written: 
Supreme Court justices have advised presidents before—Frankfurter and Douglas 
with Roosevelt jump to mind, as would Vinson’s telling Truman to seize the steel 
mills because the Court would back him up—but no justice ever went as far as 
Fortas. According to White House logs, between November 23, 1963, and July 2, 
1968, there were 145 face-to-face meetings between Johnson and Fortas. Then there 
was the red telephone. No justice prior to Fortas had a telephone on his desk with its 
direct line to the White House. 
RUDENSTINE.34.4 (Do Not Delete) 4/19/2013  12:07 PM 
2013] A  F A US T I A N  B AR GA I N  1383 
Vinson’s biographers have written: “In fact, on virtually every issue of 
importance that came before the Supreme Court, Vinson did not fail to 
serve Truman’s interests.”505 
The mere fact that Vinson and Truman were close and personal 
friends who discussed issues of importance to the President does not 
establish that Vinson was willing to depart from significant norms of 
judicial conduct and have a private conversation with Truman about a 
case in which the Truman administration was a party. Nonetheless, 
although the evidence is limited, what evidence there is establishes that 
Vinson was willing to have private conversations with the President or 
the Attorney General about matters pending before the Court. Indeed, 
the available evidence establishes that Vinson had such conversations in 
two cases that dominated the national news. 
First, Vinson advised Truman in advance of Truman seizing the 
steel mills in 1952 that the Supreme Court would uphold presidential 
seizure.506 It turned out that Vinson incorrectly assessed what the 
Supreme Court would in fact decide in the case.507 But there is no 
doubting the fact that Vinson gave the President advice about a matter 
 
POWE, supra note 318, at 470. 
 505 ST. CLAIR & GUGIN, supra note 319, at 190; see also HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES & 
PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 8 (3d ed. 1992). 
In Maeva Marcus’s study, the following conclusion is offered: “While serving on the Court, 
Vinson continued to be an adviser to the President.” MARCUS, supra note 504, at 189. It was 
because of the close relationship between Vinson and Truman, and the “inability” of Vinson to 
“move far enough out Truman’s orbit to act independently of the president” that “[s]ome 
scholars of the Court . . . rated [Vinson] a failure.” ST. CLAIR & GUGIN, supra note 319, at 189; 
see also, e.g., ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & ROY M. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED JUSTICES: 
STATISTICAL STUDIES ON THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 49 (1978) (referring to 
Justice Vinson as a failure). But see ABRAHAM, supra, at 245 (“It is unfair and inaccurate, 
however, to categorize him as a ‘failure’ on the bench . . . .”). 
 506 POWE, supra note 318, at 17–18. Vinson’s willingness to have a private communication 
with the executive branch regarding pending cases before the high court was not restricted to 
the Truman administration. Thus, Vinson met with Attorney General Herbert Brownell and 
acting Solicitor General Robert L. Stern about the appeal of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg in the 
spring of 1953. See Snyder, supra note 2, at 935; see also infra note 508. 
 507 See, e.g., POWE, supra note 318, at 17–18 (“In those days [the early 1950s], when the 
Court was filled with former presidential advisers, [Chief Justice Fred] Vinson, cruising the 
Potomac on the presidential yacht Sequoia, agreed with Truman’s position and told him that 
the Court would support him if he seized the mills. Armed with this knowledge, Truman went 
forward only to be stunned when Vinson’s vote count was wrong. Only Reed and Minton 
joined Vinson in supporting Truman’s position.”); SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 14, at 179 
(claiming that in seizing the steel mills to avoid the disruption of steel production due to a 
threatened strike, President Truman “relied on a memo from former Attorney General Clark, 
who by then was on the Supreme Court [and voted to support the position that the seizure was 
unconstitutional] and on secret oral assurances from then-Chief Justice Fred Vinson, that the 
Court would approve his decision. Vinson proved a poor oracle. The Court rejected Truman’s 
claim to inherent wartime power by six votes to three.”); see also ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO 
BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 417 (1994) (“Vinson’s long, passionate dissent pressed the same advice 
he had privately given Truman in early April: that the president had the legal power to seize the 
steel mills as a wartime emergency measure.”). 
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that the Supreme Court eventually decided. Second, in June of 1953, 
shortly after President Eisenhower became president, Vinson had 
private communications with the United States Attorney General and 
the Acting Solicitor General regarding the case of Julius and Ethel 
Rosenberg who had been convicted of espionage and sentenced to 
death.508 
Although there is no specific evidence that Truman and Vinson 
discussed the Reynolds case, if Vinson was willing to depart from 
judicial norms in cases that commanded national attention, there is no 
reason to doubt that he had scruples about having private conversations 
with the President or Attorney General about a case that attracted 
almost no public attention. That possibility increases given that 
President Truman had many opportunities to learn of the Reynolds case 
from Air Force Secretaries Symington509 or Finletter,510 or presidential 
assistant Clark Clifford, or even possibly Frank Folsom of RCA when 
the President met privately with him,511 and that Truman had 
innumerable opportunities to discuss Reynolds with Chief Justice 
 
 508 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Reynolds case and heard oral arguments 
while Harry Truman was President. The decision itself was made public on March 9, 1953, 
some weeks after Dwight D. Eisenhower took the presidential oath of office. Moreover, Snyder 
asserts that Chief Justice Vinson had ex parte communications with the Eisenhower 
administration while the Rosenbergs’ appeal to the Supreme Court was pending. Snyder, supra 
note 2, at 935. Thus, Snyder claims that Vinson met “secretly” at 11:00 PM on June 16, 1953, at 
his apartment with Acting Solicitor General Robert L. Stern and Attorney General Herbert 
Brownell to discuss the Rosenberg’s appeal to the court; that Vinson met privately from 12:25 
PM to 1:10 PM on June 17, with Brownell in Vinson’s chambers; and that Vinson told Justice 
Douglas during a “four-minute meeting on Thursday, June 18 in Vinson’s chambers before the 
Court’s conference”: “I’m sorry, but the White House has sent word that they have to fry.” See 
id. at 917–21 & nn.171–190 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although my focus is on 
Vinson’s ex parte communications with the executive about cases before the Court, there is no 
reason to assume that Vinson was the only member of the court to have ex parte 
communications with executive branch officials about pending cases. See, e.g., Carlos M. 
Vázquez, “Not a Happy Precedent”: The Story of Ex parte Quirin, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 
219 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2010). At a dinner party, Justice Felix Frankfurter 
discussed the merits of using a military commission to try the eventual defendants in Ex parte 
Quirin with Secretary of Defense Stimson, the chairman of a military commission that would 
try the defendants. Id. at 225. Justice Roberts was told that President Roosevelt told the 
Attorney General that he would not “hand [the defendants] over to any United States marshal 
armed with a writ of habeas corpus,” id. at 227 (internal quotation marks omitted), and Roberts 
“conveyed” the message “to the rest of the Justices during their first conference on the case. 
‘That would be a dreadful thing’ was the Chief Justice’s response.” Id. 
 509 Daily Presidential Appointments, HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY & MUSEUM, 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/calendar/index.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2013) (search keyword 
“Symington” and browse dates listed). 
 510 Daily Appointments with President Truman, HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY & MUSEUM, 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/calendar/index.html (search keyword “Finletter” and browse 
dates listed). 
 511 Daily Presidential Appointments, Friday, August 25, 1950, HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY & 
MUSEUM, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/calendar/main.php?currYear=1950&currMonth=
8&currDay=25 (last visited Mar. 6, 2013) (containing the following entry: “11:50 PM (Mr. Phil 
Regan) (Mr. Frank Folsom, RCA) OFF THE RECORD”). 
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Vinson, including at the “OFF THE RECORD” meeting the two of them 
had on November 12, 1952,512 which was shortly after the oral argument 
in Reynolds and before Vinson’s law clerk, Carl S. Hawkins, completed a 
draft opinion in Reynolds.513 
Moreover, there is evidence that Vinson and Truman had a private 
conversation about Reynolds in the opinion itself. Consider four 
instances. A private communication would explain why Vinson stated 
that the secret electronic equipment did not cause the crash. The 
Reynolds record included only two statements by individuals who would 
have known whether the secret electronic equipment caused the crash in 
whole or in part, and they were submitted by Secretary Finletter and 
Judge Advocate General Harmon. But neither of those statements made 
any claim regarding the relationship between the secret electronic 
equipment and the cause of the crash. Nonetheless, Vinson stated that 
the secret electronic equipment did not cause the crash, a claim central 
to Vinson’s rational for a remand. But given that Finletter and Harmon 
did not make that claim, a private communication between the 
President and the Chief Justice would explain the basis for Vinson’s 
views. 
A private communication would explain why Vinson was not 
deceived or misled by Finletter’s or Harmon’s statements into 
concluding that the disputed documents contained information that 
would injure national security if disclosed. Those statements had already 
misled two judges.514 At the trial, Judge Kirkpatrick515 thought that 
Finletter and Harmon had made this claim and as a result had ordered 
the executive to permit an in camera, ex parte judicial inspection as 
opposed to directing the executive to clarify the ambiguous claims made 
in their statements. Circuit Judge Maris also thought that Finletter and 
Harmon had claimed that the disputed documents contained military 
 
 512 Daily Presidential Appointments, Wednesday, November 12, 1952, HARRY S. TRUMAN 
LIBRARY & MUSEUM, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/calendar/main.php?currYear=1952&curr
Month=11&currDay=12 (last visited Mar. 6, 2013) (containing the following entry: “4:45 PM 
(Honorable Fred Vinson, the Chief Justice) OFF THE RECORD”). 
 513 Carl Hawkins, Draft of United States v. Reynolds Opinion (Dec. 3, 1952) (unpublished 
draft) (on file with Margaret I. King, Special Collections Library of the University of Kentucky, 
Manuscript Collection,). 
 514 When the descendants tried to reopen the judgment in the case, they also claimed that 
the Air Force officials had lied. See Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy 
Fraud on the Court, supra note 38, at 3, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *104, *107–08. 
 515 Judge Kirkpatrick was a careful and thorough judge who was quite capable to parsing 
sentences. Recall, in his June 1950 opinion he noted that the Air Force had offered to permit the 
plaintiffs to take the deposition of the surviving servicemen at the convenience of the plaintiffs 
and at the expense of the Air Force. See Brauner v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468, 470 (E.D. Pa. 
1950), aff’d sub nom. Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1951), rev’d, 345 U.S. 1 
(1953). But Kirkpatrick also noted that he did not understand by the wording of the offer that 
the Air Force had in fact made a firm and unequivocal offer by which it would be bound by. See 
id. 
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secrets: thus, in referring to the claim of privilege in this case, Judge 
Maris stated that “it asserts in effect that the documents sought to be 
produced contain state secrets of a military character.”516 In contrast to 
what Maris wrote, Vinson made no such claim in his opinion. 
Further, if the President told Vinson that the Air Force would not 
disclose the documents in whole or in part to a judge, that would 
explain why Vinson did not direct the Air Force to redact the 
documents to excise military secrets. 
Lastly, a private conversation would explain why Vinson’s opinion 
left a trial judge on remand uncertain whether a judge could order the 
inspection of the documents if the depositions were inconclusive, an 
ambiguity that pressured both the executive and the widows to settle the 
case and to avoid another showdown.517 
C.     Reflections 
The conduct of senior Air Force officials during this episode was 
far from admirable. From the commencement of the litigation the Air 
Force treated the widows who sought relief for their dead husbands not 
just as legal adversaries but as threats to the Air Force’s reputation and 
public standing. Thus, the Air Force initially conducted an investigation 
into the crash designed not to uncover any information that would 
 
 516 Reynolds, 192 F.2d at 996. Judge Maris, who, similar to Judge Kirkpatrick, was also a 
careful judge who read words carefully. Nonetheless, he was taken in by Finletter and Harmon’s 
deceptiveness. Judge Maris preceded his conclusion that the documents contained military 
secrets with a quotation from Finletter’s August 9, 1950, statement: “The defendant further 
objects to the production of this report, together with the statements of witnesses, for the 
further reason that the aircraft in question, together with the personnel on board, were engaged 
in a confidential mission of the Air Force. The airplane likewise carried confidential equipment 
on board and any disclosure of its mission or information concerning its operation or 
performance would be prejudicial to this Department and would not be in the public interest.” 
Id. at 996 (internal quotation marks omitted). Plainly, Finletter did not claim that the 
documents contained national security information. But, equally plainly, he hoped to convey 
that misleading impression. The fact that Judge Maris was taken in by the Secretary’s 
deceptiveness may be explained by the simple fact that the judge trusted Finletter not to deceive 
and mislead. 
 517 There would have been no reason for Vinson to have shared with one or more of his 
judicial colleagues information about the Reynolds case he had received from the President. 
Vinson had a close working relationship with other members of the Court who had been 
appointed by President Truman (Burton, Clark and Minton), as well as with Justice Reed. See 
FRED RODELL, NINE MEN: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES FROM 1790 TO 1955, at 305 (1955) (“Indeed, Vinson’s views were so close to Reed’s on 
most other matters, not just on civil liberties, that when Vinson at last became king of his 
Court, Reed, more often than not voting with the Truman-chosen four, became their chief 
spokesman as well as their ablest—though he had rated about at the bottom of the New Deal 
Justices.”); see also id. at 307 (“To Vinson—as to Reed alone of the Roosevelt Justices—Uncle 
Sam could almost do no wrong.”). By 1953, Vinson had honed his skill of “bending himself to 
the majority” and could count on his capacity to write an opinion that a majority of the Justices 
would support. ST. CLAIR & GUGIN, supra note 319, at 179. 
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embarrass the Air Force, place it in an unfavorable light, or ignite 
difficulties between the Air Force and Congress or between the Air 
Force and the private companies upon which the Air Force relied for 
weapon research and design. The Air Force only conducted a second 
investigation because an influential RCA official—Frank M. Folsom—
wrote the Air Force a scathing letter about the crash, and then the 
service took steps to assure that no one outside the Air Force had access 
to it, including Folsom, to whom the Air Force made false statements 
about what the second investigation concluded. 
As disturbing as those developments were, these lapses were merely 
a preface to the misconduct that followed. Within weeks of the 
completion of the second investigation that resulted in the Persons 
Report, senior Air Force officials orchestrated a written response to 
plaintiffs’ interrogatories that contained two false statements. Months 
later, after the interests of the Air Force and the Justice Department 
lawyers intersected in the Reynolds case, senior Air Force officials 
submitted statements to a federal judge which were misleading and 
deceptive. 
Such appalling conduct was not limited to the Air Force. Justice 
Department lawyers in the litigation became part of a process aimed at 
shielding the Air Force from public criticism. One lawyer was part of a 
process that resulted in submission of two false statements as part of the 
Air Force responses to plaintiffs’ interrogatories at the trial court stage, 
and other lawyers participated in the drafting and submission of 
misleading and deceptive statements submitted by the Secretary of the 
Air Force and the Judge Advocate General to a federal judge. They also 
participated in the misrepresentation that the taking of the depositions 
of the three surviving servicemen would permit the plaintiffs to 
determine the cause of the plane accident without relying upon 
privileged evidence. By acquiescing in a set of circumstances that denied 
the Justice Department lawyers access to the disputed documents, the 
lawyers became complicit in the misrepresentation of the contents of the 
disputed documents in the brief filed in the Supreme Court. 
Taken together, the conduct of senior Air Force officials and the 
government lawyers in Reynolds illustrates the willingness on the part of 
the executive to take advantage of the trust they assume judges have in 
the trustworthiness of the senior executive branch officers—lawyers and 
non-lawyers—and to abuse that trust by abusing the state secrets 
privilege.518 This conduct also suggests that senior executive officials 
 
 518 Although Constantine C. Menges’s memoir, Inside the National Security Council: The 
True Story of the Making and Unmaking of Reagan’s Foreign Policy, is focused on the deceit and 
the abuse of trust within the executive branch, the fact that senior executive branch officials 
were willing to deceive the president—in this case President Reagan—who appointed them to 
their high offices helps validates the idea that no one should underestimate the capacity of 
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assume that even if the courts suspected that the executive abused 
judicial reliance on executive trustworthiness, the courts would seek to 
avoid creating a legal context in which the courts forced the disclosure 
of executive manipulation and deceptiveness. 
As shocking as the conduct of the executive and its lawyers were in 
Reynolds, it was conduct of the Supreme Court that was even more 
disappointing. As is so well known, the Court has “no influence over the 
sword or the purse,” and thus has, as Alexander Hamilton wrote, 
“neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment.”519 By design, the Court’s 
authority rests upon the persuasiveness of its opinions, and that 
persuasiveness in turn depends upon many considerations including the 
forthrightness of those opinions. Because the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Reynolds rested so strongly on pretense and misleading and deceptive 
statements, the Reynolds opinion betrayed important expectations. 
Several aspects of the decision support this judgment. First, the 
majority opinion in Reynolds constructed a set of legal rules that 
engineered a result that the opinion explicitly denied it endorsed. The 
opinion insisted that courts should remain in control of the evidence 
and assure that the executive did not abuse the state secret privilege, but 
the Court’s announced rules in Reynolds prevented courts from doing 
just that—remaining in control of the evidence and in guarding against 
the abuse of the privilege. Instead of granting the executive a de facto 
absolute state secrets privilege, the majority should have affirmed the 
lower court judgment and permitted the trial judge to inspect the 
documents in camera, ex parte. Such a result would have achieved what 
the court stated it was seeking to achieve, namely, to assure that judges 
remained in control of the evidence and in protecting the judicial 
process from executive abuse of the privilege while simultaneously 
protecting legitimate national security interests. What the majority did 
manage to accomplish in this aspect of its opinion was the avoidance of 
a “showdown” between the executive and the judiciary, but it did so at 
the cost of upholding the rule of law. Second, the majority improperly 
 
individuals to employ deceit and mendacity in the service of ends they consider of great 
significance. See CONSTANTINE C. MENGES, INSIDE THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL: THE 
TRUE STORY OF THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF REAGAN’S FOREIGN POLICY (1988). Menges 
wrote: 
This book describes dramatic and hard-fought inside battles about major 
foreign policy issues . . . in which I participated. The episodes illustrate how the 
foreign policy process worked well—and how it failed. There was secret plotting by 
cabinet-level officials who deliberately kept their peers in the dark hoping to create 
situations that would assure their policy views prevailed. This included what seemed 
to me calculated attempts to keep information about major foreign events and plans 
from President Reagan himself. 
Id. at 12.  
 519 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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applied the newly minted legal rules announced in Reynolds to the facts 
of that case. The majority upheld the privilege in the case even though 
the facts of the case, as summarized by Vinson himself, did not support 
that outcome. Moreover, statements in the opinion undercut any 
suggestion that Vinson’s misapplication of the new rules for the state 
secrets privilege was the result of inadvertence or good faith. Third, 
because the majority knew that the depositions would be useless, it is 
difficult to escape the conclusion that in remanding the case the 
majority was mainly interested in making it appear that it was 
committed to providing the plaintiffs with a judicial remedy as opposed 
to actually providing one. 
Vinson’s opinion in Reynolds was part of a series of events 
intended to protect the Air Force’s reputation and the court’s public 
standing. Moreover, by denying the courts a meaningful role in future 
cases when the executive claims a state secrets privilege, the Vinson 
opinion undercut the capacity of the courts to uphold the rule of law 
and undermined a governing structure of checks and balances. 
D.     Consequences 
The Reynolds decision has had many consequences. The Reynolds 
rules granted the executive a de facto absolute state secrets privilege, and 
by the mid-1970s the executive began to assert this privilege with 
increasing frequency by comparison to its use during the entire prior 
history of the Republic.520 That increasing use was attributable not only 
to the rise of the national security state and the imperial presidency, but 
to the fact that the courts had granted the executive a very effective 
weapon to use to defeat legal actions. 
Not only did the executive use the privilege more frequently 
beginning almost forty years ago, but courts—and here the driving force 
was generated by the various Courts of Appeals—vastly expanded the 
scope of the privilege beyond the scope of the privilege in the Reynolds 
case. The doctrinal tools used by courts to make the privilege sweeping 
in character and near fatal to any opposing claim included the 
 
 520 See ROBERT M. PALLITTO & WILLIAM G. WEAVER, PRESIDENTIAL SECRECY AND THE LAW 
106 (2007) (“Use of the state secrets privilege in courts has grown significantly over the last 
several decades. In the twenty-three years between the decision in Reynolds and the election of 
Jimmy Carter in 1976, there are eleven reported cases where the government invoked the 
privilege. Since 1977 there have been more than seventy reported cases where courts ruled on 
invocation of the privilege.”); see also Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation 
of Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1931, 1938 (2007) (“For over two decades following Reynolds, 
the executive rarely asserted the state secrets privilege . . . . But starting in 1977, the executive 
raised the privilege with greater frequency. Between 1953 and 1976, there were only eleven 
reported cases addressing the privilege; between 1977 and 2001 there were fifty-nine reported 
cases.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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employment of the so-called Mosaic theory; the creation of the 
Unacceptable Risk doctrine; the dismissal of an action on the basis of 
the privilege before a responsive pleading was filed, even though the 
plaintiff claims it will not rely upon privileged evidence; and the 
dismissal of an action in its entirety when there is a risk that privileged 
evidence may limit or compromise a defense.521 
The de facto privilege has certainly permitted—perhaps invited, if 
not encouraged—executive abuse of the privilege.522 In that regard, the 
abuse of the privilege by the Air Force in Reynolds to conceal its own 
misconduct simply foreshadowed executive branch conduct in 
succeeding decades. Moreover, the privilege has been extended to shield 
not only misconduct but allegedly illegal conduct by executive 
officers.523 
The irony of these developments of the last four decades is that the 
Reynolds rule has accomplished just the opposite of what Chief Justice 
Vinson seems to have sought, namely a rule that would keep the courts 
out of controversy in cases implicating national security. Vinson sought 
to achieve his goal by granting the executive a de facto absolute 
privilege. He probably expected that the executive would assert the 
privilege no more in the future than in the past, and thus the privilege 
announced in Reynolds would be rarely used. His predictions held up 
for twenty years, but not after that. The result has been that courts 
sustain the privilege in highly controversial and nationally prominent 
cases, and that the courts’ rulings have embroiled the courts in intense 
controversy. This controversy is fueled not by executive exasperation 
with the judiciary but by the plaintiffs’ criticism of both the executive 
and the judiciary. Thus, the showdown Vinson avoided in Reynolds has 
 
 521 See supra note 8. 
 522 Plaintiffs’ lawyer, Charles J. Biddle, understood that an absolute privilege—de facto or de 
jure—would result in, to use Vinson’s terms, executive “caprice.” In a letter dated March 18, 
1952, addressed to Theodore Mattern, Biddle wrote: 
This is probably as good a time as any to have the legal question come before the 
Supreme Court in view of all the scandals about Government officials. If the head of 
a government department is to be permitted to himself decide whether or not to give 
out information free from any direction by the courts, it would indeed furnish a great 
opportunity to cover up things in the Department which they would rather not have 
come to light. 
Letter from Charles J. Biddle to Theodore Mattern (Mar. 18, 1952) (on file with author). 
 523 The Obama administration’s decision to funnel all claims for a state secrets privilege 
through a group of senior lawyers in the Department of Justice constitutes an implied 
admission that the executive branch had abused the privilege and that procedures were require 
to guard against its future abuse. Moreover, it is worth emphasizing that there is no evidence 
that the contemporary state secrets privilege that grants the executive a de facto absolute 
privilege is required to protect the national security. The belief underlining the Third Circuit’s 
decision in Reynolds that federal judges can be trusted to parse the issues with a sensitive eye 
towards national security concerns, see Reynolds v. United States, 192 F.2d 987, 997 (3d Cir. 
1951), rev’d, 345 U.S. 1 (1953), remains unchallenged. 
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been redefined as a confrontation between parties seeking judicial relief 
against an abusive executive and the courts failing to provide a forum 
for redress. 
Lastly, the Reynolds case helped inaugurate and define what I term 
the Age of Deference.524 This is the period that commences with the end 
of World War II and the dawn of the modern day national security state 
and continues to today. It is a period in which federal courts—mainly 
under the leadership of the Supreme Court—have created and redefined 
one legal doctrine after another, the effect of which is to insulate the 
executive branch from any meaningful judicial review in cases 
implicating national security.525 These doctrines are broad in scope and 
near-iron clad. Thus, the executive can function within this judicially 
built fortress without any of the accountability or transparency that 
results from the adjudication of serious claims in a public courtroom. 
The result has been a serious distortion in the nation’s governing 
structure and a weakening of institutional commitments to the rule of 
law.526 
 
 524 See supra notes 13–16, 18 and accompanying text. 
 525 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (articulating a new and more demanding 
pleading standard for evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint: the first step requires the 
exclusion of conclusory allegations; the second step requires an assessment of whether a 
plausible fit exists between the non-conclusory facts alleged and the judicial relief claimed); 
Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 3 (2005) (expanding the rule in Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 
(1876), “prohibiting suits against the Government based on covert espionage agreements”); 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (imposing more demanding standing 
requirements); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (delimiting 
Congress’s role in agency oversight by declaring the one-house legislative veto 
unconstitutional); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (declaring that the president is 
absolutely immune from civil damages liability for his official acts); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 
U.S. 996 (1979) (plurality opinion) (dismissing action on the ground that the case presented a 
non-justiciable political question); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (granting the 
president a constitutionally based executive privilege); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 
(1953) (announcing new rules to guide the application of the state secrets privilege); Mohamed 
v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying the state secrets privilege 
before a responsive pleading is filed on the ground that the litigation presents an unacceptable 
risk that a state secret may be inadvertently make public); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d 
Cir. 2009) (dismissing action on the ground that no Bivens claim for relief is available on the 
facts of the case absent congressional authorization). 
 526 It is common place today to claim that the “activism” of the federal courts today saps the 
vitality of the democratic process. It no longer seems to matter to the many who make this 
claim what empirical basis is; the mere recitation of a few nationally prominent decisions in 
what is frequently termed the national “cultural wars,” seems to be adequate to make the claim 
to those who assert it an unassailable truism. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) 
(declaring unconstitutional a Texas statute making homosexual sodomy a crime); Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (declaring that a woman has a constitutionally protected right to an 
abortion). Thus, Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson, III of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
recently added his voice to that chorus, though in doing so he not only deplores “judicial 
activism” but also what he terms “cosmic constitutional theory,” which he claims, in one 
paragraph, are “taking us down the road to judicial hegemony where self-governance at the 
heart of our political order cannot thrive,” and in the next asserts: “[C]osmic constitutional 
theory has done real damage to the rule of law, the role of courts in our society, and the ideals 
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VII.     THE LAST APPEAL 
A.     Justice Denied 
In early 2000, Judith Palya Loether, a daughter of Albert H. Palya, 
one of the civilian engineers who died in the 1948 crash, “came across 
an internet website offering access to recently-declassified military 
aircraft accidents reports.”527 Subsequently she obtained the Air Force 
Investigation Report and the three witness statements that senior Air 
Force officials had represented, a half century earlier, contained military 
secrets that would injure the national security if disclosed.528 To her 
surprise, the confidential documents contained “nothing approaching a 
‘military secret.’ There is not one mention of the secret mission or the 
secret equipment that had occupied these men” on the day they died in 
the crash of the B-29 bomber.”529 Eventually she and others,530 including 
Patricia J. Reynolds—now Patricia J. Herring and the spouse of Robert 
Reynolds—secured legal representation from the same law firm that 
brought the original case—the Philadelphia law firm of Drinker Biddle 
& Reath LLP—and initiated suit to reopen the case and “to set aside the 
settlement agreement reached fifty years earlier on the grounds that the 
settlement was procured by the Air Force’s claim of privilege, through 
which it committed a fraud on the Court actionable under Rule 60(b)’s 
savings clause.”531 
They claimed that the Air Force’s accident report and the three 
witness statements contained no military secrets.532 Instead, they 
 
of restraint that the greatest judges in our country once embraced. But the worst damage of all 
has been to democracy itself, which theory has emboldened judges to displace.” J. HARVIE 
WILKINSON, III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY AMERICANS ARE LOSING THEIR 
INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE 4 (2012). Whatever may be said about “judicial 
hegemony” in contemporary times, there can be no doubt that the cluster of cases that 
constitute the Age of Deference are at the opposite end of the “judicial activism” spectrum. In 
addition, it is clear that these cases invite, if not encourage, executive branch abuse of power, 
and that they inflict great damage on the rule of law and the effectiveness of a governing 
structure of checks and balances. 
 527 Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, supra note 
38, at 2, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *104, *105–07. This complaint was filed in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania by Wilson M. Brown, III 
and Jeff A. Almeida of Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, a Philadelphia law firm that represented 
the three widows in the original damage action authorized by the Federal Tort Claims Act 
against the United States. See id. at 15–16 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *104, *125–27. 
 528 Id. at 11–12, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *104, *119–122. 
 529 Id. at 2–3, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *104, *105–09. 
 530 The other parties to the suit included Susan Brauner, Catherine Brauner, William Palya, 
and Robert Palya, as living heirs of the deceased William H. Brauner and Phyllis Brauner, and 
Albert H. Palya and Elizabeth Palya. Id. at 1, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS, at *104, *104–105. 
 531 Herring v. United States, No. Civ.A.03-CV-5500-LDD, 2004 WL 2040272, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 
Sept. 10, 2004), aff’d, 424 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 532 Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, supra note 
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maintained, these recently declassified documents established that the 
B-29 that crashed in 1948 was not fit for flying;533 that the crew had not 
previously flown together;534 and that the civilian engineers who died in 
the crash had not been instructed about emergency exit procedures.535 
Thus, the descendants claimed that high government Air Force officials 
had deliberately and intentionally submitted false information to the 
court, that the submitted information was central to the court’s 
reasoning and judgment in the case, and that this fraud on the court 
warranted the exceptional relief of vacating the earlier final judgment.536 
After two efforts before the Supreme Court, one before a United States 
District Court and another before a Court of Appeals, these family 
members lost in their effort to gain a hearing to reopen the judgment in 
the case. 
Initially the families sought relief before the Supreme Court 
because it was the Supreme Court that had issued the highly important 
1953 decision.537 But on June 23, 2003, the Court refused to consider the 
matter.538 At that point, the families applied to the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for relief, the very court 
in which the original damage action was first filed. They claimed that 
the settlement agreement reached fifty years earlier was the result of the 
Air Force successfully asserting a fraudulent claim of privilege.539 
The United States District Judge Legrome D. Davis denied relief. 
He stated that although the disputed documents provide “no thorough 
 
38, at 11, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *104, *119–21. 
 533 Id. 
 534 Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, supra note 
79, at 1, 12, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *104, *121 (Complaint); id. Exhibit J, at 103, 
110, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *198, *205 (Persons Report). 
 535 Id. Exhibit J, at 103, 113, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *198, *210. As the report 
stated in its official language: “The aircraft is not considered to have been safe for flight because 
of non-compliance with Technical Orders 01-20EJ-177 and 01-20EJ-178,” “Fire developed in 
the No. 1 engine as a result of the failure of the right exhaust collector ring,” and “AF 
Regulation 60-5 was violated in that the passengers and crew were not properly briefed.” Id. 
Exhibit J, at 103, 116, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *198, *213–14. Taken together, the 
findings had the following implications: the plane was unfit for flying because it lacked heat 
shields designed to prevent engine fires as required by Air Force technical orders; the lack of 
heat shields contributed to causing the fire that the extinguishers failed to extinguish; the crew 
had not previously flown together in violation of Air Force rules and the lack of flying 
experience as a team contributed to misjudgments that, in turn, contributed to the crash; and 
the crew had not trained the civilians in escape procedures, which contributed to the outcome 
that the dead civilian engineers did not parachute safely from the plane. 
 536 Independent Action for Relief from Judgment to Remedy Fraud on the Court, supra note 
38, 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 2430, at *104. 
 537 The descendants sought leave from the Supreme Court to file a petition for a writ of error 
coram nobis, which the court denied. In re Herring, 539 U.S. 940 (2003). 
 538 Id. 
 539 Herring v. United States, No. Civ.A.03-CV-5500-LDD, 2004 WL 2040272, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 
Sept. 10, 2004), aff’d, 424 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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exploration of the secret mission”540 and do not “refer to any newly 
developed electronic devices or secret electronic equipment,”541 the 
report did “describe the mission in question as an ‘electronics project’ 
and an ‘authorized research and development mission.’”542 
The family members appealed Judge Davis’s judgment to the Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit.543 That court, sitting in a panel of three 
judges—Judges Samuel A. Alito, Franklin Van Antwerpen and Ruggero 
Aldisert—affirmed the district court’s judgment in an opinion written 
by Judge Aldisert. Judge Aldisert wrote that the affidavits submitted by 
senior Air Force officials did not constitute fraud on the court during 
the original litigation because they had claimed that the disputed 
documents contained information which was in fact in the disputed 
documents indicating that the B-29 that crashed was engaged in a secret 
mission testing secret military equipment.544 More precisely, the opinion 
stated that the affidavits submitted by Secretary of the Air Force 
Finletter and Judge Advocate General Harmon “can be reasonably read 
to assert privilege over technical information about the B-29,” such as 
the plane’s “mission,” its “operation,” or its “performance,” as opposed 
to just the “confidential equipment” it had on board for testing.545 
The families had one last hope: an appeal to the Supreme Court. 
They filed their papers; the government responded with its papers. A 
decision to review the case required four of the nine Justices to vote in 
favor of granting certiorari and reviewing the case. The ultimate vote is 
not known. But the disposition is. At least six members of the Court did 
not favor review. The families’ petition was denied.546 That ended the 
appeal, and the litigation begun a half-century earlier came to an end for 
a second time. 
B.     Unreasonable Deference 
In the effort to re-open this tragic case, the descendants hit a 
judicially-constructed brick wall. That was not altogether a surprise. The 
policies against reopening a judgment are strong and the legal 
requirements for vacating a judgment on grounds of fraud are 
demanding.547 But it is likely that the judicial resistance to reopening the 
judgment in Herring was reinforced by another factor. 
 
 540 Id. at *6. 
 541 Id. at *8. 
 542 Id. at *6. 
 543 See Herring v. United States, 424 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 544 Id. at 392. 
 545 Id. 
 546 Herring v. United States, 547 U.S. 1123 (2006). 
 547 In Herring v. United States, the Third Circuit stated the challenge facing any party 
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By the time the families had moved to reopen the case, the federal 
courts, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s direction, had for over a half-
century displayed the “utmost deference” towards the executive branch 
in cases implicating national security.548 Thus, although the family 
members of the civilian engineers who died in B-29 #866 in 1948 over 
Waycross, Georgia, initially lost before the Supreme Court in 1953 
because of the state secret privilege, they lost before the federal courts 
for a second time in 2005 because of a broad rule of deference the 
Reynolds case helped generate. Thus, the Reynolds decision forms two 
bookends demarking the Age of Deference—the 1953 Supreme Court 
decision that helped launch the era and the 2006 Supreme Court refusal 
to review the case, a decision emblematic of the era’s maturity. 
 Thirteen federal judges—one district court judge, three circuit 
judges, and nine Supreme Court Justices—participated in the review of 
the Reynolds case in light of the previously confidential Air Force 
documents. That process produced two opinions, one at the district 
court and one at the circuit court; no one on the Supreme Court wrote 
an opinion in this case. Neither of the two published opinions contains 
the faintest criticism of the conduct of the executive branch or of the 
government lawyers in the original litigation. And that is true even 
though it seems totally implausible that judges who reviewed the case 
did not conclude that Air Force officials and Department of Justice 
lawyers had manipulated, mislead and deceived the courts in the initial 
case. Indeed, the reasoning of both published opinions makes it seem as 
if reasonable judges were willing to go to unreasonable lengths to 
construct—indeed, invent—an explanation as to why Air Force officials 
sixty years earlier had acted in good faith and with sufficient cause.549 
 
wishing to reopen a case on grounds of fraud as follows: “The presumption against the 
reopening of a case that has gone through the appellate process all the way to the United States 
Supreme Court and reached final judgment must be not just a high hurdle to climb but a steep 
cliff-face to scale.” 424 F.3d at 386. 
 548 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974). 
 549 For example, consider the opinion of the Third Circuit written by Judge Aldisert. That 
opinion claims that the privilege was properly sustained if Finletter’s affidavit can be 
“reasonably read to include . . . the workings of the B-29.” Herring, 424 F.3d at 391. Judge 
Aldisert asserts that if the privilege asserted by Finletter can be understood to include the 
“workings of the B-29” as opposed to the secret electronic equipment, “the Appellants’ 
assertion that the Air Force claim of military secrets privilege misrepresented the nature of the 
information contained in the accident report over which the privilege was asserted falls apart.” 
Id. At that point, Aldisert claims that Finletter and Harmon objected to disclosure of the plane’s 
mission, as well as “information concerning its operation or performance,” and that such an 
objection was properly protected by the privilege at the time. Id. at 392 (quoting Claim of 
Privilege). Judge Aldisert’s claims about what information was properly privileged in 1950, 
when Finletter and Harmon signed their affidavits, have no support in the historical record. As 
already noted, the news reports of the crash of Bomber #866 revealed that the plane was on a 
special mission to test secret electronic equipment. See sources cited supra note 40. 
Furthermore, the New York Times had already published many reports on the operation and 
performance of the B-29. See Leviero, supra note 91, at 2. Also, the Soviet Union had three 
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American-made B-29 planes in its possession which it used to manufacture its own version of a 
B-29. But Judge Aldisert argued the following in footnote three of the opinion: “Even if we 
concluded that the Air Force’s claim of privilege could not be read to include concern about 
revealing the workings of the B-29, we would be obligated to consider whether certain 
information contained in the accident report actually revealed sensitive information about the 
mission and the electronic equipment involved.” 424 F.3d at 391 n.3. At that point, Aldisert 
made reference to three concerns: “that the project was being carried out by ‘the 3150th 
Electronics Squadron,’ that the mission required an ‘aircraft capable of dropping bombs’ and 
that the mission required an airplane capable of ‘operating at altitudes of 20,000 feet and 
above.’” Id. (quoting Report of Special investigation). Although there may not have been public 
reports identifying the 3150th Electronics Squadron as the unit involved in the tests, the other 
factors were established as part of the public record. See supra notes 112–113 and 
accompanying text. 
United States District Judge Davis’s opinion relied upon reasoning and factual allegations 
similarly unsupported by the historical record. The relevant portion of Judge Davis’s discussion 
of the matter follows:  
In 1948, amid Communist paranoia, it is hardly shocking to contemplate an Air 
Force eager to protect from public view the accident investigation report that 
mentions modifications needed for the B-29, and by extension the Tu-4. [The Tu-4 
was a Soviet version of the B-29 that was made possible when three B-29s were forced 
to land in Vladivostok, Russia in 1944. The Soviets released the crew but kept the 
planes and used reverse engineering to build a copy of the B-29—the Tu-4. Herring 
v. United States, 2004 WL 2040272, at *8.] By no means, will this Court draw firm 
conclusions as to military intelligence concerns in existence some fifty years ago. 
Rather, we will examine the events contemporaneous to the accident only in order to 
shed light on factors surrounding the Air Force’s assertion of military privilege. It is 
at least conceivable that were the accident investigation report released, it might have 
alerted the otherwise unaware Soviets to a technical problem in the Tu-4 that the 
May 1, 1947 technical order sought to remedy in the B-29. Though the Plaintiffs 
argue that the Air Force deliberately hid its obvious negligence behind fraudulent 
affidavits, disclosure of this now seemingly innocuous report would reveal far more 
than the negligence Plaintiffs read; it may have been of great moment to 
sophisticated intelligence analysts and Soviet engineers alike. Viewed against this 
political and technical backdrop, it seems that the accident investigation report may 
have reasonably contained sufficient intelligence, if not about the secret equipment 
or mission, then about ongoing developments in Air Force technical engineering, to 
warrant an assertion of the military secrets privilege. 
Herring, 2004 WL 2040272, at *9 (footnotes omitted). 
Judge Davis’s reasoning is unsupported by history. The Soviets did not need the Persons 
investigation report to alert them to the B-29 engine fire problem. The Soviets were alerted to 
the B-29 engine fires because the B-29s that made emergency landings in Russia were “on fire,” 
How Soviets Copied America’s Best Bomber During WWII, CNN.COM, Jan. 25, 2001 (on file with 
author), and because news reports made it clear that the B-29s frequently experienced 
devastating engine fires, see supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text. Moreover, the Soviets 
did not need the disclosure of the Persons Report to inform them that the Air Force was trying 
to remedy the B-29 engine problem because the New York Times reported that fact a full six 
weeks before the Persons Report was even completed, and a full ten months before Secretary 
Finletter and Judge Advocate General Harmon submitted statements to District Judge 
Kirkpatrick claiming that the report was privileged. The newspaper reported that fact when 
General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, ordered grounded all B-29s “that have 
not been modernized mechanically,” to limit, what General Curtis LeMay, head of the Strategic 
Air Command, stated was “too many engine fires.” U.S. Grounds B-29’s, supra note 78, at 1. 
Judge Davis’s claim that the Persons Report contained information about the design of the so-
called heat shields intended to minimize or eliminate engine fires was false. The report 
contained no such information. 
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By so doing, these thirteen members of the federal judiciary seem 
to fulfill Associate Justice Robert Jackson’s pessimism that in times of 
national crisis the nation’s judges cannot be relied upon to uphold 
restraints upon the exercise of raw power. In an opinion rendered in the 
year of the Reynolds plane crash, Jackson upheld rent control legislation 
under the banner of the “undefined and undefinable ‘war power’”550:  
No one will question that this power is the most dangerous one to 
free government in the whole catalogue of powers. It usually is 
invoked in haste and excitement when calm legislative consideration 
of constitutional limitation is difficult. It is executed in a time of 
patriotic fervor that makes moderation unpopular. And, worst of all, 
it is interpreted by judges under the influence of the same passions 
and pressures.551 
In reaching their results, these judges surely acted in good faith, but 
their conceptions of their responsibilities as Article III judges seem 
disturbingly deferential. Rather than understanding federal judges to be 
“public officers whose responsibility under the Constitution is just as 
great as that of the heads of the executive departments,” as Judge Maris 
did,552 these judges seem to understand their role in cases implicating 
national security as little more than being an extension of the executive 
branch.553 Or, as Alexander Bickel once commented on the outlook of 
the Vinson court: “Far from entering new claims to judicial supremacy, 
it seemed at times to forget even its independence.”554 
By any fair measure, the judges in the Herring case owed more by 
way of basic fairness to the descendants whose family members had died 
in the service of the nation than they delivered,555 and they owed more 
 
 550 Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 146 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 551 Id. 
 552 United States v. Reynolds, 192 F.2d 987, 997 (3d Cir. 1951), rev’d, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
 553 In considering the relationship between the judiciary and the executive, it is worth noting 
former Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens’ observation: 
Burger’s opinion for the Court in United States v. Nixon (1974) required 
President Nixon to produce the tape recordings that eventually led to his resignation. 
The decision not only had a historic effect on American politics and society but also 
powerfully illustrated the integrity and independence of the Court. It may well have 
done more to inspire the confidence in the work of judges that is the true backbone 
of the rule of law than any other decision in the history of the Court. 
JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE CHIEFS: A SUPREME COURT MEMOIR 114 (2011). It was in the Nixon 
case that Chief Justice Burger also stated that the Court should show the “utmost deference” in 
national security matters, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974), but whether Justice 
Stevens agreed with that formulation is certainly open to question given some opinions written 
after 9/11. What was important to Justice Stevens in the Nixon case was the Court’s insistence 
upon its own “integrity” and its own “independence” from the executive branch as a source of 
the Court’s own legitimacy and public standing. See STEVENS, supra, at 114. 
 554 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 5 (1970). 
 555 Judicial opinions sustaining the state secrets privilege during the last three decades 
contain very little if any sympathy, compassion, or solicitude for the plaintiffs who claim a legal 
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to the nation by way of a forthright statement of reasons in support of 
the judgment than they offered in their opinions. Indeed, their judicial 
 
wrong and who are denied a legal remedy because of the privilege. Because the plaintiffs in 
these cases may not be United States citizens and because the executive branch may challenge 
the veracity of the allegations of these individuals, it may seem that judges are willing to accept 
the harsh outcomes resulting from sustaining the state secrets privilege because the plaintiffs 
disadvantaged by the privilege are not necessarily loyal United States citizens (though they may 
be). The outcome in the Reynolds case belies such a supposition. In Reynolds, loyal United 
States citizens serving the national defense interests and their family members are as 
disadvantaged by the privilege as any. In contrast, judges seem more open to empathy and 
sympathy for any defendant who may be disadvantaged by the state secrets privilege. Thus, 
consider Justice Scalia’s over-flowing regard for a defendant who might be harmed by a 
privilege: 
It seems to us, however, that the effect of our determination with regard to the state 
secrets privilege is to prevent this issue from proceeding. As noted earlier, we 
honored the invocation of that privilege because we satisfied ourselves that the in 
camera affidavit set forth the genuine reason for denial of employment, and that that 
reason could not be disclosed without risking impairment of the national security. As 
a result of that necessary process, the court knows that the reason Daniel Molerio was 
not hired had nothing to do with Dagoberto Molerio’s assertion of First Amendment 
rights. Although there may be enough circumstantial evidence to permit a jury to 
come to that erroneous conclusion, it would be a mockery of justice for the court—
knowing the erroneousness—to participate in that exercise. This is not a case like 
Ellsberg v. Mitchell, in which the court’s consideration of the state secrets privilege 
did not ipso facto disclose to the court the validity of the defense—so that the latter 
could (at least in the special circumstances of that case) be left to be resolved by 
subsequent in camera proceedings. Here, by contrast, we know that further activity 
in this case would involve an attempt, however well intentioned, to convince the jury 
of a falsehood. 
Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d 815, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Note that then-Circuit Judge Scalia 
emphasized that justice would be mocked if a court entered a judgment against a defendant 
who had not violated the law, but he makes no mention of the converse, namely the injustice 
inherent in the dismissal of an action in which the defendant violated the plaintiff’s rights but 
in which the invocation of the privilege barred the plaintiff from having sufficient evidence to 
prove the relevant factual points. Id. A Fourth Circuit panel in Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. 
Grimes, acknowledged this point: 
Defendant further urges that, when the government asserts a privilege which 
deprives a defendant of the evidence needed to establish a valid defense, the court 
should shield the defendant from the effect of the deprivation by dismissing the 
action. (Understandably, but inconsistently, defendant does not suggest analogous 
protection for plaintiffs whom an assertion of privilege may deprive of valid causes of 
action.) 
635 F.2d 268, 271 (4th Cir. 1980). Judge Learned Hand also endorsed a neutral hand in the 
application of evidentiary privileges: 
There certainly is no such excuse. We agree that there may be evidence—“state 
secrets”—to divulge which will imperil “national security”; and which the 
Government cannot, and should not, be required to divulge. Salus rei publicae 
suprema lex. The immunity from disclosure of the names or statements of informers 
is an instance of the same doctrine. This privilege will often impose a grievous 
hardship, for it may deprive parties to civil actions, or even to criminal prosecutions 
of power to assert their rights or to defend themselves. That is a consequence of any 
evidentiary privilege. 
United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 638 (2d Cir. 1950) (footnotes omitted). 
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conduct was of such character that one is inclined to ask, as another 
judge asked in a different case with regard to different judges: “[I]n 
calmer times, wise people will ask themselves: how could such able and 
worthy judges have done that?”556 
We aspire to be a nation of laws and not a nation subject to 
executive privilege. And for most citizens, day-in and day-out, we are 
that. But we fall too short too often of these important aspirations, 
especially when the executive branch claims that the nation’s security is 
implicated. Although it is true that we will have no order without 
security, and no liberty without order, it is also true that our security, 
our order, and our liberty will be less than what they might be if courts 
fail in their primary duty to uphold the rule of law even when the 
executive claims that the rule of law is incompatible with national 
security. 
The Supreme Court failed to fulfill its primary responsibility in the 
1953 Reynolds litigation and the judges who participated in the recent 
re-litigation of the Reynolds case did the same. In so doing, they put at 
risk much more than injustice to identified individuals; they put at risk a 
complicated governing scheme that prizes both security and liberty and 
that is dependent upon an independent judiciary to fulfill its mandate to 
check and balance robust executive authority. 
The hallmark of a “civilized polity,” one federal judge recently 
stated, is the granting of “redress,” and “[i]n the United States, for better 
or worse, courts are, almost universally, involved.”557 Perhaps in time, 
federal judges will be less timid and less compromising in adhering to 
and upholding this basic and valued political principle even in cases 
implicating national security. 
 
 556 Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 630 (2d Cir. 2009) (Calabresi, J., dissenting). 
 557 Id. at 638. 
